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Family Law

University of Michigan Law School

Michigan Law Review

Adultery

Articles 1 - 7 of 7

Full-Text Articles in Law

Divorce-Separation For Statutory Period As A Ground Of Divorce Regardless Of Fault, William R. Hewitt S.Ed. Nov 1949

Divorce-Separation For Statutory Period As A Ground Of Divorce Regardless Of Fault, William R. Hewitt S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

H sued W for a divorce on the statutory grounds that the parties had lived apart without cohabitation for ten years. The facts showed that the separation was caused by the willful abandonment of W by H and that H had lived in adultery after the separation and had not contributed to W's support since the separation. The trial court denied the divorce. On appeal, held, reversed. Where H and W have lived apart for the statutory period without cohabitation, H was entitled to the divorce regardless of the cause of the original separation and regardless of his …


Torts - Joint Tortfeasors - Husband And Wife - Torts Between Spouses - Immunity Of Third Persons, Michigan Law Review Mar 1940

Torts - Joint Tortfeasors - Husband And Wife - Torts Between Spouses - Immunity Of Third Persons, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

Plaintiff sued defendants, including plaintiff's husband, for jointly causing a false charge of adultery to be made against plaintiff in a divorce suit. The defendants' demurrer to the complaint was sustained in the trial court as to each and all of the defendants. Held, that although plaintiff's husband was immune from liability, a cause of action had been made out against all the rest of the defendants, and the judgment in their favor was reversed. Ewald v. Lane, (App. D. C. 1939) 104 F. (2d) 222.


Attack On Decrees Of Divorce, Albert C. Jacobs May 1936

Attack On Decrees Of Divorce, Albert C. Jacobs

Michigan Law Review

Hitherto we have been concerned with the extent to which a decree is impeachable at the suit of one of the so-called "contestants" to the divorce litigation. But other parties, second spouses, children, personal representatives, grantees of a divorced party, and other third persons, may be affected; they may desire to question its efficacy. Are they controlled by the same principles of attack which govern the divorce litigants? Do these third persons all stand in the same position when they seek to assail the decree?


Evidence-Privilege-Husband And Wife-Attorney And Client Jan 1936

Evidence-Privilege-Husband And Wife-Attorney And Client

Michigan Law Review

A husband and wife are involved in marital difficulties. Together they consult an attorney in an effort to compromise their dispute, or failing in that, to arrange a property settlement prior to separation or divorce. Such a joint consultation may be for any one of a variety of purposes. In a later action, for divorce or separate maintenance for example, the question arises whether either the attorney or one of the spouses can disclose words spoken by the other spouse in the consultation. For instance, can the attorney or the husband disclose the wife's admission of adultery?


Conflict Of Laws - Foreign Marriage - Dower Jan 1935

Conflict Of Laws - Foreign Marriage - Dower

Michigan Law Review

Plaintiff was divorced in the District of Columbia on the ground of her adultery with defendant's intestate. A statute of the District provided that the innocent party only may remarry. With no intention of evading the statute, plaintiff and defendant's intestate established a domicil in Florida and were there married. On the death of the latter in the District of Columbia, plaintiff claimed a dower interest in real estate located there. Held, plaintiff can recover. Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U. S. 216, 54 Sup. Ct. 684 (1934), reversing Loughran v. Loughran, (App. D. C. 1933) 66 F. …


Evidence - Privileged Communication Dec 1931

Evidence - Privileged Communication

Michigan Law Review

In a suit for divorce on the ground of adultery, a Luthern clergyman refused to testify concerning a disclosure made to him in his religious capacity by the defendant husband, on the ground that it was a privileged communication under the Minnesota statute. The district court adjudged him in contempt of court. Upon certiorari to the supreme court of Minnesota, held, the communication was privileged, and the order was reversed. In re Swenson (Minn. 1931) 237 N.W. 589.


Divorce - Recrimination As A Defense Dec 1930

Divorce - Recrimination As A Defense

Michigan Law Review

If both parties have a right to divorce, neither party has. This judicial pronouncement, paradoxical and puzzling as it must seem, at least to the lay mind, nevertheless embodies the kernel of the doctrine of recrimination as it is applied in divorce cases by modem courts. One party seeks divorce and proves beyond doubt that he or she is entitled to relief. But, if it is found that the complaining party too, is guilty of conduct for which a divorce may be granted, the court turns a deaf ear to both. For, in the oft quoted words of Chancellor Wallworth, …