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Full-Text Articles in Law
Segregation In The Galleries: A Reconsideration, Richard Primus
Segregation In The Galleries: A Reconsideration, Richard Primus
Michigan Law Review Online
When constitutional lawyers talk about the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to questions of race, they often men-tion that the spectators’ galleries in Congress were racially segregated when Congress debated the Amendment.1 If the Thirty-Ninth Congress practiced racial segregation, the thinking goes, then it probably did not mean to prohibit racial segregation.2 As an argument about constitutional interpretation, this line of thinking has both strengths and weaknesses. But this brief Essay is not about the interpretive consequences, if any, of segregation in the congressional galleries during the 1860s. It is about the factual claim that the galleries …
Eatin' Good? Not In This Neighborhood: A Legal Analysis Of Disparities In Food Availability And Quality At Chain Supermarkets In Poverty-Stricken Areas, Nareissa Smith
Michigan Journal of Race and Law
Many Americans-especially the poor-face severe hurdles in their attempts to secure the most basic of human needs-food. One reason for this struggle is the tendency of chain supermarkets to provide a limited selection of goods and a lower quality of goods to patrons in less affluent neighborhoods. Healthier items such as soy milks, fresh fish, and lean meats are not present in these stores, and the produce that is present is typically well past the peak of freshness. Yet, if the same patron were to go to another supermarket owned by the same chain--but located in a wealthier neighborhood-she would …
A Sheep In Wolf's Clothing: The Michigan Civil Rights Initiative As The Savior Of Affirmative Action, Ryan C. Hess
A Sheep In Wolf's Clothing: The Michigan Civil Rights Initiative As The Savior Of Affirmative Action, Ryan C. Hess
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
The University of Michigan has long been a place of important discussions about civil and human rights. On the steps of the Michigan Student Union, only a few paces from the Law School, lies an inconspicuous marker where then-President John F. Kennedy, Jr. dedicated the United States Peace Core. During the Vietnam War, the University played host to significant protests that changed how we think about war and its consequences. Most recently, the University litigated a series of Supreme Court cases that have helped define the role of educational institutions in the quest for equality. This role promises to continue …
Disparate Impact And The Use Of Racial Proxies In Post-Mcri Admissions, Matthew S. Owen, Danielle S. Barbour
Disparate Impact And The Use Of Racial Proxies In Post-Mcri Admissions, Matthew S. Owen, Danielle S. Barbour
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
The Michigan Civil Rights Initiative (“MCRI”) amended the Michigan Constitution to provide that public universities, colleges, and school districts may not “discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of . . . public education.” We argue that, in addition to prohibiting the overt use of racial preferences in admissions, the MCRI also prohibits using racial proxies such as socioeconomic status or a “Ten Percent Plan” that aim to prefer minorities in admissions. Though the MCRI does not expressly say so, we stipulate …
The Michigan Civil Rights Initiative And The Civil Rights Act Of 1964, Carl Cohen
The Michigan Civil Rights Initiative And The Civil Rights Act Of 1964, Carl Cohen
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
The underlying principle of the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative (MCRI), adopted by state wide vote on 7 November 2006, is identical to that of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act provides: “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” The recent passage of the MCRI results now in the inclusion [in Article 1, Section 26 of the Michigan constitution] of section …
"Framing Affirmative Action", Kimberlé W. Crenshaw
"Framing Affirmative Action", Kimberlé W. Crenshaw
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
With the passage of the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative (“MCRI”), Michigan joins California and Washington to constitute the new postaffirmative action frontier. For proponents such as Ward Connerly, affirmative action is on the edge of extinction. Connerly plans to carry his campaign against what he calls “racial preferences” to eight states in 2008, scoring a decisive Super-Tuesday repudiation of a social policy that he portrays as the contemporary face of racial discrimination. On the other side of the issue, proponents of affirmative action are struggling to regroup, fearful that the confluence of lukewarm support among Democratic allies, messy presidential politics …
What The Mcri Can Teach White Litigants About White Dominance, Adam Gitlin
What The Mcri Can Teach White Litigants About White Dominance, Adam Gitlin
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
