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- Keyword
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- Amateur; amateurism; sports; football; college football; athelete; college athelete; student athelete; NCAA; Mark Emmert; right to publicity; First Amendment; Olympics; Olympic Model; Olympic amateur; labor law; employment law; name and likeness; Pay to Play Act; college; university; antitrust law; Ninth Circuit; FanDuel; fantasy sports; minor league; Fair Labor Standards Act; FLSA; law; policy (1)
- Citizens United; campaign finance; Super PAC; single-candidate; coordination; FEC; FPPC; independent expenditures; quid pro quo; corruption (1)
- Publication
Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Law
Preserving Fabled Amateurism: The Benefits Of The Ncaa’S Adoption Of The Olympic Amateurism Model, John Kealey
Preserving Fabled Amateurism: The Benefits Of The Ncaa’S Adoption Of The Olympic Amateurism Model, John Kealey
Journal of Law and Policy
After a century of denying student-athletes from receiving compensation outside the cost of attendance for their athletic contributions to their respective universities, the NCAA finally announced it would change its amateurism rule. The change came in response to multiple class action lawsuits and, more recently, legislation from many states, namely California and New York, which would have mandated that universities do not interfere with student-athletes desire to commercially exploit their own names, image, and likenesses. However, these statutes are potentially flawed in that each could exacerbate or perpetuate the anti-trust and first amendment issues inherent to the current amateurism rule. …
How Single-Candidate Super Pacs Changed The Game And How To Change It Back: Adopting A Presumption Of Coordination And Fixing The Fec’S Gridlock, Sarah E. Adams
How Single-Candidate Super Pacs Changed The Game And How To Change It Back: Adopting A Presumption Of Coordination And Fixing The Fec’S Gridlock, Sarah E. Adams
Brooklyn Law Review
A series of Supreme Court decisions chipping away at campaign finance regulations, particularly the regulation of expenditure-only groups, has resulted in a proliferation of single-candidate Super PACs. While purportedly independent of the candidate, in reality, single-candidate Super PACs operate as an extension of the candidate’s own campaign team. This note argues that single-candidate Super PACs, now operating as fundamental extensions of candidates’ campaigns, pose quid pro quo corruption risks by acting as surrogates for donors who have maxed out on contributions made directly to a candidate. This note will prove that curbing the proliferation of candidate Super PAC coordination, and …