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Stacking In Criminal Procedure Adjudication;Symposium On Criminal Procedure: Judicial Proceedings, Luke M. Milligan May 2019

Stacking In Criminal Procedure Adjudication;Symposium On Criminal Procedure: Judicial Proceedings, Luke M. Milligan

Luke Milligan

The institutionalist branch of "Law and Courts" studies how judges incorporate institutional constraints into their decision-making processes. Congressional constraints on judicial review, as the literature currently stands, fall into one of two general classes: overrides and Court-curbing measures. This taxonomy, however, is incomplete. Neither overrides nor curbing measures are needed to explain the not uncommon situation where a policy-oriented Justice deviates from a preferred vote based on the belief that such a vote will prompt Congress to alter an "insulated base rule" in a way that disrupts the Justice's larger policy agenda. An "insulated base rule" is a Congressional policy …


Judicial Review And Non-Enforcement At The Founding, Matthew Steilen Nov 2017

Judicial Review And Non-Enforcement At The Founding, Matthew Steilen

Matthew Steilen

This Article examines the relationship between judicial review and presidential non-enforcement of statutory law. Defenders of non-enforcement regularly argue that the justification for judicial review that prevailed at the time of the founding also justifies the president in declining to enforce unconstitutional laws. The argument is unsound. This Article shows that there is essentially no historical evidence, from ratification through the first decade under the Constitution, in support of a non-enforcement power. It also shows that the framers repeatedly made statements inconsistent with the supposition that the president could refuse to enforce laws he deemed unconstitutional. In contrast, during this …


The Confident Court, Jennifer Mason Mcaward Oct 2016

The Confident Court, Jennifer Mason Mcaward

Jennifer Mason McAward

Despite longstanding rules regarding judicial deference, the Supreme Court’s decisions in its October 2012 Term show that a majority of the Court is increasingly willing to supplant both the prudential and legal judgments of various institutional actors, including Congress, federal agencies, and state universities. Whatever the motivation for such a shift, this Essay simply suggests that today’s Supreme Court is a confident one. A core group of justices has an increasingly self-assured view of the judiciary’s ability to conduct an independent assessment of both the legal and factual aspects of the cases that come before the Court. This piece discusses …


Majoritarian Difficulty And Theories Of Constitutional Decision Making, Michael C. Dorf Feb 2015

Majoritarian Difficulty And Theories Of Constitutional Decision Making, Michael C. Dorf

Michael C. Dorf

Recent scholarship in political science and law challenges the view that judicial review in the United States poses what Alexander Bickel famously called the "counter-majoritarian difficulty." Although courts do regularly invalidate state and federal action on constitutional grounds, they rarely depart substantially from the median of public opinion. When they do so depart, if public opinion does not eventually come in line with the judicial view, constitutional amendment, changes in judicial personnel, and/or changes in judicial doctrine typically bring judicial understandings closer to public opinion. But if the modesty of courts dissolves Bickel's worry, it raises a distinct one: Are …


Moral Rights, Judicial Review, And Democracy: A Response To Horacio Spector, Laura S. Underkuffler Feb 2015

Moral Rights, Judicial Review, And Democracy: A Response To Horacio Spector, Laura S. Underkuffler

Laura S. Underkuffler

No abstract provided.


Captured Legislatures And Public-Interested Courts, Patrick Luff Feb 2013

Captured Legislatures And Public-Interested Courts, Patrick Luff

Patrick A. Luff

According to public choice, the predominant paradigm of modern regulatory theory, legislative activity provides benefits to small, organized interests at the expense of larger groups. In practice, this means that interest groups are often able to benefit themselves at the expense of the public good. This model has been extended to the courts, which are described as implicit or explicit actors in the wealth-transfer process. Applying public-choice theory to the courts, however, overlooks the structural differences between the federal judiciary and Congress, as well as the insights of judicial decisionmaking theory. Not only do judges receive better and more complete …


De Jueces, Militantes Y Dirigencias Partidistas. Un Panorama Cuantitativo Del Control Jurisdiccional De Los Conflictos Intrapartidistas En México (1996-2006), Javier Martín Reyes Jan 2012

De Jueces, Militantes Y Dirigencias Partidistas. Un Panorama Cuantitativo Del Control Jurisdiccional De Los Conflictos Intrapartidistas En México (1996-2006), Javier Martín Reyes

Javier Martín Reyes

Of Judges, Militants, and Bosses: A Quantitative Overview of the Judicial Review of Intraparty Disputes in Mexico (1996-2006) Aunque diversos trabajos han estudiado el origen y evolución del control jurisdiccional de la vida interna de los partidos políticos por parte del Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación (TEPJF), lo cierto es que los estudios cuantitativos son prácticamente inexistentes. Hace falta, incluso, la información más indispensable para aproximarse empíricamente al fenómeno: el número y tipo de conflictos intrapartidistas que se han presentado a lo largo del tiempo; su distribución geográfica y por partido político; la forma en que se …


The Japanese Constitution As Law And The Legitimacy Of The Supreme Court’S Constitutional Decisions: A Response To Matsui, Craig Martin Jan 2011

The Japanese Constitution As Law And The Legitimacy Of The Supreme Court’S Constitutional Decisions: A Response To Matsui, Craig Martin

Craig Martin

This article, from a conference at Washington University School of Law on the Supreme Court of Japan, responds to an article by Shigenori Matsui, “Why is the Japanese Supreme Court is so conservative?” Professor Matsui’s article makes the argument that a significant factor is the extent to which the judges fail to view the Constitution as positive law requiring judicial enforcement. It is novel in its emphasis on an explanation grounded in law, and the decision-making process, rather than the political, institutional, and cultural explanations that are so often offered. In this article, Borrowing from Kermit Roosevelt’s arguments on judicial …


The Myth Of The Written Constitution, Todd E. Pettys Jan 2009

The Myth Of The Written Constitution, Todd E. Pettys

Todd E. Pettys

Many Americans have long subscribed to what this Article calls the myth of the written constitution—the claim that the nation’s Constitution consists entirely of those texts that the sovereign American people have formally ratified, and the claim that the will of the American people, as expressed in those ratified texts, determines the way in which properly behaving judges resolve constitutional disputes. Drawing on two different meanings of the term myth, this Article contends that neither of those claims is literally true, but that Americans’ attachment to those claims serves at least three crucial functions. Subscribing to the myth helps to …


Deliberative Democracy And Weak Courts: Constitutional Design In Nascent Democracies, Edsel F. Tupaz Jan 2009

Deliberative Democracy And Weak Courts: Constitutional Design In Nascent Democracies, Edsel F. Tupaz

Edsel F Tupaz

This Article addresses the question of constitutional design in young and transitional democracies. It argues for the adoption of a “weak” form of judicial review, as opposed to “strong” review which typifies much of contemporary adjudication. It briefly describes how the dialogical strain of deliberative democratic theory might well constitute the normative predicate for systems of weak review. In doing so, the Article draws from various judicial practices, from European supranational tribunals to Canadian courts and even Indian jurisprudence. The Article concludes with the suggestion that no judicial apparatus other than the weak structure of judicial review can better incite …


The Birth And Development Of Abstract Review: Constitutional Courts And Policy-Making In Western Europe, Alec Stone Sweet Dec 1989

The Birth And Development Of Abstract Review: Constitutional Courts And Policy-Making In Western Europe, Alec Stone Sweet

Alec Stone Sweet

No abstract provided.