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Full-Text Articles in Law
Trolls Or Toll-Takers: Do Intellectual Property Non-Practicing Entities Add Value To Society?, Samuel F. Ernst
Trolls Or Toll-Takers: Do Intellectual Property Non-Practicing Entities Add Value To Society?, Samuel F. Ernst
Publications
The 2015 Chapman Law Review Symposium will seek to advance the discussion of non-practicing entities in three ways: (1) by expanding on the scholarly debate surrounding patent trolls summarized above; (2) by expanding on the perspectives informing this debate beyond academia by inviting the views of practitioners from both sides of the patent troll divide; and (3) by expanding on the scope of this topic by considering the nature and possibility of copyright and trademark trolls.
Protecting The Boundaries: Unclaimed Consideration In The Patentee's Social Contract, Samuel F. Ernst
Protecting The Boundaries: Unclaimed Consideration In The Patentee's Social Contract, Samuel F. Ernst
Publications
This Article argues that the primary value society receives in the patentee social contract is not new inventions, but "unclaimed consideration." Unclaimed consideration takes many forms: additional innovations to improve on the patented invention, additional innovations created through efforts to design around the patented invention, innovations created by losers in the patent race, innovations informed by the unclaimed technical information in patents, commercialization of the patented invention or these other innovations, and the signals that patents give to investors regarding the value of a company or research lab. While there are many schools of patent scholarship engaged in spirited debate …
Corporate Legacy, Andrew A. Schwartz
Corporate Legacy, Andrew A. Schwartz
Publications
Many public companies have shed takeover defenses in recent years, on the theory that such defenses reduce share price. Yet new data presented here shows that practically all new public companies--those launching their initial public offering (IPO)--go public with powerful takeover defenses in place. This behavior is puzzling because the adoption of takeover defenses presumably lowers the price at which the pre-IPO shareholders can sell their own shares in and after the IPO. Why would founders and early investors engage in this seemingly counterproductive behavior? Building on prior attempts to solve this mystery, this Article claims that IPO firms adopt …