Law Commons^™

Comparative Judicialism, Popular Sovereignty, And The Rule Of Law: The Us And Uk Supreme Courts, Lissa Griffin, Thomas Kidney

Washington and Lee Law Review Online

What does the future hold for the US and UK Supreme Courts? Both courts face an uncertain future in which their roles in their constitutional systems will come under intense scrutiny and pressure. The tension between the rule of law, often seen as the preserve of the judicial branches of government, and the sovereignty of the elected branches is palpable. In a time of the “strong man,” allegedly “populist leaders” who seemingly are pushing the limits of the rule of law, the breakdown of collaboration and debate, and the ever-present influence of social media, this tension will only become more …

The Ethical Tax Judge, Kim Brooks

Articles, Book Chapters, & Popular Press

This chapter advances the claim that judges have an ethical obligation of competence that requires them to enhance their knowledge about language (in the context of statutory interpretation) and income tax law design and policy. It articulates some of the foundational understandings that support that competence and provides a simple hierarchy of approaches to interpreting income tax law. It concludes by contending that greater competence is not only more ethical but also advances other important societal goals fulfilled by the imposition of income tax systems.

Half A Century Of Supreme Court Clean Air Act Interpretation: Purposivism, Textualism, Dynamism, And Activism, David M. Driesen, Thomas M. Keck, Brandon T. Metroka

Washington and Lee Law Review

This Article addresses the history of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act, which now goes back almost half a century. Many scholars have argued that the Court has shifted from an approach to statutory interpretation that relied heavily on purposivism—the custom of giving statutory goals weight in interpreting statutes—toward one that relies more heavily on textualism during this period. At the same time, proponents of dynamic statutory interpretation have argued that courts, in many cases, do not so much excavate a statute’s meaning as adapt a statute to contemporary circumstances.

Feminist Statutory Interpretation, Kim Brooks

Articles, Book Chapters, & Popular Press

Leading Canadian scholar Ruth Sullivan describes the act of statutory interpretation as a mix of art and archeology. The collection, Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions, affirms her assessment. If the act of statutory interpretation requires us to deploy our interdisciplinary talents, at least somewhat unmoored from the constraints of formal expressions of legal doctrine, why haven’t feminists been more inclined to write about statutory interpretation? Put another way, some scholars acknowledge that judges “are subtly influenced by preconceptions, endemic privilegings and power hierarchies, and prevailing social norms and ‘conventional’ wisdom.” Those influences become the background for how judges read legislation. …

Supreme Silence And Precedential Pragmatism: King V. Burwell And Statutory Interpretation In The Federal Courts Of Appeals, Michael J. Cedrone

Marquette Law Review

This Article studies statutory interpretation as it is practiced in the federal

courts of appeal. Much of the academic commentary in this field focuses on the

Supreme Court, which skews the debate and unduly polarizes the field. This

Article investigates more broadly by looking at the seventy-two federal

appellate cases that cite King v. Burwell in the two years after the Court issued

its decision. In deciding that the words “established by the State” encompass

a federal program, the Court in King reached a pragmatic and practical result

based on statutory scheme and purpose at a fairly high level of …

Intangible Fish And The Gulf Of Understanding: Yates V. United States And The Court's Approach To Statutory Interpretation, John M. Garvin

Indiana Law Journal

Is a fish a tangible object? The answer in most cases is obviously “yes.” But in Yates v. United States, the Supreme Court held that fish are outside the meaning of the phrase “tangible object” as it is used in the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002. This Note argues that the Yates decision provides a lens with which to examine the Court’s contemporary methods of statutory interpretation. In adopting the textualist vocabulary most famously associated with the late Justice Scalia, the Justices have committed to speaking the same language. Still, fundamental differences between the Justices remain. These differences expose the …

Lessons Unlearned: The Effects Of Statutory Ambiguity And The Interpretative Uncertainty It Injects In The Courts, Carolyn Singh

University of the District of Columbia Law Review

For centuries, courts have dealt with the challenge of imposing penalties for crimes when governing law changes. Applying the new provisions can be a straightforward exercise for courts, but when legislatures are ambiguous with regard to which law applies-forexample, to pending cases-the courts are forced to interpret what legislatures intended. For some judges, the answer is easily found in the plain meaning of the text. For others, legislative intent can become the deciding factor. Throughout United States history, this has been a manageable yet controversial task, but aside from interpretive differences among judges, creating laws with uncertainty is a dangerous …

Book Review: "Taking Law Seriously" A Review Of Reading Law: The Interpretation Of Legal Texts, By Antonin Scalia And Bryan A. Garner, David F. Forte

Law Faculty Articles and Essays

No abstract provided.

Statutory Interpretation Doctrine On The Modern Supreme Court And Four Doctrinal Approaches To Judicial Decision-Making , R. Randall Kelso

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Waiving Rights Goodbye: Class Action Waivers In Arbitration Agreements After Stolt-Nielsen V. Animalfeeds International , Diana M. Link, Richard A. Bales

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal

This article first argues that to determine the enforceability of a class action waiver, courts should take a "totality of the circumstances" approach rather than adopting a bright-line rule. A set of defined factors that also allows courts to consider real-world issues facing litigants will provide a substantial framework for courts to interpret this area of the law and will lead to more consistent and well-reasoned outcomes in the future. These factors include: the probable size of each class member's individual recovery, the potential for retaliation against class members, the awareness of potential class members that their rights have been …

Much Ado About Pluralities: Pride And Precedent Amidst The Cacophy Of Concurrences, And Re-Percolation After Rapanos, Donald J. Kochan, Melissa M. Berry, Matthew J. Parlow

Donald J. Kochan

Conflicts created by concurrences and pluralities in court decisions create confusion in law and lower court interpretation. Rule of law values require that individuals be able to identify controlling legal principles. That task is complicated when pluralities and concurrences contribute to the vagueness or uncertainty that leaves us wondering what the controlling rule is or attempting to predict what it will evolve to become. The rule of law is at least handicapped when continuity or confidence or confusion infuse our understanding of the applicable rules. This Article uses the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Rapanos v. United States to …

A Constitutional Defense Of Legislative History, Paul E. Mcgreal

ExpressO

This essay sets forth an original, constitutional defense of legislative history in statutory interpretation that challenges conventional textualist wisdom. Textualists believe that the Constitution requires judges to focus on statutory text to the exclusion of legislative history. This is because only text, and not the committee reports and debates that constitute legislative history, passes through the Constitution’s law making steps of bicameralism (passage by both chambers of Congress) and presentment (delivery of the bill for the President’s signature or veto). Thus, textualists argue, only the statute’s text is enacted law, and judges ought to consider that law and nothing else. …

Statutory Interpretation And Mr. Justice Rutledge, Nathaniel L. Nathanson

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

What Is Law? A Search For Legal Meaning And Good Judging Under A Textualist Lens, Roger Colinvaux

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Justice Rehnquist, Statutory Interpretation, The Policies Of Clear Statement, And Federal Jurisdiction, William V. Luneburg

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.