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International Law As Behavior: An Agenda, Harlan G. Cohen, Timothy Meyer
International Law As Behavior: An Agenda, Harlan G. Cohen, Timothy Meyer
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Over the past few decades, scholars in a variety of fields – economics, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and international relations, among others – have made enormous strides studying the behavioral roots of international law by exploring individual motivations, describing organizational cultures, and mapping communities of practice. Taken together, the work of these scholars presents a complex, nuanced understanding of how international law works. However, these projects are rarely considered together: often separated by academic enclosures and focused on different subfields within international law, communication among scholars using different methodologies is restricted. The goal of this book is to break down some …
Towards A Communicative Theory Of International Law, Timothy L. Meyer
Towards A Communicative Theory Of International Law, Timothy L. Meyer
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Does international law's effectiveness require a clear distinction between law and non-law? This essay, which reviews Jean d'Aspremont's Formalism and the Sources of International Law, argues the answer is no. Ambiguity about the legal nature of international instruments has important benefits. Clarity in the law may encourage states to do the minimum necessary to comply, while some uncertainty about what the law requires may induce states to take extra efforts to ensure they are in compliance. Ambiguity in the law also promotes dynamic change, an important feature in rapidly developing areas of the law such as international environmental law and …
Power, Exit Costs, And Renegotiation In International Law, Timothy L. Meyer
Power, Exit Costs, And Renegotiation In International Law, Timothy L. Meyer
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Scholars have long understood that the instability of power has ramifications for compliance with international law. Scholars have not, however, focused on how states’ expectations about shifting power affect the initial design of international agreements. In this paper, I integrate shifting power into an analysis of the initial design of both the formal and substantive aspects of agreements. I argue that a state expecting to become more powerful over time incurs an opportunity cost by agreeing to formal provisions that raise the cost of exiting an agreement. Exit costs - which promote the stability of legal rules - have distributional …
Soft Law As Delegation, Timothy L. Meyer
Soft Law As Delegation, Timothy L. Meyer
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This article examines one of the most important trends in international legal governance since the end of the Second World War: the rise of "soft law," or legally non-binding instruments. Scholars studying the design of international agreements have long puzzled over why states use soft law. The decision to make an agreement or obligation legally binding is within the control of the states negotiating the content of the legal obligations. Basic contract theory predicts that parties to a contract would want their agreement to be as credible as possible, to ensure optimal incentives to perform. It is therefore odd that …
International Common Law: The Soft Law Of International Tribunals, Timothy L. Meyer, Andrew T. Guzman
International Common Law: The Soft Law Of International Tribunals, Timothy L. Meyer, Andrew T. Guzman
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Rising legalization in the international community has lead to greater use of international tribunals and soft law. This paper explores the intersection of these instruments. The decision of an international tribunal interprets binding legal obligations but is not itself legally binding except, in some instances, as between the parties. The broader, and often more important function of a tribunal's decision - its influence on state behavior beyond the particular case and its impact on perceptions regarding legal obligations - is best characterized as a form of soft law.
Despite its inability to bind states, a tribunal can influence state behavior …