Law Commons^™

Staying Faithful To The Standards Of Proof, Kevin M. Clermont

Cornell Law Review

Academics have never quite understood the standards of proof or, indeed, much about the theory of proof Their formulations beget probabilistic musings, which beget all sorts of paradoxes, which in turn beget radical reconceptions and proposals for reform. The theoretical radicals argue that the law needs some basic reconception such as recognizing the aim of legal proof as not at all a search for truth but rather the production of an acceptable result, or that the law needs some shattering reform such as greatly heightening the civil standard of proof on each part of the case to ensure a more-likely …

The Silliness Of Magical Realism, Kevin M. Clermont

Kevin M. Clermont

Relative plausibility, even after countless explanatory articles, remains an underdeveloped model bereft of underlying theory. Multivalent logic, a fully developed and accepted system of logic, comes to the same endpoint as relative plausibility. Multivalent logic would thus provide the missing theory, while it would resolve all the old problems of using traditional probability theory to explain the standards of proof as well as the new problems raised by the relative plausibility model. For example, multivalent logic resolves the infamous ‘conjunction paradox’ that traditional probability creates for itself, and which relative plausibility tries to sweep under the rug.

Yet Professors Allen …

The Silliness Of Magical Realism, Kevin M. Clermont

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Relative plausibility, even after countless explanatory articles, remains an underdeveloped model bereft of underlying theory. Multivalent logic, a fully developed and accepted system of logic, comes to the same endpoint as relative plausibility. Multivalent logic would thus provide the missing theory, while it would resolve all the old problems of using traditional probability theory to explain the standards of proof as well as the new problems raised by the relative plausibility model. For example, multivalent logic resolves the infamous ‘conjunction paradox’ that traditional probability creates for itself, and which relative plausibility tries to sweep under the rug.

Yet Professors Allen …

Common Sense On Standards Of Proof, Kevin M. Clermont

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The law speaks clearly on the standards of proof, but listeners often misunderstand its words. This article tries, with some common sense and a modicum of multivalent logic, to explain how the law expects its standards to be applied, and then to show how the law thereby avoids such complications as the conjunction paradox.

First, in accordance with belief function theory, the factfinder should start at zero belief. Given imperfect evidence, the factfinder will end up retaining a fair amount of uncommitted belief. As evidence comes in, though, the factfinder will form a belief in the truth of the disputed …

Error Costs, Legal Standards Of Proof And Statistical Significance, Michelle Burtis, Jonah B. Gelbach, Bruce H. Kobayashi

All Faculty Scholarship

The relationship between legal standards of proof and thresholds of statistical significance is a well-known and studied phenomena in the academic literature. Moreover, the distinction between the two has been recognized in law. For example, in Matrix v. Siracusano, the Court unanimously rejected the petitioner’s argument that the issue of materiality in a securities class action can be defined by the presence or absence of a statistically significant effect. However, in other contexts, thresholds based on fixed significance levels imported from academic settings continue to be used as a legal standard of proof. Our positive analysis demonstrates how a …

Standards Of Proof In Japan And The United States, Kevin M. Clermont

Kevin M. Clermont

This article treats the striking divergence between Japanese and U.S. civil cases as to standards of proof. The civil-law Japan requires proof to a high probability similar to the criminal standard, while the common-law United States requires only that the burdened party prove the fact to be more likely than not. This divergence not only entails great practical consequences, but also suggests a basic difference in attitudes toward the process of trial. As to the historical causation of the difference in standards of proof, civil-law and common-law standards diverged in the late eighteenth century, probably because of one system’s French …

Procedure's Magical Number Three: Psychological Bases For Standards Of Decision, Kevin M. Clermont

Kevin M. Clermont

So many procedural doctrines appear, after research and teaching, to trifurcate. An obvious example is that kind of standard of decision known as the standard of proof: what in theory might have been a continuum of standards divides in practice into the three distinct standards of preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Other examples suggest both that I am not imagining the prominence of three and that more than coincidence is at work. Part I of this essay describes the role of the number three in procedure, with particular regard to standards …

Standards Of Proof In Japan And The United States, Kevin M. Clermont

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

This article treats the striking divergence between Japanese and U.S. civil cases as to standards of proof. The civil-law Japan requires proof to a high probability similar to the criminal standard, while the common-law United States requires only that the burdened party prove the fact to be more likely than not. This divergence not only entails great practical consequences, but also suggests a basic difference in attitudes toward the process of trial.

As to the historical causation of the difference in standards of proof, civil-law and common-law standards diverged in the late eighteenth century, probably because of one system’s French …

Procedure's Magical Number Three: Psychological Bases For Standards Of Decision, Kevin M. Clermont

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

So many procedural doctrines appear, after research and teaching, to trifurcate. An obvious example is that kind of standard of decision known as the standard of proof: what in theory might have been a continuum of standards divides in practice into the three distinct standards of preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Other examples suggest both that I am not imagining the prominence of three and that more than coincidence is at work.

Part I of this essay describes the role of the number three in procedure, with particular regard to standards …