Law Commons^™

International Comparisons Of Bank Regulation, Liberalization, And Banking Crises, Puspa Amri, Apanard P. Angkinand, Clas Wihlborg

Business Faculty Articles and Research

Purpose: The recurrence of banking crises throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and in the more recent 2008-09 global financial crisis, has led to an expanding empirical literature on crisis explanation and prediction. This paper provides an analytical review of proxies for and important determinants of banking crises − credit growth, financial liberalization, bank regulation and supervision.

Design/Methodology/Approach: The study surveys the banking crisis literature by comparing proxies for and measures of banking crises and policy-related variables in the literature. Advantages and disadvantages of different proxies are discussed.

Findings: Disagreements about determinants of banking crises are in part …

Financial Liberalization And Banking Crises: A Cross-Country Analysis, Apanard P. Angkinand, Wanvimol Sawangngoenyuang, Clas Wihlborg

Business Faculty Articles and Research

Several studies indicate that financial liberalization contributes to the likelihood of a financial crisis. We focus on banking crises and argue that they are most likely to occur after an intermediate degree of liberalization. Using a recently updated dataset for financial reforms in 48 countries between 1973 and 2005, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between liberalization and the likelihood of crisis. We ask whether the relationship remains when institutional characteristics of countries and dynamic effects of liberalization are considered. The empirical results indicate that the relationship between liberalization and banking crises depends strongly on the strength of capital regulation …

Deposit Insurance Coverage, Ownership, And Banks' Risk-Taking In Emerging Markets, Apanard P. Angkinand, Clas Wihlborg

Business Faculty Articles and Research

We ask how deposit insurance systems and ownership of banks affect the degree of market discipline on banks' risk-taking. Market discipline is determined by the extent of explicit deposit insurance, as well as by the credibility of non-insurance of groups of depositors and other creditors. Furthermore, market discipline depends on the ownership structure of banks and the responsiveness of bank managers to market incentives. An expected U-shaped relationship between explicit deposit insurance coverage and banks' risk-taking is influenced by country specific institutional factors, including bank ownership. We analyze specifically how government ownership, foreign ownership and shareholder rights affect the disciplinary …

Effect Of Regulation On Banking: California 1879-1929, Lynne Doti, Richard Runyon

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

California had a virtually unregulated banking environment until the first comprehensive banking regulations were passed in 1905. These regulations, and subsequent changes in 1909, required reserves and paid-up capital. Several tests of commonly accepted measures of safety, such as bank reserves, paid-up capital, bank failures, and real estate loans that resulted in foreclosure, are compared for selected years before and after the regulations. Results do not clearly demonstrate that regulation enhanced the safety of individual banks, but do support the conclusion that regulation enhanced the safety of the banking system as a whole.