Law Commons^™

Defamation 2.0, Cortelyou C. Kenney

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

There is a literal prohibition in the media bar that media lawyers cannot represent plaintiffs in suits for defamation. The stated principle behind this rule—a rule that can result in excommunication from the premier media law organization if it is violated—is that playing both sides of the defamation game is disloyal to traditional media actors because any chance of victory could inadvertently distort the law of defamation to increase the risk of frivolous suits against media outlets or other innocent third parties. But has the maxim finally gone too far?

Fueled by a new model where media profits are driven …

Mypillow Lands Hard In Judge Wright’S Court, Michael K. Steenson

Faculty Scholarship

In Smartmatic USA Corp. v. Lindell, Smartmatic sued Michael Lindell and MyPillow, Inc. in Minnesota federal district court, alleging defamation and violation of Minnesota’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act based on Lindell’s claims of fraud in the 2020 presidential election, including that Smartmatic voting machines were rigged. This post focuses on Smartmatic’s defamation claim against Lindell and MyPillow.

Four Privacy Stories And Two Hard Cases, Jessica Silbey

Faculty Scholarship

In the context of reviewing Scott Skinner's book "Privacy at the Margins" (Cambridge University Press, 2021), this article discusses four "privacy stories" (justifications for and explanation of the application of privacy law) that need substantiation and reinterpretation for the 21st century and for what I call "fourth generation" privacy law and scholarship. The article then considers these stories (and Skinner's analysis of them) in light of two "hard" cases, one he discusses in his book and one recently decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, both concerning privacy in taking and dissemination of photographs.

Absolute Publishing Power And Bulletproof Immunity: How Section 230 Shields Internet Service Providers From Liability And Makes It Impossible To Protect Your Reputation Online, Victoria Anderson

Seattle University Law Review SUpra

No abstract provided.

Law School News: Logan Article Central To Scotus Dissent, Roger Williams University School Of Law

Life of the Law School (1993- )

No abstract provided.

Automation In Moderation, Hannah Bloch-Wehba

Faculty Scholarship

This Article assesses recent efforts to encourage online platforms to use automated means to prevent the dissemination of unlawful online content before it is ever seen or distributed. As lawmakers in Europe and around the world closely scrutinize platforms’ “content moderation” practices, automation and artificial intelligence appear increasingly attractive options for ridding the Internet of many kinds of harmful online content, including defamation, copyright infringement, and terrorist speech. Proponents of these initiatives suggest that requiring platforms to screen user content using automation will promote healthier online discourse and will aid efforts to limit Big Tech’s power.

In fact, however, the …

Rescuing Our Democracy By Rethinking New York Times Co. V. Sullivan, David A. Logan

Law Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Public Official, Figures, And Controversies In Minnesota Defamation Law, Michael K. Steenson

Faculty Scholarship

In Minnesota, the plaintiff in a common law defamation claim is entitled to recover presumed damages in libel and slander per se cases. Those rules change when the First Amendment is injected into defamation cases when the plaintiff is a public official or figure or is a private person involved in a public controversy. A plaintiff who is a public official or figure must prove not only the elements of the common law defamation claim, but also that the defamatory communication was a false statement of fact and prove by clear and convincing evidence that it was made with actual …

The Case Against Expanding Defamation Law, Yonathan A. Arbel, Murat C. Mungan

Faculty Scholarship

It is considered axiomatic that defamation law protects reputation. This proposition—commonsensical, pervasive, and influential—is faulty. Underlying this fallacy is the failure to appreciate audience effects: the interaction between defamation law and members of the audience.

Defamation law seeks to affect the behavior of speakers by making them bear a cost for spreading untruthful information. Invariably, however, the law will also affect members of the audience, as statements made in a highly regulated environment tend to appear more reliable than statements made without accountability. Strict defamation law would tend to increase the perceived reliability of statements, which in some cases can …

Law School News: Logan To Serve As Adviser On Restatement Third Of Torts 11-07-2019, Michael M. Bowden

Life of the Law School (1993- )

No abstract provided.

Brief Amici Curiae Of Electronic Frontier Foundation, 1851 Center For Constitutional Law, And Profs. Jonathan Entin, David F. Forte, Andrew Geronimo, Raymond Ku, Stephen Lazarus, Kevin Francis O’Neill, Margaret Tarkington, Aaron H. Caplan, And Eugene Volokh In Support Of Respondent-Appellant, Joni Bey And Rebecca Rasawehr V. Jeffrey Rasawehr, Supreme Court Of Ohio (Case No. 2019-0295), David Forte, Stephen R. Lazarus, Kevin F. O'Neill, Jonathan L. Entin, Andrew Geronimo, Raymond Ku, Margaret Tarkington, Aaron H. Kaplan, Eugene Volokh

Law Faculty Briefs and Court Documents

The brief argues that the Third District Court of Appeals, in violation of the First Amendment, erred in upholding an injunction that barred defendant from any online postings regarding plaintiff, whether or not those postings were to plaintiff or to third parties.

