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Full-Text Articles in Law

Weaponizing En Banc, Neal Devins, Allison Orr Larsen Nov 2021

Weaponizing En Banc, Neal Devins, Allison Orr Larsen

Faculty Publications

The federal courts of appeals embrace the ideal that judges are committed to rule-of-law norms, collegiality, and judicial independence. Whatever else divides them, these judges generally agree that partisan identity has no place on the bench. Consequently, when a court of appeals sits “en banc,” (i.e., collectively) the party affiliations of the three-judge panel under review should not matter. Starting in the 1980s, however, partisan ideology has grown increasingly important in the selection of federal appellate judges. It thus stands to reason—and several high-profile modern examples illustrate—that today’s en banc review could be used as a weapon by whatever party …


The Race To The Top To Reduce Prosecutorial Misconduct, Adam M. Gershowitz Mar 2021

The Race To The Top To Reduce Prosecutorial Misconduct, Adam M. Gershowitz

Faculty Publications

This Essay offers an unconventional approach to deterring prosecutorial misconduct. Trial judges should use their inherent authority to forbid prosecutors from appearing and handling cases in their courtrooms until the prosecutors have completed training on Brady v. Maryland, Batson v. Kentucky, and other types of prosecutorial misconduct. If a single trial judge in a medium-sized or large jurisdiction imposes training prerequisites on prosecutors, it could set off a race to the top that encourages other judges to adopt similar (or perhaps even more rigorous) training requirements. A mandate that prosecutors receive ethics training before handling any cases is …


Reform Through Resignation: Why Chief Justice Roberts Should Resign (In 2023), Scott P. Bloomberg Jan 2021

Reform Through Resignation: Why Chief Justice Roberts Should Resign (In 2023), Scott P. Bloomberg

Faculty Publications

Many proponents of reforming the Supreme Court have expressed support for adopting a system of eighteen-year staggered term limits. These proposals, however, are hobbled by constitutional constraints: Amending the Constitution to implement term limits is highly implausible and implementing term limits through statute is likely unconstitutional. This Essay offers an approach to implementing term limits that avoids these constitutional constraints. Just as President Washington was able to establish a de facto Presidential term limit by not seeking a third term in office, Chief Justice Roberts is uniquely positioned to establish a new norm of serving eighteen-year terms on the Court. …