The ballots have barely been counted, but litigation to enjoin implementation of the now-codified Michigan Civil Rights Initiative (“MCRI”) or at least limit its effect on admissions practices in Michigan’s universities is already underway. One of the primary arguments against the MCRI—and the basis upon which some plaintiff professors assert standing—is that students will suffer an impaired education if current admissions practices are discarded. Assuming that the MCRI survives these legal challenges, educators should be consoled somewhat to know the MCRI may still offer some pedagogy as compensation: litigation will likely be brought to enforce its provisions, and that litigation …
Justifying The Disparate Impact Standard Under A Theory Of Equal Citizenship, Rebecca S. Giltner
Justifying The Disparate Impact Standard Under A Theory Of Equal Citizenship, Rebecca S. Giltner
Michigan Journal of Race and Law
Part I of this Note outlines the limitations on congressional power under Section V and their implications for justifying the constitutionality of the disparate impact standard. Part II explores the prohibition of intentional discrimination as a justification for the disparate impact standard and argues that justifying the disparate impact standard through this theory, as some courts currently do, may eventually narrow disparate impact doctrine and thus constrain the possibilities for substantive equality in employment. This Part also analogizes the limits of using an intentional discrimination rationale to justify the disparate impact standard to the limits of using the diversity rationale …
Dissing Congress, Ruth Colker, James J. Brudney
Dissing Congress, Ruth Colker, James J. Brudney
Michigan Law Review
The Supreme Court under Chief Justice Rehnquist's recent leadership has invalidated numerous federal laws, arguably departing from settled precedent to do so. The Rehnquist Court has held that Congress exceeded its constitutional authority in five instances during the 2000-01 Term, on four occasions during the 1999-2000 Term and in a total of twenty-nine cases since the 1994-95 Term. Commentators typically explain these decisions in federalism terms, focusing on the Court's use of its power to protect the States from an overreaching Congress. That explanation is incomplete and, in important respects, unpersuasive. The Rehnquist Court has not been as solicitous of …
Miranda, The Constitution, And Congress, David A. Strauss
Miranda, The Constitution, And Congress, David A. Strauss
Michigan Law Review
Are Miranda warnings required by the Constitution, or not? If they are, why has the Supreme Court repeatedly said that the rights created by Miranda are "not themselves rights protected by the Constitution"? If not, why can't an Act of Congress, such as 18 U.S.C. 3501, declare them to be unnecessary? These were the central questions posed by United States v. Dickerson. It is not clear that the majority opinion ever really answered them. The majority said that "Miranda is constitutionally based," that Miranda has "constitutional underpinnings," that Miranda is "a constitutional decision," and that Miranda "announced a constitutional rule." …
Cracking The Code: "De-Coding" Colorblind Slurs During The Congressional Crack Cocaine Debates, Richard Dvorak
Cracking The Code: "De-Coding" Colorblind Slurs During The Congressional Crack Cocaine Debates, Richard Dvorak
Michigan Journal of Race and Law
This article proposes "de-coding" as a method for unveiling the racist purpose behind the enactment of race-neutral legislation. Through the use of "code words," defined as “phrases and symbols which refer indirectly to racial themes, but do not directly challenge popular democratic or egalitarian ideals,” legislators can appeal to racist sentiments without appearing racist. More importantly, they can do so without leaving evidence that can be traced back as an intent to discriminate. This article proposes to use "de-coding" as a method to unmask the racist purpose behind the enactment of the 100:1 crack versus powder cocaine ratio for mandatory …
A Response To Professor Rubenfeld, Jonathan D. Hacker
A Response To Professor Rubenfeld, Jonathan D. Hacker
Michigan Law Review
Professor Jed Rubenfeld has offered in these pages an ingenious explanation for why the Supreme Court was right to strike down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in City of Boerne v. Flores. Rubenfeld finds in the First Amendment's Establishment Clause a historical and inherent principle he calls "antidisestablishmentarianism": a prohibition on acts of Congress that "disestablish" religion in the several states. Rubenfeld reads the Establishment Clause as proscribing not only congressional acts that "establish" religion but also all congressional acts that "dictate a position on religion for states," including laws designed to ensure that states abide by the requirements …
Reply: Did The Fourteenth Amendment Repeal The First?, Jed Rubenfeld
Reply: Did The Fourteenth Amendment Repeal The First?, Jed Rubenfeld
Michigan Law Review
To get right to the point: Mr. Hacker does not disagree that the Establishment Clause would, in the absence of the Fourteenth Amendment, have prohibited Congress from passing a nationwide religion law like RFRA. He believes, however, that the Fourteenth Amendment has in part repealed the First. Of course, he doesn't want to say repealed. The language of repeal is not pleasant to the ears of those who would like to forget about First Amendment antidisestablishmentarianism. The Fourteenth Amendment did not "repeal any aspect of the text of the [Establishment] Clause," Hacker says, but only "change[d] profoundly the meaning of …