Law Commons^™

From Romer V. Evans To United States V. Windsor: Law As A Vehicle For Moral Disapproval In Amendment 2 And The Defense Of Marriage Act, Linda C. Mcclain

Faculty Scholarship

This article considers the intertwined fates of Romer v. Evans and the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which both date back to 1996. In United States v. Windsor, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, struck down Section 3 of DOMA, using Romer as a template. This article reflects on Romer as it bears on the use of law as a vehicle to express morality, in particular, “moral disapproval of homosexuality” and moral approval -- and the defense and nurture -- of “traditional, heterosexual marriage.” Proponents of Amendment 2 (struck down in Romer, in an opinion written by Justice Kennedy) and …

The Moonscape Of Tax Equality: Windsor And Behyond, Anthony C. Infanti

Articles

This essay takes a critical look at the tax fallout from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Windsor, which declared section three of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) unconstitutional. The essay is important because, while other federal laws will apply to some same-sex couples some of the time, the federal tax laws are a concern for all same-sex couples all of the time. The essay is timely because it addresses the recently issued IRS guidance regarding the tax treatment of same-sex couples.

In this essay, I first describe the path that led to the decision …

Marriage Rights And The Good Life: A Sociological Theory Of Marriage And Constitutional Law, Ari Ezra Waldman

Articles & Chapters

This is the first in a series of three Articles investigating the underappreciated role that the social theory of Emile Durkheim plays in the quest for the freedom to marry for gay Americans. To that end, this Article begins the discussion by examining the Durkheimian legal arguments that go unnoticed in equal protection and due process claims against marriage discrimination. This Article challenges two assumptions: first, that the most effective legal argument for marriage rights is a purely liberal one, and second, that the substance and rhetoric of liberal toleration cannot exist symbiotically in the marriage discrimination debate with a …