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Articles 1 - 4 of 4

Full-Text Articles in Law

Socialist Countries In Gatt, K. Grzybowski Jan 1980

Socialist Countries In Gatt, K. Grzybowski

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Trigger Price Mechanism: Protecting Competition Or Competitors, The , Jacqueline Nolan-Haley Jan 1980

Trigger Price Mechanism: Protecting Competition Or Competitors, The , Jacqueline Nolan-Haley

Faculty Scholarship

The International Trade Commission asserted that for most of 1978 and probably for the indefinite future, the TPM was "the greatest single factor influencing the conditions of competition" in the U.S. steel industry. The precise contours of this influence are uncertain. While it is premature to assess adequately the economic impact of the TPM, it is possible to make some observations vis-a-vis our national antitrust policy goals. The TPM, like the steel VRA's of 1972, has had no discernable impact on increasing efficiency through expansion, modernization or development of domestic steel-making technology. The TPM, however, does have an impact on …


Trade In Place Of Migration, Jagdish N. Bhagwati Jan 1980

Trade In Place Of Migration, Jagdish N. Bhagwati

Faculty Scholarship

This is a very useful and welcome study, sponsored by the World Employment Programme of the I.L.O., of the effects that increased trade flows could have on the level of employment in one “receiving country,” West Germany, and two sending countries, “Spain and Turkey,” and their implications for immigration policies.


Revenue Seeking: A Generalization Of The Theory Of Tariffs, Jagdish N. Bhagwati, T.N. Srinivasan Jan 1980

Revenue Seeking: A Generalization Of The Theory Of Tariffs, Jagdish N. Bhagwati, T.N. Srinivasan

Faculty Scholarship

The theory of commercial policy has recently addressed three phenomena: (i) tariff (quota) seeking or lobbying by potential beneficiaries for the imposition of a tariff (quota), (ii) tariff (quota) evasion, and (iii) rent seeking or lobbying for getting an allocation of the import quota to earn the rents generated. Revenue seeking or lobbying to secure a share in the disposition of the tariff revenues is analyzed here. It is shown that revenue seeking may, even for a small country, result in a reduction in importable output. Furthermore, revenue seeking may be welfare improving. Rent seeking may be welfare improving as …