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Intellectual Property Law

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

Food and Drug Administration

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The Cost Of Confusion: The Paradox Of Trademarked Pharmaceuticals, Hannah Brennan Oct 2015

The Cost Of Confusion: The Paradox Of Trademarked Pharmaceuticals, Hannah Brennan

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

The United States spends nearly $1,000 per person annually on drugs—forty percent more than the next highest spender, Canada, and more than twice the amount France and Germany spend. Although myriad factors contribute to high drug spending in the United States, intellectual property law plays a crucial and well-documented role in inhibiting access to cheaper, generic medications. Yet, for the most part, the discussion of the relationship between intellectual property law and drug spending has centered on patent protection. Recently, however, a few researchers have turned their attention to a different avenue of exclusivity—trademark law. New studies suggest that pharmaceutical …


Patent Punting: How Fda And Antitrust Courts Undermine The Hatch-Waxman Act To Avoid Dealing With Patents, Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Daniel A. Crane Jan 2015

Patent Punting: How Fda And Antitrust Courts Undermine The Hatch-Waxman Act To Avoid Dealing With Patents, Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Daniel A. Crane

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, patent law and FDA regulation work together to determine the timing of generic entry in the market for drugs. But FDA has sought to avoid any responsibility for reading patents, insisting that its role in administering the patent provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act is purely ministerial. This gap in regulatory oversight has allowed innovators to use irrelevant patents to defer generic competition. Meanwhile, patent litigation has set the stage for anticompetitive settlements rather than adjudication of the patent issues in the courts. As these settlements have provoked antitrust litigation, antitrust courts have proven no more willing …


Pay-For-Delay Settlements In The Wake Of Actavis, Michael L. Fialkoff May 2014

Pay-For-Delay Settlements In The Wake Of Actavis, Michael L. Fialkoff

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

“Pay-for-delay” settlements, also known as reverse payments, arise when a generic manufacturer pursues FDA approval of a generic version of a brand-name drug. If a patent protects the brand-name drug, the generic manufacturer has the option of contesting the validity of the patent or arguing that its product does not infringe the patent covering the brand-name drug. If the generic manufacturer prevails on either of these claims, the FDA will approve its generic version for sale. Approval of a generic version of a brand-name drug reduces the profitability of the brand-name drug by forcing the brand-name manufacturer to price its …


Interpreting Biological Similarity: Ongoing Challenges For Diverse Decision Makers, Sarah M. Cork Jan 2013

Interpreting Biological Similarity: Ongoing Challenges For Diverse Decision Makers, Sarah M. Cork

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

Similarity is an elusive and complicated concept facing comparisons of biological molecules, as even minute changes to a molecule's structure can dramatically affect its function in the body. Yet the flood of biologic drugs on the market will increasingly force these similarity comparisons. These concerns are particularly relevant to two groups of drugs: families of biologic drugs that closely resemble each other in structure and function, here termed "similar-impact biologics," and the biosimilars, which are intended to closely approximate generic forms of biologic drugs. In bringing biologic drugs to the market, manufacturers are likely to face dual obstacles: FDA approval …


Patents V. Statutory Exclusivities In Biological Pharmaceuticals - Do We Really Need Both, Yaniv Heled Jan 2012

Patents V. Statutory Exclusivities In Biological Pharmaceuticals - Do We Really Need Both, Yaniv Heled

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

Over the past decade or so, the United States has been the arena of a boisterous debate regarding the creation of a new regulatory framework for the approval of generic versions of biologics-based pharmaceutical products (also known as "biological products" and "biologics")--an important and increasingly growing class of drugs. The basic purpose of such a framework is to create a fast and less-costly route to FDA approval for biologics that would be similar or identical to already-approved biological products--typically ones that are sold on the market at monopoly rates--thereby allowing cheaper versions of such medicines to enter the market. One …


How Many Patents Does It Take To Make A Drug - Follow-On Pharmaceutical Patents And University Licensing, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette Jan 2010

How Many Patents Does It Take To Make A Drug - Follow-On Pharmaceutical Patents And University Licensing, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

