Law Commons^™

Why The Actual Malice Test Should Be Eliminated, John M. Kang

Faculty Scholarship

Under traditional common law, a plaintiff could recover damages for libel if she could prove that the defendant had published a factual statement about the plaintiff that tended to injure the plaintiff’s reputation. The plaintiff, at most, was required to show negligence to recover damages for libel. While the amount of money that any given plaintiff could recover in damages was uncertain, one thing was clear: the First Amendment would not protect libel. In 1964, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court radically upended this received view of libel as unprotected speech. According to Sullivan, …

The Case Against Expanding Defamation Law, Yonathan A. Arbel, Murat C. Mungan

Faculty Scholarship

It is considered axiomatic that defamation law protects reputation. This proposition—commonsensical, pervasive, and influential—is faulty. Underlying this fallacy is the failure to appreciate audience effects: the interaction between defamation law and members of the audience.

Defamation law seeks to affect the behavior of speakers by making them bear a cost for spreading untruthful information. Invariably, however, the law will also affect members of the audience, as statements made in a highly regulated environment tend to appear more reliable than statements made without accountability. Strict defamation law would tend to increase the perceived reliability of statements, which in some cases can …