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Full-Text Articles in Law
Judicial Ethics: A New Paradigm For A New Era, Charles G. Geyh
Judicial Ethics: A New Paradigm For A New Era, Charles G. Geyh
St. Mary's Journal on Legal Malpractice & Ethics
As the preamble to the Model Code of Judicial Conduct indicates, traditional notions of judicial ethics operate within a rule of law paradigm, which posits that the “three I’s” of judicial ethics—independence, impartiality, and integrity—enable judges to uphold the law. In recent decades, however, social science, public opinion, and political commentary suggest that appointed judges abuse their independence by disregarding the law and issuing rulings in accord with their biases and other extralegal impulses, while elected judges disregard the law and issue rulings popular with voters, all of which calls the future of the three I’s and judicial ethics itself …
Playing Favorites? Implicit Bias On The Bench, Michele Benedetto Neitz
Playing Favorites? Implicit Bias On The Bench, Michele Benedetto Neitz
Publications
The concept of implicit bias has moved to the forefront of public discussion in the last decade, and many judges have already been trained on this issue. But it is worth considering how a specific type of implicit bias, in-group favoritism, may affect a judge’s everyday decisions.
Restoring The Civil Jury In A World Without Trials, Dmitry Bam
Restoring The Civil Jury In A World Without Trials, Dmitry Bam
Faculty Publications
Early in this nation’s history, the civil jury was the most important institutional check on biased and corrupt judges. Recently, concerns about judicial bias, especially in elected state judiciaries, have intensified as new studies demonstrate the extent of that bias. But the jury of Hamilton, Madison, and Jefferson is nowhere to be found. In fact, the civil jury is virtually dead. It is used in less than 1% of all civil cases, and even when it makes a rare appearance, the jury’s powers have been significantly curtailed.
This article argues that we must reimagine the civil jury to match the …
Remarks: Caperton's Next Generation -- Beyond The Bank, Dmitry Bam
Remarks: Caperton's Next Generation -- Beyond The Bank, Dmitry Bam
Faculty Publications
On November 14, 2014, a symposium entitled, "Courts, Campaigns, and Corruption: Judicial Recusal Five Years After Caperton," was held at New York University. The symposium was sponsored by the Brennan Center for Justice, the American Bar Association's Center for Professional Responsibility, and NYU's Journal of Legislation and Public Policy. This document contains the transcript starting from Dmitry Bam's remarks from one of the four panels, and is entitled "Caperton's Next Generation: Beyond the Bank." The panel members included Professors Jed Shugerman, Debra Lyn Bassett, Gregory S. Parks, Dmitry Bam, and Rex Perschbacher.
Our Unconstitutional Recusal Procedure, Dmitry Bam
Our Unconstitutional Recusal Procedure, Dmitry Bam
Faculty Publications
In this article, I argue that the recusal procedure used in state and federal courts for nearly all of American history is unconstitutional. For centuries, recusal procedure in the United States has largely resembled that of England before American independence. To this day, in most American courtrooms, the judge hearing the case decides whether recusal is required under the applicable substantive recusal rules. If the judge determines that she can act impartially, or that her impartiality could not reasonably be questioned, the judge remains on the case. And although the judge’s decision is typically subject to appellate review — with …
Recusal Failure, Dmitry Bam
Recusal Failure, Dmitry Bam
Faculty Publications
The American judiciary is suffering from a terrible affliction: biased judges. I am not talking about the subconscious or unconscious biases — stemming from different backgrounds, experiences, ideologies, etc. — that everyone, including judges, harbors. Rather, I am describing invidious, improper biases that lead judges to favor one litigant over another for reasons that almost everyone would agree should play no role in judicial decision-making: the desire to repay a debt of gratitude to those who helped the judge get elected and be reelected.
