Law Commons^™

The Problem Of Extravagant Inferences, Cass Sunstein

Georgia Law Review

Judges and lawyers sometimes act as if a constitutional or statutory term must, as a matter of semantics, be understood to have a particular meaning, when it could easily be understood to have another meaning, or several other meanings. When judges and lawyers act as if a legal term has a unique semantic meaning, even though it does not, they should be seen to be drawing extravagant inferences. Some constitutional provisions are treated this way; consider the idea that the vesting of executive power in a President of the United States necessarily includes the power to remove, at will, a …

Faulty Forensics: Bolstering Judicial Gatekeeping In Georgia Courts, Miranda S. Bidinger

Georgia Law Review

Forensic evidence is widely used in criminal cases
across the country and is accorded great weight by
juries. But critics have begun to question its reliability.
Its use has contributed to numerous wrongful
convictions, and though some individuals have been
exonerated, many remain incarcerated for crimes they
did not commit.
This Note explores a variety of forensic science
disciplines and their associated problems, the recent
push for forensic reform, and the current standards
governing the admissibility of forensic evidence at the
federal level and in Georgia courts, highlighting the
lenient standard embodied in the Georgia Code and
elaborated upon in …

Constitutional Preservation And The Judicial Review Of Partisan Gerrymanders, Edward B. Foley

Georgia Law Review

This Essay makes three contributions to the debate
over whether the Constitution contains a judicially
enforceable constrain on gerrymanders. First,it directly
tackles the Chief Justice'sfear of thejudiciaryappearing
partisan,observing that the same fear would exist if the
Constitution explicitly banned gerrymanders and
explaining why an implicit ban should be no less
judicially enforceable than an explicit ban under
Marbury v. Madison. Second, invoking the idea of
"institutional forbearance" in the important new book
How Democracies Die, the Essay shows how the
Elections Clause can be construed to protect
congressional districting from abuses of legislative
discretion committed by state legislatures. Together,
these …

Spoliating The Adverse Inference Instruction: The Impact Of The 2015 Amendment To Federal Rule Of Civil Procedure 37(E), Alexandra M. Reynolds

Georgia Law Review

The discovery process relies heavily on the information
that we store on our electronic devices. The ease with
which we tap into the many capabilities of technology,
however, exposes litigants to a significant risk-spoliation
of evidence. Evidence may be spoliated accidentally or
intentionally, but when spoliation does occur, the party
seeking that evidence often seeks a remedy from the court.
The adverse inference instruction has functioned as one of
those remedies. Courts split on what level of culpability is
required to issue an adverse inference instruction. The
Rule 37(e) amendments attempt to address rising costs of
electronic discovery and resolve …

Give Ghosts A Chance: Why Federal Courts Should Cease Sanctioning Every Legal Ghostwriter, Blake G. Tanase

Georgia Law Review

For decades, federal judges have punished attorneys who draft documents for pro se litigants. Meanwhile, many states and the American Bar Association have come to accept this practice as beneficial for low-income litigants and the legal system at large. The Second Circuit recently broke from the federal tradition and found that an attorney's so-called "ghostwriting"of litigation documents for pro se litigants was not sanctionable conduct. That court noted the changes taking place at the state level and rejected other federal courts' justifications for sanctioning legal ghostwriting, but did not elaborate as to why legal ghostwriting should be considered acceptable attorney …

The Epistemological Trend In The Evolution Of The Law Of Expert Testimony: A Scrutiny At Once Broader, Narrower, And Deeper, Edward J. Imwinkelried

Georgia Law Review

The thesis of this Article is that we are moving toward a
fundamentally epistemological approach to determining
the admissibility of expert testimony. The first part of the
Article notes that while many Frye jurisdictions exempted
soft science and nonscientific expertise, the Daubert line of
authority mandates that like an epistemologist, a trial
judge examine knowledge claims by any expert. The
second part addresses the question of the breadth of the
judge's analysis. The second part points out that under

the marketplace and general acceptance tests, courts
sometimes conducted a global analysis and inquired
generally whether the discipline itself was recognized …

A Tale Of Two Dauberts, Julie A. Seaman

Georgia Law Review

Under the Federal Rules of Evidence and Supreme
Court precedent, a single standard ostensibly governs the
admissibility of scientific and other expert evidence in
criminal and civil cases. Although Georgia has recently
become the forty-fourth state to adopt the Federal Rules of
Evidence, it has declined to adopt Daubert for criminal
cases and has retained the prior, more lenient, standard.
While many commentators view this approach as perverse,
this Article considers the possible virtues not only of
explicitly applying a separate rule to scientific evidence in
criminal cases but also of applying a less stringent rule to
such evidence. Based …

Limiting Article Iii Standing To "Accidental" Plaintiffs: Lessons From Environmental And Animal Law Cases, Robert J. Pushaw Jr.

Georgia Law Review

According to the Supreme Court, Article III's extension
of "judicialPower" to "Cases" and "Controversies"limits
standing to plaintiffs who can demonstrate an
individualized "injury in fact" that was caused by the
defendant and that is judicially redressable. Article III's
text and history, however, do not mention "injury,"
"causation,"or "redressability."
Furthermore, these standards are malleable and have
been applied to achieve ideological goals, especially in
cases involving environmental and animal-welfare laws.
Most notably, the Court has recognized an "injury in fact"
to one's aesthetic enjoyment of nature, but determining
such an injury is arbitrarybecause "aesthetics"is a matter
of personal taste. Judges have …