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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Law
In Support Of The Trips Agreement, Amanda Jakobsson, Paul S. Segerstrom
In Support Of The Trips Agreement, Amanda Jakobsson, Paul S. Segerstrom
Research Collection School Of Economics
This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that the TRIPs agreement is bad for developing countries. We present a dynamic general equilibrium model of North-South trade that allows us to study the implications of stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) protection and simultaneous trade liberalization. In our model, stronger IPR protection in the South (TRIPs) leads to more innovation in the North, more technology transfer to the South and higher long-run southern consumer welfare. The South also benefits from trade liberalization but the welfare gains from TRIPs are considerably larger.
Optimal International Agreement And Treatment Of Domestic Subsidy, Gea M. Lee
Optimal International Agreement And Treatment Of Domestic Subsidy, Gea M. Lee
Research Collection School Of Economics
We investigate how a domestic subsidy is treated in an international agreement, when a government, having incentive to use its domestic subsidy as a means of import protection, can disguise its protective use of subsidy as a legitimate intervention with which to address a market imperfection. We show that any optimal agreement, as opposed to the conventional message of the targeting principle, restricts the home government’s freedom to select its domestic subsidy in order to increase the market-access level for foreign exporters. Our finding suggests that a proper restriction on domestic subsidy is somewhere between GATT and WTO rules.
The Evolution And Utilization Of The Gatt/Wto Dispute Settlement Mechanism, Pao-Li Chang
The Evolution And Utilization Of The Gatt/Wto Dispute Settlement Mechanism, Pao-Li Chang
Research Collection School Of Economics
This paper provides a theoretical framework of dispute settlement to explain the surge in blocking incidence of GATT panel reports during the 1980s and the variations in withdrawn incidence versus total disputes across different decades of the GATT regime. The study first suggests the role of the degree of legal controversy over a panel ruling in determining countries' incentives to block (appeal) a panel report under the GATT (WTO) regime. The study then analyzes the effects of political power on countries' incentives to use, and their interactions in using, the dispute settlement mechanism, when two-sided asymmetric information exists regarding panel …
The Politics Of Wto Enforcement Mechanism, Pao Li Chang
The Politics Of Wto Enforcement Mechanism, Pao Li Chang
Research Collection School Of Economics
This paper attempts to develop a formal economic framework to analyze the influences of domestic political considerations by democratic governments in shaping the WTO enforcement outcomes following a violation ruling against the defendant. Since a different mix of import and export sectors in the defendant and complainant country will benefit from the various potential enforcement outcomes, they become competing forces which steer the strategic interactions between the disputing governments. The results of the paper illustrate the complainant's strategy in selecting the retaliation list, and the likelihood of the defendant's compliance or compensation in response to the proposed or foreseeable retaliation, …
The Politics Of Wto Enforcement Mechanism, Pao Li Chang
The Politics Of Wto Enforcement Mechanism, Pao Li Chang
Research Collection School Of Economics
This paper attempts to develop a formal economic framework to analyze the influences of domestic political considerations by democratic governments in shaping the WTO enforcement outcomes following a violation ruling against the defendant. Since a different mix of import and export sectors in the defendant and complainant country will benefit from the various potential enforcement outcomes, they become competing forces which steer the strategic interactions between the disputing governments. The results of the paper illustrate the complainant's strategy in selecting the retaliation list, and the likelihood of the defendant's compliance or compensation in response to the proposed or foreseeable retaliation, …
The Evolution And Utilization Of The Gatt/Wto Dispute Settlement Mechanism, Pao Li Chang
The Evolution And Utilization Of The Gatt/Wto Dispute Settlement Mechanism, Pao Li Chang
Research Collection School Of Economics
This paper attempts to study the usage of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement mechanism and to explain its patterns across different regimes and decades, using a unified theoretical model. This study first explores the role of the degree of legal controversy over a panel ruling in determining countries’ incentives to block/appeal a panel report under the GATT/WTO regime. The model is able to explain the surge in blocking incidence during the 1980s over the preceding GATT years and the immense frequency at which the new appellate procedure under the WTO is invoked. Furthermore, a two-sided asymmetric information framework is used to …