Law Commons^™

Rlupia And The Limits Of Religious Institutionalism, Zachary A. Bray

Zachary Bray

What special protections, if any, should religious organizations receive from local land use controls? The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”)—a deeply flawed statute—has been a magnet for controversy since its passage in 2000. Yet until recently, RLUIPA has played little role in debates about “religious institutionalism,” a set of ideas that suggest religious institutions play a distinctive role in developing the framework for religious liberty and that they deserve comparably distinctive deference and protection. This is starting to change: RLUIPA’s magnetic affinity for controversy has begun to connect conflicts over religious land use with larger debates about …

Holmes And Brennan, Howard M. Wasserman

Howard M Wasserman

Abstract Principle V. Contextual Conceptions Of Harm: A Comment On R. V. Butler, Jamie Cameron

Jamie Cameron

This comment provides a critique of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Butler, which held that section 163(8) of the Criminal Code, defining obscenity, is a reasonable limit on freedom of expression under section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Before discussing the Charter, the Court expanded the scope of section 163(8) to include a prohibition against sexually explicit material that is degrading or dehumanizing. Initially, the author is critical of the Court's methodology, which enlarged section 163(8) at the expense of expressive freedom, without even mentioning the Charter. Once the Court had interpreted …

Categories, Tiers Of Review, And The Roiling Sea Of Free Speech Doctrine And Principle: A Methodological Critique Of United States V. Alvarez, Rodney A. Smolla

Rod Smolla

None available.

Section 1983 Civil Rights Litigation In The October 2005 Term, Martin Schwartz

Martin A. Schwartz

No abstract provided.

Nonprofits, Speech, And Unconstitutional Conditions, Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer

Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer

This Article proposes a new constitutional framework for approaching the issue of speech-related conditions on government funding accepted by nonprofits and demonstrates its application by reviewing the Court’s landmark decisions in this area. It argues that speech rights are generally inalienable as against the government under the First Amendment, and therefore any abridgement of such rights by the government—whether direct or indirect—is subject to strict scrutiny. As a result, the government is not permitted to buy an organization’s speech absent a compelling governmental interest in doing so and then only if the purchase is done in a manner that is …

Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions And The Siren Song Of Liberalism, Gerard V. Bradley

Gerard V. Bradley

No abstract provided.

Mirror, Mirror On The Wall, Who Are You To Say Who Is Fairest Of Them All?, Ashley R. Brown

Ashley R Brown

No abstract provided.

Mirror, Mirror On The Wall, Who Are You To Say Who Is Fairest Of Them All?, Ashley R. Brown

Ashley R Brown

No abstract provided.

Clinton, Campaigns, And Corporate Expenditures: The Supreme Court's Recent Decision In Citizen's United And Its Impact On Corporate Political Influence, Glen M. Vogel

Glen M Vogel

The public’s ability to discuss and debate the character and fitness of presidential candidates is at the core of the First Amendment’s prohibition that “Congress shall make no law… abridging the Freedom of Speech.” Despite the existence of this fundamental right, articulated so eloquently in our founding document, in November of 2002, Congress made political speech a felony for one class of speakers – corporations and unions. Under the McCain-Feingold Campaign Finance Reform Law, corporations and unions were prohibited from spending their own funds in support of or against a candidate for political office. Violators of this ban faced up …

Obscenity And The Right To Be Let Alone: The Balancing Of Constitutional Rights, Stephen W. Gard

Stephen W. Gard

While on the one hand a conceptual framework for obscenity cases is essential, it is equally true that the Supreme Court has in the past accepted theories proposed by commentators without making significant progress in extricating itself from the quagmire. In light of this situation, the purpose of this Note is not to urge the Court to accept any new theory for dealing with obscenity, but, rather, to suggest a conceptual framework present in the results of its prior decisions and to urge its explicit acceptance by the Court. No attempt will be made to be faithful to all the …