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Full-Text Articles in Law

Rethinking Religious Objections (Old-Testament Based) To Same-Sex Marriage, Doron M. Kalir Jan 2019

Rethinking Religious Objections (Old-Testament Based) To Same-Sex Marriage, Doron M. Kalir

Law Faculty Articles and Essays

In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court closed the door on one issue only to open the floodgates to another. While recognizing a constitutional right for same-sex marriage, the Court also legitimized religious objections to such unions, practically inviting complex legal challenges to its doors. In doing so, the Court also called for an "open and searching debate" on the issue. This Article seeks to trigger such debate.

For millennia, objections to same-sex marriage were cast in religious and moral terms. The Jewish Bible ("Old Testament"), conventional wisdom argues, provided three demonstrable proofs of the Bible's abhorrence of same-sex …


Jess Smith And The Design Firm, Gabriel Tenaglia Jan 2017

Jess Smith And The Design Firm, Gabriel Tenaglia

Richard T. Schellhase Essay Prize in Ethics

No abstract provided.


Nsfw: An Empirical Study Of Scandalous Trademarks, Megan M. Carpenter Mar 2015

Nsfw: An Empirical Study Of Scandalous Trademarks, Megan M. Carpenter

Megan M Carpenter

This project is an empirical analysis of trademarks that have received rejections based on the judgment that they are “scandalous." It is the first of its kind. The Lanham Act bars registration for trademarks that are “scandalous” and “immoral.” While much has been written on the morality provisions in the Lanham Act generally, this piece is the first scholarly project that engages an empirical analysis of 2(a) rejections based on scandalousness; it contains a look behind the scenes at how the morality provisions are applied throughout the trademark registration process. We study which marks are being rejected, what evidence is …


2007 National Lawyer’S Convention The Federalist Society And Its Federalism And Separation Of Powers Practice Groups Present A Panel Debate On Federalism: Religion, Early America And The Fourteenth Amendment, John Eastman, Marci Hamilton, William H. Pryor Jr. Dec 2014

2007 National Lawyer’S Convention The Federalist Society And Its Federalism And Separation Of Powers Practice Groups Present A Panel Debate On Federalism: Religion, Early America And The Fourteenth Amendment, John Eastman, Marci Hamilton, William H. Pryor Jr.

University of Massachusetts Law Review

Transcript of the Federalist Society and its Federalism and Separation of Powers Practice Groups panel debate at the 2007 National Lawyers Convention including panelists Dean John Eastman of Chapman University School of Law, Professor Marci Hamilton of the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, and moderated by Hon. William H. Pryor Jr. of the U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.


Conscience, Coercion, And The Constitution: Some Thoughts, Dwight G. Duncan Dec 2014

Conscience, Coercion, And The Constitution: Some Thoughts, Dwight G. Duncan

University of Massachusetts Law Review

As a consequence, this article will argue that the most viable constitutional strategy for protecting conscientious objectors is to bracket the question of whether it is religiously motivated. Rather, it will focus simply on the question of whether it is a sincerely held moral conviction, while seeking to expand existing freedom of speech case law under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution to maximize protection for people of conscience from being obliged to act contrary to their conscience.


Standing, Spending, And Separation: How The No-Establishment Rule Does (And Does Not) Protect Conscience, Richard W. Garnett Nov 2013

Standing, Spending, And Separation: How The No-Establishment Rule Does (And Does Not) Protect Conscience, Richard W. Garnett

Richard W Garnett

The First Amendment’s “Establishment Clause” is widely thought to protect “conscience.” Does it? If so, how? It is proposed in this paper that the no-establishment rule does indeed promote and protect religious liberty, and does safeguard conscience, but not (or, at least, not only) in the way most people think it does, namely, by sparing those who object from the asserted injury to their conscience caused by public funding of religious activity. The Supreme Court’s decision in Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation - a case in which the Justices limited taxpayer standing to bring Establishment Clause claims - reminds …


Re-Establishing Distributor Liability On The Internet: Recognizing The Applicability Of Traditional Defamation Law To Section 230 Of The Communications Decency Act Of 1996, William E. Buelow Iii Sep 2013

Re-Establishing Distributor Liability On The Internet: Recognizing The Applicability Of Traditional Defamation Law To Section 230 Of The Communications Decency Act Of 1996, William E. Buelow Iii

West Virginia Law Review

Plaintiffs whose reputations have suffered irreparable injury from the distribution of defamatory statements have generally been permitted by law to recover damages from the enterprises that distributed the publications known to contain the defamatory material. However, when the enterprise that knowingly distributed the injurious content is an Internet service provider ("ISP"), present law denies that same plaintiff recovery. This perception of ISP immunity flows from a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Zeran v. America Online, Inc., where the Court extended certain immunities offered by the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (the "CDA"). …


Standing, Spending, And Separation: How The No-Establishment Rule Does (And Does Not) Protect Conscience, Richard W. Garnett Jan 2009

Standing, Spending, And Separation: How The No-Establishment Rule Does (And Does Not) Protect Conscience, Richard W. Garnett

Journal Articles

The First Amendment’s “Establishment Clause” is widely thought to protect “conscience.” Does it? If so, how? It is proposed in this paper that the no-establishment rule does indeed promote and protect religious liberty, and does safeguard conscience, but not (or, at least, not only) in the way most people think it does, namely, by sparing those who object from the asserted injury to their conscience caused by public funding of religious activity.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation - a case in which the Justices limited taxpayer standing to bring Establishment Clause claims - reminds …


Sex, Politics, And Morality, Edward L. Rubin Oct 2005

Sex, Politics, And Morality, Edward L. Rubin

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.


Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure Of American Constitutional Law, Matthew D. Adler Oct 1998

Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure Of American Constitutional Law, Matthew D. Adler

Michigan Law Review

The Bill of Rights, by means of open-ended terms such as "freedom of speech," "equal protection," or "due process," refers to moral criteria, which take on constitutional status by virtue of being thus referenced. We can disagree about whether the proper methodology for judicial application of these criteria is originalist or nonoriginalist. The originalist looks, not to the true content of the moral criteria named by the Constitution, but to the framers' beliefs about that content; the nonoriginalist tries to determine what the criteria truly require, and ignores or gives less weight to the framers' views. Bracketing this disagreement, however, …


Information Superhighway Or Technological Sewer: What Will It Be?, Robert W. Peters Dec 1994

Information Superhighway Or Technological Sewer: What Will It Be?, Robert W. Peters

Federal Communications Law Journal

No abstract provided.


Harm, Morality, And Feminist Religion: Canada's New -- But Not So New -- Approach To Obscenity, Daniel O. Conkle Jan 1993

Harm, Morality, And Feminist Religion: Canada's New -- But Not So New -- Approach To Obscenity, Daniel O. Conkle

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.


Obscenity, The Law And Religion, Thomas A. Long Oct 1974

Obscenity, The Law And Religion, Thomas A. Long

IUSTITIA

The long history of the relation between Western religion and secular law is both interesting and complex.' In what follows I shall discuss one current social issue which is illustrative of this relation,namely, the relatively recent legal-moral controversy over obscenity.


Nine Justices In Search Of A Doctrine, Thomas I. Emerson Dec 1965

Nine Justices In Search Of A Doctrine, Thomas I. Emerson

Michigan Law Review

To the ordinary layman, Griswold v. Connecticut seemed easy. But to the lawyer it was somewhat more difficult. The lawyer's problem with the case was that the issues did not readily fit into any existing legal pigeonhole. Actually, there were five possibilities. The case could have been dealt with under the equal protection clause, the first amendment, substantive due process, the right of privacy, or, in extremis, the ninth amendment. In order to strike down the statute under any of these doctrines, however, the Court would be forced to enter uncharted waters. Whatever course the Court took, its action …


Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental And Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, Paul G. Kauper Dec 1965

Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental And Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, Paul G. Kauper

Michigan Law Review

The varying theories followed in the several opinions in the Griswold case can be fully understood and appreciated only in the context of the tortuous but fascinating history of the judicial interpretation of the fourteenth amendment.


The Right Of Privacy: Emanations And Intimations, Robert B. Mckay Dec 1965

The Right Of Privacy: Emanations And Intimations, Robert B. Mckay

Michigan Law Review

When Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren wrote in 1890 of "The Right to Privacy," they sought a means of protecting against unwelcome newspaper attention to social activities in the Warren household. Addressing their argument to the private law of torts, they presumably did not anticipate constitutional protection for other rights under the claim of privacy. Nevertheless, seventy· five years later that concept, now called the "right of privacy," was used by the Supreme Court of the United States in Griswold v. Connecticut to describe a constitutional right. Some members of the Court said the new right was within the "penumbra" …


Privacy In Connecticut, Arthur E. Sutherland Dec 1965

Privacy In Connecticut, Arthur E. Sutherland

Michigan Law Review

Occasionally a judgment of our Supreme Court, delivered in a superficially petty case, suddenly before our startled eyes displays fundamentals of our constitutional theory. Thus, in Griswold v. Connecticut, holding unconstitutional an 1879 Connecticut statute forbidding all persons to use contraceptive devices, the Court found it necessary to discover a "right of privacy" latent in the Bill of Rights and incorporated into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The outcome of the case is satisfying; all nine Justices joined in saying, in one way or another, that Connecticut's statute was nonsense. I am happy to see this …


Giannella: Religion And The Public Order, Rev. Robert F. Drinan S. J. Jan 1965

Giannella: Religion And The Public Order, Rev. Robert F. Drinan S. J.

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Religion and the Public Order. An Annual Review of Church and State and of Religion, Law and Society, The Institute of Church and State, Villanova University School of Law. Edited by Donald A. Giannella.


Constitutional Law - Freedom Of Press - Validity Of Motion Picture Licensing Statute, Dean L. Berry S.Ed. Jan 1959

Constitutional Law - Freedom Of Press - Validity Of Motion Picture Licensing Statute, Dean L. Berry S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

The distributor of the motion picture "Lady Chatterley's Lover" applied to the Motion Picture Division of the New York State Education Department for a license, required by New York law, for public presentation of the film. The application was denied on the ground the film was "immoral" within the meaning of the licensing statute. On review, the Board of Regents approved this determination, but on appeal the state supreme court reversed the Board. A divided court of appeals reversed the supreme court, holding that the contents of the film met the statutory definition of "immoral." On appeal to the Supreme …