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Sanciones Económicas Y Compensación De Daños En El Régimen De Competencia Mexicano, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor Dec 2009

Sanciones Económicas Y Compensación De Daños En El Régimen De Competencia Mexicano, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.


On Refusals To Deal In The European Competition Regime, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor Dec 2009

On Refusals To Deal In The European Competition Regime, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.


Crisis Económica Y Política De Competencia En México, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor Jul 2009

Crisis Económica Y Política De Competencia En México, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.


Professor's Update To Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text And Cases, Phillip Areeda, Louis Kaplow, Aaron S. Edlin Jun 2009

Professor's Update To Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text And Cases, Phillip Areeda, Louis Kaplow, Aaron S. Edlin

Aaron Edlin

No abstract provided.


Crisis Económica Y Política Antimonopolios, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor May 2009

Crisis Económica Y Política Antimonopolios, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.


Analyzing Horizontal Mergers: Unilateral Effects In Product-Differentiated Markets, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Mar 2009

Analyzing Horizontal Mergers: Unilateral Effects In Product-Differentiated Markets, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

This essay offers a brief, non-technical exposition of the antitrust analysis of horizontal mergers in product differentiated markets where the resulting price increase is thought to be unilateral - that is, only the post-merger firm increases its prices while other firms in the market do not. More realistically, non-merging firms who are reasonably close in product space to the merging firm will also be able to increase their prices when the post-merger firm's prices rise. The unilateral effects theory is robust and has become quite conventional in merger analysis. There is certainly no reason for thinking that it involves any …


The Neal Report And The Crisis In Antitrust, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Mar 2009

The Neal Report And The Crisis In Antitrust, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

The Neal Report, which was commissioned by Lyndon Johnson and published in 1967, is rightfully criticized for representing the past rather than the future of antitrust. Its authors completely embraced a theory of competition and industrial organization that had dominated American economic thinking for forty years, but was just in the process of coming to an end. The structure-conduct-performance (S-C-P) paradigm that the Neal Report embodied had in fact been one of the most elegant and most tested theories of industrial organization. The theory represented the high point of structuralism in industrial organization economics, resting on the proposition that certain …


Wobbling Back To The Fire: Economic Efficiency And The Creation Of A Retail Market For Set-Top Boxes, T. Randolph Beard, George S. Ford, Lawrence J. Spiwak, Michael Stern Jan 2009

Wobbling Back To The Fire: Economic Efficiency And The Creation Of A Retail Market For Set-Top Boxes, T. Randolph Beard, George S. Ford, Lawrence J. Spiwak, Michael Stern

GEORGE S FORD

Under Section 629 of the Communications Act, Congress directed the FCC to adopt regulations to promote a retail market for set-top boxes. The Commission’s first attempt was the ill-fated CableCard experiment, which—by the Commission’s own admission—was a dismal failure. In response, the Commission is now contemplating an aggressive new “AllVid” regime, whereby the agency would mandate multichannel video program distributors (“MVPDs”) to provide an adapter to serve as a “common interface for connection to televisions, DVRs, and other smart video devices.” Because the FCC is again proceeding without any formal economic analysis of the nature of the service-equipment relationship in …


The Need For Better Analysis Of High Capacity Services, George S. Ford, Lawrence J. Spiwak Jan 2009

The Need For Better Analysis Of High Capacity Services, George S. Ford, Lawrence J. Spiwak

GEORGE S FORD

In 1999, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) began to grant incumbent local exchange carriers (“LECs”) pricing flexibility on special access services in some Metropolitan Statistical Areas (“MSAs”) when specific evidence of competitive alternatives is present. The propriety of that deregulatory move by the FCC has been criticized by the purchasers of such services ever since. Proponents of special access price regulation rely on three central arguments to support a retreat to strict price regulation: (1) the market(s) for special access and similar services is unduly concentrated; (2) rates of return on special access services, computed using FCC ARMIS data, are …


Collusion In Convergent Markets, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor Jan 2009

Collusion In Convergent Markets, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.


The Viability Of Antitrust Price Squeeze Claims, Erik Hovenkamp, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 2009

The Viability Of Antitrust Price Squeeze Claims, Erik Hovenkamp, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

A price squeeze occurs when a vertically integrated firm "squeezes' a rival's margins between a high wholesale price for an essential input sold to the rival, and a low output price to consumers for whom the two firms compete. Price squeezes have been a recognized but controversial antitrust violation for two-thirds of a century. We examine the law and economics of the price squeeze, beginning with Judge Hand's famous discussion in the Alcoa case in 1945. While Alcoa has been widely portrayed as creating a "fairness" or "fair profit" test for unlawful price squeezes, Judge Hand actually adopted a cost-based …


United States Competition Policy In Crisis: 1890-1955, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 2009

United States Competition Policy In Crisis: 1890-1955, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

The development of marginalist, or neoclassical, economics led to a fifty-year long crisis in competition theory. Given an industrial structure with sufficient fixed costs, competition always became "ruinous," forcing firms to cut prices to marginal cost without sufficient revenue remaining to pay off investment. Early neoclassicists such as Alfred Marshall were not able to solve this problem, and as a result many economists were hostile toward the antitrust laws in the early decades of the twentieth century. The ruinous competition debate came to an abrupt end in the early 1930's, when Joan Robinson and particularly Edward Chamberlin developed models that …


Neoclassicism And The Separation Of Ownership And Control, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 2009

Neoclassicism And The Separation Of Ownership And Control, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

"Separation of ownership and control" is a phrase whose history will forever be associated with Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means' The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932), as well as with Institutionalist economics, Legal Realism, and the New Deal. Within that milieu the large publicly held business corporation became identified with excessive managerial power at the expense of stockholders, social irresponsibility, and internal inefficiency. Neoclassical economists both then and ever since have generally been critical, both of the historical facts that Berle and Means purported to describe and of the conclusions that they drew. In fact, however, within …