Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Publication Type
Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Law
May Hospitals Withhold Ventilators From Covid-19 Patients With Pre-Existing Disabilities? Notes On The Law And Ethics Of Disability-Based Medical Rationing, Samuel R. Bagenstos
May Hospitals Withhold Ventilators From Covid-19 Patients With Pre-Existing Disabilities? Notes On The Law And Ethics Of Disability-Based Medical Rationing, Samuel R. Bagenstos
Law & Economics Working Papers
Thanks to the coronavirus pandemic, the threat of medical rationing is now clear and present. Hospitals faced with a crush of patients must now seriously confront questions of how to allocate scarce resources—notably life-saving ventilators—at a time of severe shortage. In their protocols for addressing this situation, hospitals and state agencies often employ explicitly disability-based distinctions. For example, Alabama’s crisis standards of care provide that “people with severe or profound intellectual disability ‘are unlikely candidates for ventilator support.’” This essay, written as this crisis unfolds, argues that disability-based distinctions like these violate the law. The Americans with Disabilities Act, the …
Olmstead V. L.C.: The Supreme Court Case, Samuel R. Bagenstos, Irv Gornstein, Michael Gottesman, Jennifer Mathis
Olmstead V. L.C.: The Supreme Court Case, Samuel R. Bagenstos, Irv Gornstein, Michael Gottesman, Jennifer Mathis
Articles
You have an incredible luxury here at Georgetown Law. You have faculty who are engaged in the world like two of my colleagues on this panel. To my immediate left is Professor Michael Gottesman (Georgetown University Law Center) who argued the case on behalf of Lois and Elaine, and to my next far left, Professor Irv Gornstein (Georgetown University Law Center) who argued the case on behalf of the United States. Between them is Jennifer Mathis (The Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law) who has spent, I think, most of her career at the Bazelon Center litigating, and organizing, and …
Mental Illness And The Law Of Contracts, Robert M. Brucken S.Ed., David L. Genger S.Ed., Denis T. Rice S.Ed., Mark Shaevsky S.Ed., William R. Slye S.Ed., Robert P. Volpe S.Ed.
Mental Illness And The Law Of Contracts, Robert M. Brucken S.Ed., David L. Genger S.Ed., Denis T. Rice S.Ed., Mark Shaevsky S.Ed., William R. Slye S.Ed., Robert P. Volpe S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review
The traditional and most important problem relative to mental illness and the contract is the situation created when mental illness exists at the time of agreement (the problem of contractual capacity). One principal result of mental illness at this time may be the avoidance of the contract by the mentally ill person. Since case law in this area is extensive, the major portion of the study is concerned with this problem (parts II, III and IV) and the effects of such incapacity throughout the remaining course of the contract. Mental illness occurring after agreement and at the time of performance …
Simulation Of Nervous And Mental Disease, Moses Keschner
Simulation Of Nervous And Mental Disease, Moses Keschner
Michigan Law Review
Simulation may be defined as a wilful, deliberate and fraudulent imitation or exaggeration of illness intended to deceive the observer for the purpose of gaining a consciously desired end. Simulation of a physical or mental illness is usually resorted to: (1) by persons who have sustained an injury, the disability resulting therefrom being compensable by benefits payable under the workmen's compensation law or by damages in personal injury actions based on alleged negligence; (2) by persons who wish to obtain insurance benefits for disability in accordance with the provisions of health, accident and life insurance policies, and included in this …
Malpractice Actions And Compensation Acts, Paul A. Leidy
Malpractice Actions And Compensation Acts, Paul A. Leidy
Michigan Law Review
S, an employee, is injured as the result of the negligence of his employer, M; S is taken for treatment to the office of X, a competent physician or surgeon selected by S or by M; on this particular occasion X is negligent and as a result of X's negligence S's two weeks' injury is aggravated and the period of disability becomes one of two months' duration. At common law, inasmuch as the original injury was one for which M was legally responsible, S could recover from M for the entire disability-that resulting directly from the original negligence of M …