As described by Professors Dan Burk and Mark Lemley, drugs are[...] special because of the low number of patents per product: "In some industries, such as chemistry and pharmaceuticals, a single patent normally covers a single product. Much conventional wisdom in the patent system is built on the unstated assumption of such a one-to-one correspondence." Although many have repeated this one-patent, one-drug assumption, there has been little empirical analysis of how many patents actually protect each drug. In fact, most small-molecule drugs are protected by multiple patents. The average was nearly 3.5 patents per drug in 2005, with over five …


It Is Time: Why The Fda Should Start Disclosing Drug Trial Data, Mustafa Ünlü Jan 2010

It Is Time: Why The Fda Should Start Disclosing Drug Trial Data, Mustafa Ünlü

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

Although [drug] manufacturers bear the cost of research data generation, it is oftentimes a worthwhile investment that also confers significant commercial advantages. Consequently, they have argued that research data should be considered a trade secret and kept confidential. The FDA's longstanding position has been to accept this proposition. Even when Congress appeared to mandate disclosure or weaken the underlying rationale for secrecy, the FDA has continued to treat research data as confidential. A strong argument against a default posture of confidentiality is that research data disclosure would promote broad public interests by eliminating the societal costs brought about by keeping …


Why Fdca Section 505(U) Should Not Concern Us Greatly, Kyle Faget Jan 2009

Why Fdca Section 505(U) Should Not Concern Us Greatly, Kyle Faget

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

Among the many amendments found in the Food and Drug Administration Amendment Act of 2007 (FDAAA) is a provision at the end of the act, Section 505(u), which grants chiral switches five years of market exclusivity under certain circumstances. Prior to Congressional enactment of the FDAAA, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) refused to award new chemical entity (NCE) status to enantiomers of previously approved racemic mixtures. The FDA defines a new chemical entity ("NCE") as a drug that contains no active moiety that has been approved by the FDA in any other application submitted under Section 505(b) of the …


Pharmaceutical Lemons: Innovation And Regulation In The Drug Industry, Ariel Katz Jan 2007

Pharmaceutical Lemons: Innovation And Regulation In The Drug Industry, Ariel Katz

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

Before a new drug can be marketed, the Food and Drug Administration must be satisfied that it is safe and effective. According to conventional wisdom, the cost and delay involved in this process diminish the incentives to invest in the development of new drugs. Accordingly, several reforms aimed at restoring such incentives have been implemented or advocated. This Article challenges the central argument that drug regulation and drug innovation are necessarily at odds with one another. Although intuitively appealing, the argument that drug regulation negatively affects the incentives to innovate does not fully capture the role that regulation plays in …


The Patent End Game: Evaluating Generic Entry Into A Blockbuster Pharmaceutical Market In The Absence Of Fda Incentives, Jeremiah Helm Jan 2007

The Patent End Game: Evaluating Generic Entry Into A Blockbuster Pharmaceutical Market In The Absence Of Fda Incentives, Jeremiah Helm

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

Generic drugs play an important role in the American system of health care. Most anticipate that the entry of these drugs into the market will lower prices and thereby increase treatment options for consumers. To stimulate generic entry, the Food and Drug Administration currently offers a period of marketing exclusivity to the first firm that gains approval for a generic version of a branded drug. During this 180-day period, only two firms can sell versions of the drug: the original, branded drug maker and the first approved generic firm. After the period of exclusivity expires, other generic firms are free …


The Role Of The Fda In Innovation Policy, Rebecca S. Eisenberg Jan 2007

The Role Of The Fda In Innovation Policy, Rebecca S. Eisenberg

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

This Article reexamines the role of FDA regulation in motivating investment in biopharmaceutical innovation. I begin by challenging the standard story that it is the patent system that makes drug development profitable, and drug regulation that makes it costly, by showing how patents add to costs and how drug regulation works in tandem with patents to protect profits. I then compare FDA-administered exclusive rights to patents as a means of fortifying drug development incentives, suggesting ways that FDA-administered rights might be preferable both from the perspective of policy makers and from the perspective of firms. In the remainder of the …