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Full-Text Articles in Law
A Case For The Public Domain, Clark Asay
A Case For The Public Domain, Clark Asay
Faculty Scholarship
Over the past several decades open license movements have proven highly successful in the software and content worlds. Such movements rely in part on the belief that greater freedom of use triggers innovative activity that is superior to what a restrictive IP approach produces. Ironically, such open license movements also rely on IP rights to promote their vision of freedom and openness. They do so through IP licenses that, while granting significant freedoms, also impose certain conditions on users such as the “copyleft” requirement in the software world. Such movements rely on this IP-based approach due to fears that, without …
Access To Information And Knowledge, Lucie Guibault
Access To Information And Knowledge, Lucie Guibault
Articles, Book Chapters, & Popular Press
No abstract provided.
The Patent Litigation Explosion, James Bessen, Michael J. Meurer
The Patent Litigation Explosion, James Bessen, Michael J. Meurer
Faculty Scholarship
This Article provides the first look at patent litigation hazards for public firms during the 1980s and 1990s. Litigation is more likely when prospective plaintiffs acquire more patents, when firms are larger and technologically close and when prospective defendants spend more on research and development ("R&D"). The latter suggests inadvertent infringement may be more important than piracy. Public firms face dramatically increased hazards of litigation as plaintiffs and even more rapidly increasing hazards as defendants, especially for small public firms. The increase cannot be explained by patenting rates, R&D, firm value or industry composition. Legal changes are the most likely …
Problems In Sharing The Surplus, Roger D. Blair, Thomas Knight
Problems In Sharing The Surplus, Roger D. Blair, Thomas Knight
UF Law Faculty Publications
Dennis Carlton and Allan Shampine have addressed opportunistic and strategic behavior by standard-essential patent owners. After a standard has been specified, and sunk investments have been made by those who would implement the standard, the holder of a standard-essential patent can demand more for the patent license than it could have demanded ex ante. This sort of ex post opportunism can lead to economically inefficient outcomes. The solution is to limit such patent holders to “fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory” (FRAND) patent license fees. Carlton and Shampine have advanced our understanding of precisely what this means.
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