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First Amendment

Boston University School of Law

Hate speech

Publication Year

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Full-Text Articles in Law

Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, And Censorship Creep, Danielle K. Citron Jan 2018

Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, And Censorship Creep, Danielle K. Citron

Faculty Scholarship

Silicon Valley has long been viewed as a full-throated champion of First Amendment values. The dominant online platforms, however, have recently adopted speech policies and processes that depart from the U.S. model. In an agreement with the European Commission, tech companies have pledged to respond to reports of hate speech within twenty-four hours, a hasty process that may trade valuable expression for speedy results. Plans have been announced for an industry database that will allow the same companies to share hashed images of banned extremist content for review and removal elsewhere.

These changes are less the result of voluntary market …


Defining Hate Speech, Andrew Sellars Dec 2016

Defining Hate Speech, Andrew Sellars

Faculty Scholarship

There is no shortage of opinions about what should be done about hate speech, but if there is one point of agreement, it is that the topic is ripe for rigorous study. But just what is hate speech, and how will we know it when we see it online? For all of the extensive literature about the causes, harms, and responses to hate speech, few scholars have endeavored to systematically define the term. Where other areas of content analysis have developed rich methodologies to account for influences like context or bias, the present scholarship around hate speech rarely extends beyond …


Implications Of Mill's Theory Of Liberty For The Regulation Of Hate Speech And Hate Crimes, Keith N. Hylton Jan 1996

Implications Of Mill's Theory Of Liberty For The Regulation Of Hate Speech And Hate Crimes, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

The notion that utilitarianism cannot support a theory of fundamental rights is a recurring source of conflict in law and philosophy.' Those who adhere to this view argue that a utilitarian or consequentialist approach cannot provide a stable, permanent justification for rights: at any moment, the utilitarian calculus might conclude that what it considered a right yesterday, actually reduces total welfare, and therefore is not a right today. Perhaps no one has gone further in attempting to refute this claim than John Stuart Mill.' As a result, any effort to construct a consequentialist theory of fundamental rights must draw at …