In this article, I argue that that recusal has failed to prevent biased judges from rendering …
Beyond Finality: How Making Criminal Judgments Less Final Can Further The Interests Of Finality, Andrew Chongseh Kim
Beyond Finality: How Making Criminal Judgments Less Final Can Further The Interests Of Finality, Andrew Chongseh Kim
Andrew Chongseh Kim
Courts and scholars commonly assume that granting convicted defendants more liberal rights to challenge their judgments would harm society’s interests in “finality.” According to conventional wisdom, finality in criminal judgments is necessary to conserve resources, encourage efficient behavior by defense counsel, and deter crime. Thus, under the common analysis, the extent to which convicted defendants should be allowed to challenge their judgments depends on how much society is willing to sacrifice to validate defendants’ rights. This Article argues that expanding defendants’ rights on post-conviction review does not always harm these interests. Rather, more liberal review can often conserve state resources, …
The Dimensions Of Judicial Impartiality, Charles G. Geyh
The Dimensions Of Judicial Impartiality, Charles G. Geyh
Articles by Maurer Faculty
Scholars have traditionally analyzed judicial impartiality piecemeal, in disconnected debates on discrete topics. As a consequence, current understandings of judicial impartiality are balkanized and muddled. This Article seeks to reconceptualize judicial impartiality comprehensively, across contexts. In an era when "we are all legal realists now," perfect impartiality-the complete absence of bias or prejudice-is at most an ideal; "impartial enough" has, of necessity, become the realistic goal. Understanding when imperfectly impartial is nonetheless impartial enough is aided by conceptualizing judicial impartiality in three distinct dimensions: a procedural dimension, in which impartiality affords parties a fair hearing; a political dimension, in which …
Understanding The Person Beneath The Robe: Practical Methods For Neutralizing Harmful Judicial Biases, Evan R. Seamone
Understanding The Person Beneath The Robe: Practical Methods For Neutralizing Harmful Judicial Biases, Evan R. Seamone
Journal Articles
This article presents hands-on self-awareness techniques for use by judges, arbitrators, members of commissions, and other legal decision-makers who are confronted with complex cases. All too often, these judges are expected to make the “right” decisions without knowing how to accomplish this task. While judges, no doubt, are capable of applying the law to a case, this is only one aspect of righteous behavior. This article is concerned with the related expectation that judges are capable of rendering fair and impartial decisions. No matter how much training they receive, judges can only avoid biases that are known to them.
Judicial Mindfulness, Evan R. Seamone
Judicial Mindfulness, Evan R. Seamone
Journal Articles
Like all human beings, judges are influenced by personal routines and behaviors that have become second nature to them or have somehow dropped below the radar of their conscious control. Professor Ellen Langer and others have labeled this general state "mindlessness." They have distinguished "mindful" thinking as a process that all people can employ to gain awareness of subconscious influences, and thus increase the validity of their decisions. In this Article, I establish a theory of "judicial mindfulness" that would guard against two types of "cold" bias when interpreting legal materials. The first harmful bias involves traumatic past events that …
Dissecting Axes Of Subordination: The Need For A Structural Analysis, Darren Lenard Hutchinson
Dissecting Axes Of Subordination: The Need For A Structural Analysis, Darren Lenard Hutchinson
UF Law Faculty Publications
Proceedings of a criminal trial in Dallas, Texas, demonstrate the vulnerability of LGBT individuals to judicial bias. Although the jury convicted the defendant of murdering two gay males, the judge explained his light sentence: "I put prostitutes and gays at about the same level, and I'd be hard put to give somebody life for killing a prostitute . . . had [the victims] not been out there trying to spread AIDS, they'd still be alive today . . . These two guys that got killed wouldn't have been killed if they hadn't been cruising the streets picking up teen-age boys …
Eliminating Consideration Of Parental Wealth In Post-Divorce Child Custody Disputes, Carolyn J. Frantz
Eliminating Consideration Of Parental Wealth In Post-Divorce Child Custody Disputes, Carolyn J. Frantz
Michigan Law Review
There may be no story as old as that of the child of privilege, spoiled in the things of the world, who finally achieves happiness through coming to appreciate the simple charms of working-class life. But equal in strength are the real life stories of American parents: their drive for the accumulation of personal wealth, so frequently justified as "for the children." The place of wealth in the good life of a child is deeply controversial, and it should surprise no one to see it played out in child custody law. Under the statutes of almost all states, custody disputes …
The Meaning Of Equality And The Interpretive Turn, Robin West
The Meaning Of Equality And The Interpretive Turn, Robin West
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The turn to hermeneutics and interpretation in contemporary legal theory has contributed at least two central ideas to modern jurisprudential thought: first, that the "meaning" of a text is invariably indeterminate -- what might be called the indeterminacy claim -- and second, that the unavoidably malleable essence of texts -- their essential inessentiality -- entails that interpreting a text is a necessary part of the process of creating the text's meaning. These insights have generated both considerable angst, and considerable excitement among traditional constitutional scholars, primarily because at least on first blush these two claims seem to inescapably imply a …