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Insurance Law

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Incentives

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Spending Medicare’S Dollars Wisely: Taking Aim At Hospitals’ Cultures Of Overtreatment, Jessica Mantel Dec 2015

Spending Medicare’S Dollars Wisely: Taking Aim At Hospitals’ Cultures Of Overtreatment, Jessica Mantel

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

With Medicare’s rising costs threatening the country’s fiscal health, policymakers have focused their attention on a primary cause of Medicare’s high price tag—the overtreatment of patients. Guided by professional norms that demand they do “everything possible” for their patients, physicians frequently order additional diagnostic tests, perform more procedures, utilize costly technologies, and provide more inpatient care. Much of this care, however, does not improve Medicare patients’ health, but only increases Medicare spending. Reducing the overtreatment of patients requires aligning physicians’ interests with the government’s goal of spending Medicare’s dollars wisely. Toward that end, recent Medicare payment reforms establish a range …


An Insurance Structure To Encourage Investment In Preventative Health Care, Nicholas Georgakopoulos Jan 2013

An Insurance Structure To Encourage Investment In Preventative Health Care, Nicholas Georgakopoulos

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The incentives for investments in Americans' health are poorly aligned. Health insurers are not sufficiently motivated to invest for the long term. The structure of health insurance does not compensate insurers for investments in lasting health, such as measures preventing chronic disease. If an American changes insurers, the new insurer reaps the benefits of the good health the prior insurer's investment produced. This Essay explores insurers' incentives to invest in health, illustrates how those incentives fail, explores possible improvements, and shows that subsequent insurers should have an obligation to compensate the prior insurer for the averted expenses of expected diseases …