The Defamation Injunction Meets The Prior Restraint Doctrine, Doug Rendleman

Scholarly Articles

In Near v. Minnesota, the Supreme Court added the injunction to executive licensing as a prior restraint. Although the Near court circumscribed the injunction as a prior restraint, it approved criminal sanctions and damages judgments. The prior restraint label resembles a death sentence. This article maintains that such massive retaliation is overkill.

A judge’s injunction that forbids the defendant’s tort of defamation tests Near and prior restraint doctrine because defamation isn’t protected by the First Amendment. Arguing that the anti-defamation injunction has outgrown outright bans under the prior restraint rule and the equitable Maxim that “Equity will not enjoin defamation” …

Ventura V. Kyle And American Sniper; The Anatomy Of A Public Figure’S Lawsuit, Michael K. Steenson

Faculty Scholarship

Chris Kyle's book, American Sniper, detailed his exploits as a prolific Navy SEAL sniper. In a book subchapter Kyle detailed an encounter with a "Mr. Scruff Face" in a San Diego Bar. The book states that Ventura made certain statements that were demeaning of the United States and the Navy SEALS. Scruff Face was subsequently identified by Chris Kyle as Jesse Ventura, former governor of Minnesota. Ventura sued Chris Kyle for defamation, appropriation, and unjust enrichment. Relying on trial court documents, briefs, and the opinions in the case, this article probes those theories of recovery with an emphasis on the …

Facebook V. Sullivan: Public Figures And Newsworthiness In Online Speech, Thomas E. Kadri, Kate Klonick

Scholarly Works

In the United States, there are now two systems to adjudicate disputes about harmful speech. The first is older and more established: the legal system in which judges apply constitutional law to limit tort claims alleging injuries caused by speech. The second is newer and less familiar: the content-moderation system in which platforms like Facebook implement the rules that govern online speech. These platforms are not bound by the First Amendment. But, as it turns out, they rely on many of the tools used by courts to resolve tensions between regulating harmful speech and preserving free expression—particularly the entangled concepts …

Facebook V. Sullivan: Public Figures And Newsworthiness In Online Speech, Thomas E. Kadri, Kate Klonick

Faculty Publications

In the United States, there are now two systems to adjudicate disputes about harmful speech. The first is older and more established: the legal system in which judges apply constitutional law to limit tort claims alleging injuries caused by speech. The second is newer and less familiar: the content-moderation system in which platforms like Facebook implement the rules that govern online speech. These platforms are not bound by the First Amendment. But, as it turns out, they rely on many of the tools used by courts to resolve tensions between regulating harmful speech and preserving free expression—particularly the entangled concepts …

Rwu First Amendment Blog: David A. Logan's Blog: Infowars Goes To War With The First Amendment 08-15-2018, David A. Logan

Law School Blogs

No abstract provided.

Rwu First Amendment Blog: David Logan's Blog: Discovering Trump 06-22-2018, David A. Logan

Law School Blogs

No abstract provided.

Defamation And Privacy In The Social Media Age: What Would Justice Brennan Think?, Stephen Wermiel

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

No abstract provided.

Defamation Per Se And Transgender Status: When Macro-Level Value Judgments About Equality Trump Micro-Level Reputational Injury, Clay Calvert, Ashton T. Hampton, Austin Vining

UF Law Faculty Publications

This Article uses the September 2017 defamation decision in Simmons v. American Media, Inc. as a springboard for examining defamatory meaning and reputational injury. Specifically, it focuses on cases in which judges acknowledge that plaintiffs have suffered reputational harm yet rule for defendants because promoting the cultural value of equality weighs against redress. In Simmons, a normative, axiological judgment--that the law should neither sanction nor ratify prejudicial views about transgender individuals-- prevailed at the trial court level over a celebrity's ability to recover for alleged reputational harm. Simmons sits at a dangerous intersection: a crossroads where a noble judicial desire …

Freedom Of Speech And The Criminal Law, Dan T. Coenen

Scholarly Works

Because the Free Speech Clause limits government power to enact penal statutes, it has a close relationship to American criminal law. This Article explores that relationship at a time when a fast-growing “decriminalization movement” has taken hold across the nation. At the heart of the Article is the idea that free speech law has developed in ways that have positioned the Supreme Court to use that law to impose significant new limits on the criminalization of speech. More particularly, this article claims that the Court has developed three distinct decision-making strategies for decriminalizing speech based on constitutional principles. The first …

How Do We Know When Speech Is Of Low Value?, Helen Norton

Publications

No abstract provided.

