Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

Surprise Vs. Probability As A Metric For Proof, Edward K. Cheng, Matthew Ginther Mar 2019

Surprise Vs. Probability As A Metric For Proof, Edward K. Cheng, Matthew Ginther

Edward Cheng

In this Symposium issue celebrating his career, Professor Michael Risinger in Leveraging Surprise proposes using "the fundamental emotion of surprise" as a way of measuring belief for purposes of legal proof. More specifically, Professor Risinger argues that we should not conceive of the burden of proof in terms of probabilities such as 51%, 95%, or even "beyond a reasonable doubt." Rather, the legal system should reference the threshold using "words of estimative surprise" -asking jurors how surprised they would be if the fact in question were not true. Toward this goal (and being averse to cardinality), he suggests categories such …


Surprise Vs. Probability As A Metric For Proof, Edward K. Cheng, Matthew Ginther Jan 2018

Surprise Vs. Probability As A Metric For Proof, Edward K. Cheng, Matthew Ginther

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In this Symposium issue celebrating his career, Professor Michael Risinger in Leveraging Surprise proposes using "the fundamental emotion of surprise" as a way of measuring belief for purposes of legal proof. More specifically, Professor Risinger argues that we should not conceive of the burden of proof in terms of probabilities such as 51%, 95%, or even "beyond a reasonable doubt." Rather, the legal system should reference the threshold using "words of estimative surprise" -asking jurors how surprised they would be if the fact in question were not true. Toward this goal (and being averse to cardinality), he suggests categories such …


Equity - Admissibility Of Evidence Arising Pendente Lite May 1934

Equity - Admissibility Of Evidence Arising Pendente Lite

Michigan Law Review

In equitable actions "the right to judgment is not limited to the facts as they existed at the commencement of the action, but the relief administered is such as the nature of the case, and the facts as they exist at the close of the litigation, demand." While this quotation may express the general rule regarding the admissibility of evidence arising pendente lite, the difficulties in its application are numerous.