Law Commons^™

Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones And The Things They Carry, Margot E. Kaminski

Publications

Civilian drones are scheduled to be permitted in the national airspace as early as 2015. Many think Congress should establish the necessary nationwide regulations to govern both law enforcement and civilian drone use. That thinking, however, is wrong. This Essay suggests drone federalism instead: a state-based approach to privacy regulation that governs drone use by civilians, drawing on states’ experience regulating other forms of civilian-on-civilian surveillance. This approach will allow necessary experimentation in how to best balance privacy concerns against First Amendment rights in the imminent era of drone-use democratization. This Essay closes by providing some guidance to states as …

After Privacy: The Rise Of Facebook, The Fall Of Wikileaks, And Singapore’S Personal Data Protection Act 2012, Simon Chesterman

Simon Chesterman

This article discusses the changing ways in which information is produced, stored, and shared — exemplified by the rise of social-networking sites like Facebook and controversies over the activities of WikiLeaks — and the implications for privacy and data protection. Legal protections of privacy have always been reactive, but the coherence of any legal regime has also been undermined by the lack of a strong theory of what privacy is. There is more promise in the narrower field of data protection. Singapore, which does not recognise a right to privacy, has positioned itself as an e-commerce hub but had no …

The Policy Against Federal Funding For Abortions Extends Into The Realm Of Free Speech After Rust V. Sullivan, Loye M. Barton

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

California's Constitutional Right To Privacy, J. Clark Kelso

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Private Club Exemption From Civil Rights Legislation - Sanctioned Discrimination Or Justified Protection Of Right To Associate, Margaret E. Koppen

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

To Drink The Cup Of Fury: Funeral Picketing, Public Discourse And The First Amendment, Steven J. Heyman

All Faculty Scholarship

In Snyder v. Phelps, the Supreme Court held that the Westboro Baptist Church had a First Amendment right to picket the funeral of a young soldier killed in Iraq. This decision reinforces a position that has become increasingly prevalent in First Amendment jurisprudence – the view that the state may not regulate public discourse to protect individuals from emotional or dignitary injury. In this Article, I argue that this view is deeply problematic for two reasons: it unduly sacrifices the value of individual personality and it tends to undermine the sphere of public discourse itself by negating the practical and …

Substance And Method In The Year 2000, Akhil Reed Amar

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Brief Of Aarp And The National Legislative Association On Prescription Drug Prices As Amici Curiae In Support Of Petitioners, Sean Flynn

Sean Flynn

This brief was written in support of Vermont’s Prescription Confidentiality Law, which regulates the confidentiality of prescription records and protects them from being used by pharmaceutical companies as a “targeting tool” to identify doctors most susceptible to sales messages.

Electronic Privacy And Employee Speech, Pauline T. Kim

Chicago-Kent Law Review

The boundary between work and private life is blurring as a result of changes in the organization of work and advances in technology. Current privacy law is ill-equipped to address these changes and as a result, employees' privacy in their electronic communications is only weakly protected from employer scrutiny. At the same time, the law increasingly protects certain socially valued forms of employee speech. In particular, collective speech, speech that enforces workplace regulations and speech that deters or reports employer wrong-doing are explicitly protected by law from employer reprisals. These two developments—weak protection of employee privacy and increased protection for …

Privacy Rights: The Virtue Of Protecting A False Reputation, John A. Humbach

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

What is the virtue of protecting a false reputation? The thesis of this paper is that there is none. There is none, at least, that justifies the suppression of free speech. Yet, there is a growing trend to see the protection of reputation from truth as a key function of the so-called “right of privacy.”

Unfortunately, people often do things that they are not proud of or do not want others to know about. Often, however, these are precisely the things that others want or need to know. For our own protection, each of us is better off being aware …

Is It Better To Be Safe Than Sorry?: Free Speech And The Precautionary Principle, Frederick Schauer

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

No Cause Of Action: Video Surveillance In New York City, Olivia J. Greer

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

In 2010, New York City Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly announced a new network of video surveillance in the City. The new network would be able to prevent future terrorist attacks by identifying suspicious behavior before catastrophic events could take place. Kelly told reporters, "If we're looking for a person in a red jacket, we can call up all the red jackets filmed in the last 30 days," and "[w]e're beginning to use software that can identify suspicious objects or behaviors." Gothamist later made a witticism of Kelly's statement, remarking, "Note to terrorists: red jackets are not a good look for …

Foia And The First Amendment: Representative Democracy And The People's Elusive "Right To Know", Barry Sullivan

Maryland Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Sidis Case And The Origins Of Modern Privacy Law, Samantha Barbas

Journal Articles

The American press, it’s been said, is freer to invade personal privacy than perhaps any other in the world. The tort law of privacy, as a shield against unwanted media exposure of private life, is very weak. The usual reason given for the weakness of U.S. privacy law as a bar on the publication of private information is the strong tradition of First Amendment freedom. But “freedom of the press” alone cannot explain why liberty to publish has been interpreted as a right to print truly intimate matters or to thrust people into the spotlight against their will. Especially in …

Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, And Constitutional Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes Of Age, Laura K. Donohue

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Federal interest in using facial recognition technology (“FRT”) to collect, analyze, and use biometric information is rapidly growing. Despite the swift movement of agencies and contractors into this realm, however, Congress has been virtually silent on the current and potential uses of FRT. No laws directly address facial recognition—much less the pairing of facial recognition with video surveillance—in criminal law. Limits placed on the collection of personally identifiable information, moreover, do not apply. The absence of a statutory framework is a cause for concern. FRT represents the first of a series of next generation biometrics, such as hand geometry, iris, …

Electronic Privacy And Employee Speech, Pauline Kim

Scholarship@WashULaw

The boundary between work and private life is blurring as a result of changes in the organization of work and advances in technology. Current privacy law is ill-equipped to address these changes and as a result, employees’ privacy in their electronic communications is only weakly protected from employer scrutiny. At the same time, the law increasingly protects certain socially valued forms of employee speech. In particular, collective speech, speech that enforces workplace regulations and speech that deters or reports employer wrong-doing are explicitly protected by law from employer reprisals. These two developments — weak protection of employee privacy and increased …

Privacy And The Right Of Free Expression, John A. Humbach

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

Nobody likes to be talked about but everybody likes to talk. Trying to stop the dissemination of private information is, however, an impingement on free expression and the freedom to observe. A freestanding “right of privacy” that violates these interests is constitutionally permissible only if it can be justified using one of the standard bases for allowing restrictions on First Amendment rights. The three most likely possibilities are that the law in question: (1) can pass strict scrutiny, (2) fall within a recognized “categorical” exception, or (3) places only an “incidental” burden on First Amendment interests. Of these three, only …