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Full-Text Articles in Law
Learned Hand On Statutory Interpretation: Theory And Practice, Thomas W. Merrill
Learned Hand On Statutory Interpretation: Theory And Practice, Thomas W. Merrill
Faculty Scholarship
It is a great honor to take part in the celebration of the Second Circuit’s 125th anniversary and in particular to present the Hands Lecture. The Second Circuit in the 1930s and 1940s came to be called the “Hand Court,” and during those years it established its reputation as the most admired of the U.S. circuit courts of appeals. It was called the Hand Court because two of its judges, who often formed the majority on three-judge panels, bore the surname Hand. They were cousins. Augustus Hand was a few years older than Learned Hand but was appointed to the …
The Pre-Session Recess, Peter L. Strauss
The Pre-Session Recess, Peter L. Strauss
Faculty Scholarship
In the brief remarks following, I do not address the Burkean argument that practice has established the permissibility of recess appointments during the week-or-more adjournments of Congress that modern transportation modalities permit. We can perhaps let President Eisenhower’s recess appointments of Chief Justice Warren, Justice Brennan, and Justice Stewart stand witness to that understanding. Rather, I want to suggest flaws in the originalist analysis used by the Canning court and in the Senate’s ruse of meeting every three days over the winter period of 2011-12 that many take to place the January 4, 2012 recess appointments President Obama made to …
The Judicial Prerogative, Thomas W. Merrill
The Judicial Prerogative, Thomas W. Merrill
Faculty Scholarship
In John Locke's account of separation of powers, the executive is not limited to enforcing the rules laid down by the legislature. The chief magistrate also exercises the prerogative, a power "to act according to discretion for the public good, without the prescription of the law and sometimes even against it. "Locke explained that such a discretionary power is required because "it is impossible to foresee and so by laws to provide for all accidents and necessities that may concern the public, or make such laws as will do no harm, if they are executed with an inflexible rigor on …
Massachusetts And The Judges: Judicial Independence In Perspective, Barbara Aronstein Black
Massachusetts And The Judges: Judicial Independence In Perspective, Barbara Aronstein Black
Faculty Scholarship
This is an essay about an incident that took place in the Province of Massachusetts Bay during the period 1772-1774, an incident that I will call the Affair of the Royal Salary. Close relative of the Stamp Act Crisis, The Boston Tea Party, even the Boston Massacre, the Affair of the Royal Salary similarly involved a clash between the forces of popular government and those of imperial government; like its better known cousins it is part of the story of the coming of the American Revolution in Massachusetts. In addition, since the Salary around which the Affair developed was intended …
Democracy And Distrust: A Theory Of Judicial Review, Gerard E. Lynch
Democracy And Distrust: A Theory Of Judicial Review, Gerard E. Lynch
Faculty Scholarship
John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust is an ambitious attempt to create a new theory of judicial review, breaking away from both "interpretivism" and "noninterpretivism" – a division Professor Ely regards as a "false dichotomy" (p. vii). The book is brilliant and provocative, so much so that one fears less that its faults will be obscured – there is little danger that polemic critics will fail to pounce on them – than that the flash of Professor Ely's reasoning and the controversy it generates will distract us from the genuine importance of the insight that powers his analysis.
Constitutional Adjudication: The Who And When, Henry Paul Monaghan
Constitutional Adjudication: The Who And When, Henry Paul Monaghan
Faculty Scholarship
When the newly appointed Justices of the Supreme Court assembled in the Royal Exchange Building in New York for their first session on February 2, 1790, the most farsighted individual could not have foreseen what the future held for this tribunal. Now less than a generation short of its 200th anniversary, the Court is universally acknowledged to be the final and authoritative expositor of the Constitution. Yet after almost two centuries, questions concerning this power of the Court to interpret the Constitution remain. The first set of questions centers on the substantive standards for constitutional adjudication. The second, with which …