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Free Speech And The Myth Of The Internet As An Unintermediated Experience, Christopher S. Yoo Sep 2010

Free Speech And The Myth Of The Internet As An Unintermediated Experience, Christopher S. Yoo

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In recent years, a growing number of commentators have raised concerns that the decisions made by Internet intermediaries — including last-mile network providers, search engines, social networking sites, and smartphones — are inhibiting free speech and have called for restrictions on their ability to prioritize or exclude content. Such calls ignore the fact that when mass communications are involved, intermediation helps end users to protect themselves from unwanted content and allows them to sift through the avalanche of desired content that grows ever larger every day. Intermediation also helps solve a number of classic economic problems associated with the Internet. …


Censorship By Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, And The Problem Of The Weakest Link, Seth F. Kreimer Nov 2006

Censorship By Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, And The Problem Of The Weakest Link, Seth F. Kreimer

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The rise of the Internet has changed the First Amendment drama, for governments confront technical and political obstacles to sanctioning either speakers or listeners in cyberspace. Faced with these challenges, regulators have fallen back on alternatives, predicated on the fact that, in contrast to the usual free expression scenario, the Internet is not dyadic. The Internet's resistance to direct regulation of speakers and listeners rests on a complex chain of connections, and emerging regulatory mechanisms have begun to focus on the weak links in that chain. Rather than attacking speakers or listeners directly, governments have sought to enlist private actors …


Initial Interest Confusion: Standing At The Crossroads Of Trademark Law, Jennifer E. Rothman Oct 2005

Initial Interest Confusion: Standing At The Crossroads Of Trademark Law, Jennifer E. Rothman

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While the benchmark of trademark infringement traditionally has been a demonstration that consumers are likely to be confused by the use of a similar or identical trademark to identify the goods or services of another, a court-created doctrine called initial interest confusion allows liability for trademark infringement solely on the basis that a consumer might initially be interested, attracted, or distracted by a competitor's, or even a non-competitor's, product or service. Initial interest confusion is being used with increasing frequency, especially on the Internet, to shut down speech critical of trademark holders and their products and services, to prevent comparative …


Sovereign Indignity? Values, Borders And The Internet: A Case Study, Eric Easton Jan 1998

Sovereign Indignity? Values, Borders And The Internet: A Case Study, Eric Easton

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This article focuses on the publication ban issued by a Canadian court in a notorious murder trial, and the popular reaction to the publication ban, as a case study of the new global communications environment. Part I reconstructs the factual circumstances that provoked the ban, as well as the responses of the media, the legal establishment, and the public. Part II examines the ban itself, the constitutional challenge mounted by the media, and the landmark Dagenais decision. Part III reflects on the meaning of the entire episode for law, journalism, and national sovereignty.

The Dagenais decision demonstrates the continued independence …


Closing The Barn Door After The Genie Is Out Of The Bag: Recognizing A "Futility Principle" In First Amendment Jurisprudence, Eric Easton Oct 1995

Closing The Barn Door After The Genie Is Out Of The Bag: Recognizing A "Futility Principle" In First Amendment Jurisprudence, Eric Easton

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This article argues for a simple proposition: the First Amendment imposes a presumption against the suppression of speech when suppression would be futile. Suppression is futile when the speech is available to the same audience through some other medium or at some other place. The government can overcome this presumption of futility only when it asserts an important interest that is unrelated to the content of the speech in question, and only when the suppression directly advances that interest.

In Part I, the article explores the role that this unarticulated "futility principle" has played in Supreme Court and other decisions …