Law Commons^™

Inference Under Stability Of Risk Preferences, Levon Barseghyan, Francesca Molinari, Joshua C. Teitelbaum

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

We leverage the assumption that preferences are stable across contexts to partially identify and conduct inference on the parameters of a structural model of risky choice. Working with data on households' deductible choices across three lines of insurance coverage and a model that nests expected utility theory plus a range of non-expected utility models, we perform a revealed preference analysis that yields household-specific bounds on the model parameters. We then impose stability and other structural assumptions to tighten the bounds, and we explore what we can learn about households' risk preferences from the intervals defined by the bounds. We further …

Fiscal Federalism As Risk-Sharing: The Insurance Role Of Redistributive Taxation, John R. Brooks

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In addition to funding government and redistributing income, a redistributive tax-and-transfer system, and a progressive income tax in particular, provides insurance against the risk of uncertain future income. By providing for high taxes for high incomes, and low taxes, exemptions, and transfers for low incomes, a progressive income tax lowers the volatility of potential after-tax income relative to a lump-sum tax. This insurance function is distinct from the redistributive function of the system, since it provides a direct risk-mitigation benefit to the taxpayer himself, rather than simply redistributing income from one taxpayer to another.

This article analyzes the question of …

Distinguishing Probability Weighting From Risk Misperceptions In Field Data, Levon Barseghyan, Francesca Molinari, Ted O'Donoghue, Joshua C. Teitelbaum

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The paper outlines a strategy for distinguishing rank-dependent probability weighting from systematic risk misperceptions in field data. Our strategy relies on singling out a field environment with two key properties: (i) the objects of choice are money lotteries with more than two outcomes and (ii) the ranking of outcomes differs across lotteries. We first present an abstract model of risky choice that elucidates the identification problem and our strategy. The model has numerous applications, including insurance choices and gambling. We then consider the application of insurance deductible choices and illustrate our strategy using simulated data.

The Nature Of Risk Preferences: Evidence From Insurance Choices, Levon Barseghyan, Francesca Molinari, Joshua C. Teitelbaum, Ted O'Donoghue

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The authors use data on insurance deductible choices to estimate a structural model of risky choice that incorporates "standard" risk aversion (diminishing marginal utility for wealth) and probability distortions. They find that probability distortions--characterized by substantial overweighting of small probabilities and only mild insensitivity to probability changes--play an important role in explaining the aversion to risk manifested in deductible choices. This finding is robust to allowing for observed and unobserved heterogeneity in preferences. They demonstrate that neither Kőszegi-Rabin loss aversion alone nor Gul disappointment aversion alone can explain our estimated probability distortions, signifying a key role for probability weighting.

Are Risk Preferences Stable Across Contexts? Evidence From Insurance Data, Levon Barseghyan, Jeffrey Prince, Joshua C. Teitelbaum

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Using a unique data set, the authors test whether households' deductible choices in auto and home insurance reflect stable risk preferences. Their test relies on a structural model that assumes households are objective expected utility maximizers and claims are generated by household-coverage specific Poisson processes. They find that the hypothesis of stable risk preferences is rejected by the data. Their analysis suggests that many households exhibit greater risk aversion in their home deductible choices than their auto deductible choices. They find that their results are robust to several alternative modeling assumptions.

Insurance Discrimination On The Basis Of Health Status: An Overview Of Discrimination Practices, Federal Law And Federal Reform Options, Sara Rosenbaum

O'Neill Institute Papers

Actuarial underwriting, or discrimination based on an individual’s health status, is a business feature of the voluntary private insurance market. The term “discrimination” in this paper is not intended to convey the concept of unfair treatment, but rather how the insurance industry differentiates among individuals in designing and administering health insurance and employee health benefit products.

Discrimination can occur at the point of enrollment, coverage design, or decisions regarding scope of coverage. Several major federal laws aimed at regulating insurance discrimination based on health status focus at the point of enrollment. However, because of multiple exceptions and loopholes, these laws …

The Purchase Of Insurance Across State Lines In The Individual Insurance Market, Stephanie W. Kanwit

O'Neill Institute Papers

Proposals to allow the purchase of insurance across state lines (PASL) have gained some support in recent years. Health insurers have traditionally been allowed to sell a policy only within the state that approved and regulates that particular policy. PASL would allow insurers to sell a policy approved in one state to people residing in any state.

Any federal legislation to enact PASL in an individual insurance market would have to address two main legal considerations: 1) the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which allows the states to retain their regulatory authority over insurance, and 2) a constitutional prohibition against the commandeering of …

Risk Governance And Deliberative Democracy In Health Care, Nan D. Hunter

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

I argue in this article that the concept of risk-centered governance is the best theoretical paradigm for understanding health law and the health care system. Over the past 20 years, an insurance-inflected discourse has migrated from the purely financial side of the health system into the heart of traditional medicine - the doctor-patient relationship. Rather than focus on doctrinal strands, I argue that scholars should analyze the law of health care as a set of governance practices organized around managing and allocating financial, as well as clinical, risk.

Over the same period, the body of law that structures most private …