Law Commons^™

Federal And State Judicial Selection In An Interest Group Perspective, Rafael Gely, Michael E. Solimine

Faculty Publications

The literature on judicial selection systems has given considerable attention to the role that politicians and their parties - through their legislative roles - have played in the adoption and operation of these judicial selection systems. Less attention, however, has been given to both the effect that interest groups, broadly defined, have in the creation and implementation of judicial selection systems and the effect that these systems have on the strategies adopted by interest groups to accomplish their goals. This Article seeks to fill this gap. Using the framework advanced by William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner in their …

Forward: Sandra Day O'Connor, Earl F. Nelson, And State Judicial Selection And Retention Systems, R. Lawrence Dessem

Faculty Publications

In difficult cases, in unpopular cases, in cases that may draw criticism from the executive branch of government, the legislature, the media, or the general populace, it is essential that judges be insulated from public pressure. However much we believe in the strength and integrity of the human spirit, we cannot expect judges to do justice without establishing an institutional framework that guarantees them that their next decision, however loathsome or unpopular, will not be their last.

Legal Holes, Noa Ben-Asher

Faculty Publications

(Excerpt)

In the years that followed the events of September 11, 2001, a debate crystallized between those who think that “legal grey and black holes”—which I call simply “legal holes”—are necessary and integral to U.S. law and those who think that they are dangerous and should be abolished. Legal black holes “arise when statutes or legal rules ‘either explicitly exempt[] the executive from the requirements of the rule of law or explicitly exclude[] judicial review of executive action.’” Grey holes, in contrast, “arise when ‘there are some legal constraints on executive action . . . but the[y] are so insubstantial …

A New Look At Judicial Impact: Attorney's Fees In Securities Class Actions After Goldberger V. Integrated Resources, Inc., Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey Miller, Michael A. Perino

Faculty Publications

Political scientists have long been interested in what impact judicial decisions have on their intended audiences. Compliance has been defined as the lower court's proper application of standards the superior court has enunciated in deciding all cases raising similar or related questions. Most studies find widespread compliance in lower courts, with only rare instances of overt defiance.

This Article attempts to address three questions in the extant judicial impact literature. First, existing studies use rather insensitive measures of compliance and thus may fail to identify instances of subtle resistance to higher court rulings. Second, judicial impact literature has a restrained …

Representation Reinforcement: A Legislative Solution To A Legislative Process Problem, Anita S. Krishnakumar

Faculty Publications

One of the most valuable—and disturbing—insights offered by public choice theory has been the recognition that wealthy, well-organized interests with narrow, intense preferences often dominate the legislative process while diffuse, unorganized interests go under-represented. Responding to this insight, legal scholars in the fields of statutory interpretation and administrative law have suggested that the solution to the problem of representational inequality lies with the courts. Indeed, over the past two decades, scholars in these fields have offered up a host of John Hart Ely-inspired representation reinforcing "canons of construction," designed to encourage judges to use their role as statutory interpreters to …