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Condemning Religion: Rluipa And The Politics Of Eminent Domain, Christopher Serkin, Nelson Tebbe
Condemning Religion: Rluipa And The Politics Of Eminent Domain, Christopher Serkin, Nelson Tebbe
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
Should religious landowners enjoy special protection from eminent domain? A recent federal statute, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), compels courts to apply a compelling interest test to zoning and landmarking regulations that substantially burden religiously owned property. That provision has been controversial in itself, but today a new cutting-edge issue is emerging: whether the Act’s extraordinary protection should extend to condemnation as well. The matter has taken on added significance in the wake of Kelo, where the Supreme Court reaffirmed its expansive view of the eminent domain power. In this Article, we argue that RLUIPA should …
Establishing Inequality, Gene R. Nichol
Establishing Inequality, Gene R. Nichol
Michigan Law Review
Part I outlines Nussbaum's thesis and her similarly interesting, if perhaps not always completely consistent, applications of it. Part II touches on some challenges and potential shortcomings her theory presents-for clearly there are such. But, in Part III, I argue that her wide-ranging study of the work of the religion clauses nonetheless touches something residing at the core of American citizenship. No bosses. No masters. No insiders. None outcast. Finally, and far more idiosyncratically, in Part IV I explore and expand on Nussbaum's thesis in light of a modestly serious and rather public dispute over religious equality that occurred at …
Excluding Religion: A Reply, Nelson Tebbe
Excluding Religion: A Reply, Nelson Tebbe
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
This short piece replies to three prominent scholars who have offered thoughtful responses to my article, Excluding Religion. It first takes up their invitation to explore some of the ramifications of the article for legal and political theory, albeit in a limited way. Second, it revisits the article’s central argument - namely, that governments ought to have greater constitutional leeway to deny aid to religious actors and entities than is commonly thought - and shows how that proposal emerges from the conversation intact. Third, the reply defends certain limits on the practice of excluding religion, particularly the presumptive prohibition on …