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Full-Text Articles in Law

A Comparison Of Anti-Manipulation Rules In U.S. And Eu Electricity And Natural Gas Markets: A Proposal For A Common Standard, Shaun D. Ledgerwood, Dan Harris Apr 2012

A Comparison Of Anti-Manipulation Rules In U.S. And Eu Electricity And Natural Gas Markets: A Proposal For A Common Standard, Shaun D. Ledgerwood, Dan Harris

Shaun D. Ledgerwood

In this paper, we describe the development and current status of anti-manipulation rules as they apply to wholesale electricity and natural gas markets in the United States and the European Union, including the institutions that are responsible for overseeing these rules. We then compare and contrast these jurisdictions to discuss similarities, differences, and potential gaps in coverage within and across their internal markets. We note that while the behavior prohibited by the U.S. and EU statutes is remarkably similar, there is in fact no common standard for defining market manipulation. The absence of a common EU/U.S. framework for examining manipulative …


Capture In Financial Regulation" Can We Channel It Toward The Common Good?, Lawrence G. Baxter Jan 2011

Capture In Financial Regulation" Can We Channel It Toward The Common Good?, Lawrence G. Baxter

Lawrence G. Baxter

“Regulatory capture” is central to regulatory analysis yet is a troublesome concept. It is difficult to prove and sometimes seems refuted by outcomes unfavorable to powerful interests. Nevertheless, the process of bank regulation and supervision fosters a closeness between regulator and regulated that would seem to be conducive to “capture” or at least to fostering undue sympathy by regulators for the companies they oversee. The influence of very large financial institutions has also become so great that financial regulation appears to have become excessively distorted in favor of these entities and to the detriment of many other legitimate interests, including …


Relational Contract Theory And Management Contracts: A Paradigm For The Application Of The Theory Of The Norms, Michael Diathesopoulos Jun 2010

Relational Contract Theory And Management Contracts: A Paradigm For The Application Of The Theory Of The Norms, Michael Diathesopoulos

Michael Diathesopoulos

This paper examines management contracts as a paradigm for the application of relational contracts theory and especially of the theory of contractual and relational norms. This theory, deriving from Macauley's implications, but structured and analysed by I.R. MacNeil gives us a framework for the explanation and understanding of contractual obligations and business relations' rules and practice. After presenting the key literature about the norms theory and especially defining the content of MacNeil's norms, we define management contracts as relations, characterised by a high relational element and we explain why, investigating all their features, which make them a suitable object for …


What Determines Professionals’ Bankruptcy Fees: An Empirical Investigation, Gijs Van Dijk, Martin Gramatikov Jan 2010

What Determines Professionals’ Bankruptcy Fees: An Empirical Investigation, Gijs Van Dijk, Martin Gramatikov

Martin Gramatikov

Countries have adopted different approaches to compensate bankruptcy trustees for winding up the estate. The approaches vary from state trustees to funding mechanisms where bankruptcy trustees receive a fixed fee, to a system where their fees depend on the size of the assets. Few studies have addressed the cost-effectiveness of the different approaches. This study contributes to this topic by examining the fees of the winding up, including an analysis of the determinants of these fees. After analyzing 289 Dutch bankruptcies consisting of short-term and medium-term cases, we find substantial differences in the mean hourly remuneration fees of bankruptcy trustees. …


The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo Sep 2009

The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo

Paolo Santella

No abstract provided.


The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo Jul 2009

The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo

Paolo Santella

No abstract provided.


The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo Jan 2009

The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo

Paolo Santella

No abstract provided.


Shareholders, Unicorns And Stilts: An Analysis Of Shareholder Property Rights, Benedict Sheehy Dec 2005

Shareholders, Unicorns And Stilts: An Analysis Of Shareholder Property Rights, Benedict Sheehy

Benedict Sheehy

Abstract: Shareholders rights advocates argue that shareholders have the right to control the corporation. This article examines the basis for the claims. It begins with an analysis of rights, then moves to an analysis of legal rights, which is followed by an analysis of property rights as a species of legal rights. The article then examines the historical context, rationale and development of shareholder rights which leads to the analysis of current shareholders’ rights. The article concludes with some comments and suggestions concerning future development of corporate governance thinking.