Law Commons^™

Theorizing Precedent In International Law, Harlan G. Cohen

Scholarly Works

Precedent presents a puzzle for international law. As a matter of doctrine, judicial decisions construing international law are not-in-and-of themselves law. They are not binding on future parties in future cases, even before the same tribunal. And yet, international precedent is everywhere. From international investment to international criminal law to international human rights to international trade, prior decisions are invoked, argued over, and applied as precedents by practitioners and by tribunals.

How and why do certain interpretations of international law take on the weight of precedent, reshaping international law arguments around them, while others do not? This chapter develops a …

Book Review, Economic Foundations Of International Law, By Eric A. Posner And Alan O. Sykes, Timothy L. Meyer

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This essay reviews Eric Posner’s and Alan Sykes’ Economic Foundations of International Law. In the last ten years or so, economic analysis of international law has established itself as a mainstream discipline, providing insights into why international law is structured as it is, the conditions under which it is effective, and how it might be improved. Economic Foundations consolidates and extends these insights. As such, the book is destined to be a starting place for economic analysis of international law. The book is divided into five parts. Part I provides an introduction to international law and the tools necessary to …

Towards A Communicative Theory Of International Law, Timothy L. Meyer

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Does international law's effectiveness require a clear distinction between law and non-law? This essay, which reviews Jean d'Aspremont's Formalism and the Sources of International Law, argues the answer is no. Ambiguity about the legal nature of international instruments has important benefits. Clarity in the law may encourage states to do the minimum necessary to comply, while some uncertainty about what the law requires may induce states to take extra efforts to ensure they are in compliance. Ambiguity in the law also promotes dynamic change, an important feature in rapidly developing areas of the law such as international environmental law and …

Book Review, International Organizations: Politics, Law, Practice (2010), Timothy L. Meyer

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This essay reviews Ian Hurd’s International Organizations: Politics, Law, Practice. International law and international relations scholars are increasingly interested in the variation in the structures and powers of international organizations, as well as how that variation affects state decisions to comply with international law. Hurd’s book offers a nuanced overview of the relationship between the legal powers of international organizations and the political contexts in which they operate. The book uses eight case studies, including the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the International Court of Justice, and the International Labor Organization, to assess how different political environments and institutional …

Power, Exit Costs, And Renegotiation In International Law, Timothy L. Meyer

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Scholars have long understood that the instability of power has ramifications for compliance with international law. Scholars have not, however, focused on how states’ expectations about shifting power affect the initial design of international agreements. In this paper, I integrate shifting power into an analysis of the initial design of both the formal and substantive aspects of agreements. I argue that a state expecting to become more powerful over time incurs an opportunity cost by agreeing to formal provisions that raise the cost of exiting an agreement. Exit costs - which promote the stability of legal rules - have distributional …

Soft Law As Delegation, Timothy L. Meyer

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This article examines one of the most important trends in international legal governance since the end of the Second World War: the rise of "soft law," or legally non-binding instruments. Scholars studying the design of international agreements have long puzzled over why states use soft law. The decision to make an agreement or obligation legally binding is within the control of the states negotiating the content of the legal obligations. Basic contract theory predicts that parties to a contract would want their agreement to be as credible as possible, to ensure optimal incentives to perform. It is therefore odd that …