Law Commons^™

Boyle As Constitutional Preemption, Bradford R. Clark

Notre Dame Law Review

Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. arguably departed from his usual preferences by recognizing a government contractor defense as a matter of federal common law. This Essay offers an alternative rationale for the decision in Boyle grounded in constitutional preemption, and explains why this approach is more consistent with Justice Scalia’s broader methodological and constitutional commitments.

Reviewability And The "Law Of Rules": An Essay In Honor Of Justice Scalia, Adrian Vermeule

Notre Dame Law Review

Justice Scalia developed a consistent approach to questions of reviewability: roughly, the idea that “general programs” and “general policies” are to be excluded from judicial review, and even general and legally binding agency rules may or may not be reviewable before enforcement. On this approach, the proper business of courts is to review specific applications of agency rules to particular parties.

Keynote Address: Two Challenges For The Judge As Umpire: Statutory Ambiguity And Constitutional Exceptions, Brett M. Kavanaugh

Notre Dame Law Review

Justice Scalia believed in the rule of law as a law of rules. He wanted judges to be umpires, which ordinarily entails judges applying a settled legal principle to a particular set of facts. I agree with that vision of the judiciary. But there are two major impediments in current jurisprudence to achieving that vision of the judge as umpire. The first is the ambiguity trigger in statutory interpretation. The second is the amorphous tests employed in cases involving claimed constitutional exceptions. We should identify and study these issues. Inspired by Justice Scalia’s longstanding efforts to improve the law, we …

Justice Scalia And Class Actions: A Loving Critique, Brian T. Fitzpatrick

Notre Dame Law Review

I am not sure any other Justice of the Supreme Court in American history has done more to hinder the class action lawsuit than Justice Scalia did. Under the auspices of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the Justice authored two majority opinions giving a green light to corporations that want to opt out of class-wide liability entirely so long as they do so using arbitration contracts. It is very hard to square these opinions with either the text or the history of the FAA.

In Part I of this Essay, I review the Justice’s class action opinions; I give special …

Originalism And Stare Decisis, Amy Coney Barrett

Notre Dame Law Review

The question whether stare decisis is compatible with originalism has occupied both originalists and their critics. In this Essay, I explore what light Justice Scalia’s approach to precedent casts on that question. I argue that while he did treat stare decisis as a pragmatic exception to originalism, that exception was not nearly so gaping as his “fainthearted” quip suggests. In fact, a survey of his opinions regarding precedent suggests new lines of inquiry for originalists grappling with the role of stare decisis in constitutional adjudication.

Justice Scalia And Sherman Act Textualism, Alan J. Meese

Notre Dame Law Review

This Essay offers a defense of Justice Scalia’s approach to the Sherman Act.

Beyond The Text: Justice Scalia's Originalism In Practice, Michael D. Ramsey

Notre Dame Law Review

This Essay considers the late Justice Antonin Scalia’s contributions to constitutional originalism as a practical methodology. Justice Scalia was the leading judicial theorist and advocate of originalism of his era, and his legacy has widely been assessed in those terms. He was also, along with Justice Clarence Thomas, the leading judicial practitioner of originalism of his era. This latter role has received less comprehensive attention. Although there are of course countless articles analyzing and critiquing his originalist methodology in particular cases, or seeking to demonstrate that certain of his opinions are inconsistent with his theoretical commitments, relatively few articles have …

The Limits Of Reading Law In The Affordable Care Act Cases, Kevin C. Walsh

Notre Dame Law Review

Justice Scalia’s leadership moved the law of interpretation closer to the central case of statutory interpretation appropriate for our constitutional order. He thereby lawfully improved that law over the course of his judicial tenure even though—over time—this involved transforming rather than simply transmitting the law of interpretation that had been handed down to him.

Did Justice Scalia Have A Theory Of Interpretation?, Gary Lawson

Notre Dame Law Review

It seems beyond bizarre to ask whether Justice Scalia had a theory of textual interpretation. If he did not have such a theory, what were he and his critics talking about for the past three decades? The answer is that they were talking about part of a theory of textual interpretation but not an actual, complete theory. A complete theory of textual interpretation must prescribe principles of admissibility (what counts towards meaning), significance (how much does the admissible evidence count), standards of proof (how much evidence do you need for a justified conclusion), burdens of proof (does inertia lie with …

Justice Scalia's Unfinished Business In Statutory Interpretation: Where Textualism's Formalism Gave Up, Abbe R. Gluck

Notre Dame Law Review

Justice Scalia, in the end, was no interpretive formalist. He would not be pleased to hear this claim, but the fact is that formalism has not succeeded in statutory interpretation, and in fact, the textualism that Justice Scalia deserves so much credit for creating never really embraced formalism at all.

Textualism lacks all the conditions necessary for formalism. It does not have a defined set of predictable rules ordered to ensure objective application. Instead, we have more than one hundred interpretive presumptions—the presumptions favored by textualists—with no defined method of choosing among them. These doctrines of the field are not …

Justice Scalia, Implied Rights Of Action, And Historical Practice, Anthony J. Bellia

Notre Dame Law Review

This Essay examines a specific area that Justice Scalia influenced through the methods of interpretation that he applied—namely, the question of “implied rights of action.”

The idea that federal courts historically applied common law causes of action to remedy federal statutory violations without congressional authorization is a myth. From the first, federal courts heard only those causes of action that Congress had authorized them to hear. And there is reason to think that early federal courts would not have been understood to have power to define their own causes of action had Congress not provided this authorization from the start. …

Justice Scalia, The Nondelegation Doctrine, And Constitutional Argument, William K. Kelley

Notre Dame Law Review

This Essay canvasses Justice Scalia’s approach to the nondelegation doctrine by examining his two most prominent opinions in that field, Mistretta and Whitman. It goes on to critically examine the nature of the arguments he makes in those cases, and what his approach has to tell us about his overall approach to the judicial role.

Aggregation As Disempowerment: Red Flags In Class Action Settlements, Howard M. Erichson

Notre Dame Law Review

Class action critics and proponents cling to the conventional wisdom that class actions empower claimants. Critics complain that class actions over-empower claimants and put defendants at a disadvantage, while proponents defend class actions as essential to consumer protection and rights enforcement. This Article explores how class action settlements sometimes do the opposite. Aggregation empowers claimants’ lawyers by consolidating power in the lawyers’ hands. Consolidation of power allows defendants to strike deals that benefit themselves and claimants’ lawyers while disadvantaging claimants. This Article considers the phenomenon of aggregation as disempowerment by looking at specific settlement features that benefit plaintiffs’ counsel and …

The Exceptional Role Of Courts In The Constitutional Order, N.W. Barber, Adrian Vermeule

Notre Dame Law Review

This Article looks at a rare part of the judicial role: those exceptional cases when the judge is called upon to pass judgment on the constitution itself. This arises in three groups of cases, roughly speaking. First, in exceptional cases the validity of the constitution and the legal order is thrown into dispute. Second, on some occasions the judge is asked to rule on the transition from one constitutional order to another. Third, there are some cases in which the health of the constitutional order requires the judge to act not merely beyond the law, as it were, but actually …