Law Commons^™

The Cost Of Novelty, Will Nicholson Price Ii

Articles

Patent law tries to spur the development of new and better innova­tive technology. But it focuses much more on “new” than “better”—and it turns out that “new” carries real social costs. I argue that patent law promotes innovation that diverges from existing technology, either a little (what I call “differentiating innovation”) or a lot (“exploring innova­tion”), at the expense of innovation that tells us more about existing technology (“deepening innovation”). Patent law’s focus on newness is unsurprising, and fits within a well-told narrative of innovative diversity accompanied by market selection of the best technologies. Unfortunately, innovative diversity brings not only …

The Uneasy Case For Patent Law, Rachel E. Sachs

Michigan Law Review

A central tenet of patent law scholarship holds that if any scientific field truly needs patents to stimulate progress, it is pharmaceuticals. Patents are thought to be critical in encouraging pharmaceutical companies to develop and commercialize new therapies, due to the high costs of researching diseases, developing treatments, and bringing drugs through the complex, expensive approval process. Scholars and policymakers often point to patent law’s apparent success in the pharmaceutical industry to justify broader calls for more expansive patent rights.

This Article challenges this conventional wisdom about the centrality of patents to drug development by presenting a case study of …

Manufacturing Barriers To Biologics Competition And Innovation, W. Nicholson Price Ii., Arti K. Rai

Articles

As finding breakthrough small-molecule drugs becomes more difficult, drug companies are increasingly turning to "large molecule" biologics. Although biologics represent many of the most promising new therapies for previously intractable diseases, they are extremely expensive. Moreover, the pathway for generic-type competition set up by Congress in 2010 is unlikely to yield significant cost savings. This Article provides a fresh diagnosis of and prescription for this major public policy problem. It argues that the key cause is pervasive trade secrecy in the complex area of biologics manufacturing. Under the current regime, this trade secrecy, combined with certain features of Food and …

An Administrative Meter Maid: Using Inter Partes Review And Post-Grant Review To Curb Exclusivity Parking Via The "Failure To Market" Provision Of The Hatch-Waxman Act, Brian T. Apel

Michigan Law Review

Congress created the unique Hatch-Waxman framework in 1984 to increase the availability of low-cost generic drugs while preserving patent incentives for new drug development. The Hatch-Waxman Act rewards generic drug companies that successfully challenge a pharmaceutical patent: 180 days of market exclusivity before any other generic firm can enter the market. When a generic firm obtains this reward, sometimes drug developers agree to pay generic firms to delay entering the market. These pay-for-delay agreements give rise to exclusivity parking and run counter to congressional intent by delaying full generic drug competition. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act created …

Patents V. Statutory Exclusivities In Biological Pharmaceuticals - Do We Really Need Both, Yaniv Heled

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

Over the past decade or so, the United States has been the arena of a boisterous debate regarding the creation of a new regulatory framework for the approval of generic versions of biologics-based pharmaceutical products (also known as "biological products" and "biologics")--an important and increasingly growing class of drugs. The basic purpose of such a framework is to create a fast and less-costly route to FDA approval for biologics that would be similar or identical to already-approved biological products--typically ones that are sold on the market at monopoly rates--thereby allowing cheaper versions of such medicines to enter the market. One …

Does Misery Love Company - Evidence From Pharmaceutical Markets Before And After The Orphan Drug Act, Frank R. Lichtenberg, Joel Waldfogel

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

The possibility that small populations would see few medications developed for their conditions has [...] led the U.S. Congress to pass the 1983 Orphan Drug Act ("ODA"), giving firms special incentives to develop drugs for diseases afflicting fewer than 200,000 persons per year.[...][U]under the Act, drug makers receive seven years of exclusive marketing upon FDA approval of newly-developed drugs qualifying as "orphan drugs"--i.e., drugs for disorders affecting fewer than 200,000 persons.[...]Together, [the] provisions (a) increase the effective market size; and (b) reduce fixed (sunk) costs. In doing so, the Act provides a natural experiment for measuring the impact of increased …

Pdufa And Initial U.S. Drug Launches, Mary K. Olson

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

In the 1970s and 1980s, many pharmaceutical firms launched new drugs abroad prior to gaining U.S. approval. Consequently, U.S. patients often faced delays in accessing important new medicines. High regulatory barriers to entry, such as a stringent regulation and a lengthy drug review process, contributed to this problem. This Article examines the impact of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA), and subsequent increases in the speed of FDA review, on the likelihood of initial U.S. drug launches. These factors are hypothesized to lower regulatory barriers to entry in the U.S. pharmaceutical market. The results show that increased drug review …

Why Fdca Section 505(U) Should Not Concern Us Greatly, Kyle Faget

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

Among the many amendments found in the Food and Drug Administration Amendment Act of 2007 (FDAAA) is a provision at the end of the act, Section 505(u), which grants chiral switches five years of market exclusivity under certain circumstances. Prior to Congressional enactment of the FDAAA, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) refused to award new chemical entity (NCE) status to enantiomers of previously approved racemic mixtures. The FDA defines a new chemical entity ("NCE") as a drug that contains no active moiety that has been approved by the FDA in any other application submitted under Section 505(b) of the …

Platitudes About Product Stewardship In Torts: Continuing Drug Research And Education, Lars Noah

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

This Article focuses on one emerging aspect of tort litigation against pharmaceutical manufacturers that, if it gained traction, portends a dramatic (and potentially counterproductive) expansion in the prescription drug industry's exposure to liability. The traditional theories of products liability--mismanufacture, defective design, and inadequate warnings--no longer exhaust the potential obligations of sellers. In addition to increasingly popular claims of misrepresentation and negligent marketing, which seem more like extensions of the three defect categories than entirely novel theories, a growing chorus of commentators would impose on pharmaceutical manufacturers a broader duty to test and educate (aspects of what they call an obligation …

The Problem Of New Uses, Rebecca S. Eisenberg

Articles

Discovering new uses for drugs that are already on the market seems like it ought to be the low-lying fruit of biopharmaceutical research and development (R&D). Firms have already made significant investments in developing these drugs and bringing them to market, including testing them in clinical trials, shepherding them through the FDA regulatory approval process, building production facilities, and training sales staff to market them to physicians. By this point, the drugs have begun to enjoy goodwill among patients and physicians and casual observations in the course of clinical experience may point to potential new uses. One might expect that …

Learning The Value Of Drugs - Is Rofecoxib A Regulatory Success Story?, Rebecca S. Eisenberg

Articles

Controversy over recent revelations concerning the adverse cardiovascular effects of selective cyclooxygenase- 2 (COX-2) inhibitors has generally been framed as a story of regulatory failure, in which the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has failed in its mission to protect the public from unsafe products. But this simplistic understanding of the mission of the FDA seems to make failure all but inevitable, if the reliable observation of the risks and benefits of a drug requires rigorous long-term studies. Perhaps in an earlier era the goal of drug regulation was simply to protect the public from poisons. Today, drug regulation guides …