Summary Of Jacobs V. Adelson, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 44, Kylee Gloeckner

Nevada Supreme Court Summaries

The Court determined whether the absolute privilege rule applies to statements made to the media.

On Business Torts And The First Amendment, Richard J. Peltz-Steele

Faculty Publications

A gaping question in free speech law surrounds the application of the First Amendment defense in business torts. The pervasiveness of communication technologies, the flourishing of privacy law, and the mere passage of time have precipitated an escalation in tort cases in which communication, and what the defendant may allege is free speech, lies at the heart of the matter.

Material Falsity In Defamation Cases: The Supreme Court's Call For Contextual Analysis, Charles D. Tobin, Leonard M. Niehoff

Articles

In the book The Phantom Tollbooth, one of the characters, Milo, declares that he comes from a faraway land called Context. After a circuitous journey through many strange cities, bearing names that have meanings Milo struggles to understand, he finds himself back at home in his bedroom.

Context, by and large, is the home base for courts in defining the boundaries between actionable and nonactionable speech. Often, after circuitous travels through precedent and logic, courts meander back to the simple notion that the meaning and legal significance of words are determined by their context.

Zombies Among Us: Injunctions In Defamation Cases Come Back From The Dead, Jim Stewart, Leonard M. Niehoff

Articles

Here's a scary thought: an individual, unhappy with negative statements that have been made about him, sues for defamation and persuades the trial court to issue an injunction prohibiting the speaker from engaging in that speech again. An appellate court reviews the injunction and, in large measure, upholds it. This creepy scenario brings shudders to free speech and media advocates, who have long viewed such injunctions as prior restraints that the First Amendment forbids in all but the most extreme and extraordinary cases. As a recent decision from the Michigan Court of Appeals demonstrates, however, decades of United States Supreme …

Collateral Censorship And The Limits Of Intermediary Immunity, Felix T. Wu

Articles

The law often limits the liability of an intermediary for the speech it carries. And rightly so, because imposing liability on intermediaries can induce them to filter out questionable content and this “collateral censorship” risks suppressing much lawful, even highly beneficial, speech. The “collateral censorship” rationale has its limits, though, and correspondingly, so should the applicability of intermediary immunity. The worry with collateral censorship is not just that intermediaries censor, but that they censor more than an original speaker would in the face of potential liability. Increased censorship, in turn, is the product of applying liability targeted at original speakers …

Opinions, Implications, And Confusions, Leonard M. Niehoff

Articles

The law of defamation is haunted by ancient common law principles, such as the distinction between libel per se and libel per quad, that contribute nothing to our current jurisprudence beyond providing opportunities for misunderstanding and perplexity. Unfortunately, more contemporary doctrines have further complicated the field by sowing fresh confusions. This article explores two such doctrines-the principle that a defamation claim cannot rest upon an opinion and the principle that a defamation claim can rest upon unstated implications- and suggests that there are troublesome contradictions both within them and between them. In short, this article respectfully proposes that these two …

When Is Religious Speech Outrageous?: Snyder V. Phelps And The Limits Of Religious Advocacy, Jeffrey Shulman

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The Constitution affords great protection to religiously motivated speech. Religious liberty would mean little if it did not mean the right to profess and practice as well as to believe. But are there limits beyond which religious speech loses its constitutional shield? Would it violate the First Amendment to subject a religious entity to tort liability if its religious profession causes emotional distress? When is religious speech outrageous?

These are vexing questions, to say the least; but the United States Supreme Court will take them up next term—and it will do so in a factual context that has generated as …

Relative Access To Corrective Speech: A New Test For Requiring Actual Malice, Aaron Perzanowski

Articles

This Article reexamines the First Amendment protections provided by the public figure doctrine. It suggests that the doctrine is rooted in a set of out-dated assumptions regarding the media landscape and, as a result, has failed to adapt in a manner that accounts for our changing communications environment.

The public figure doctrine, which imposes the more rigorous actual malice standard of fault on defamation plaintiffs who enjoy greater access to mass media, was constructed in an era defined by one-to-many communications media. Newspapers, broadcasters, and traditional publishers exhausted the Court's understanding of the means of communicating with mass audiences. As …

Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse In Cyberspace, Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky

UF Law Faculty Publications

John Doe has become a popular defamation defendant as corporations and their officers bring defamation suits for statements made about them in Internet discussion fora. These new suits are not even arguably about recovering money damages but instead are brought for symbolic reasons-some worthy, some not so worthy. If the only consequence of these suits were that Internet users were held accountable for their speech, the suits would be an unalloyed good. However, these suits threaten to suppress legitimate criticism along with intentional and reckless falsehoods, and existing First Amendment law doctrines are not responsive to the threat these suits …