Law Commons^™

Judges Should Be Discerning Consensus, Not Evaluating Scientific Expertise, David S. Caudill, Harry Collins, Robert Evans

University of Cincinnati Law Review

One of the most constructive critiques of the Daubert admissibility regime is Professor Edward Cheng’s recent proposal for a new Consensus Rule in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rejecting the notion that judges and juries have the capacity to evaluate scientific expertise, Cheng’s proposal would eliminate Daubert hearings—and judicial gatekeeping concerning expert testimony—and require judges and juries, in their verdicts, to follow consensus in the relevant scientific community. Significantly, Cheng argues that judges and juries would have an easier time identifying consensus than they have in deciding between experts who disagree.

We find Cheng’s emphasis on consensus compelling, and …

Neuropsychological Malingering Determination: The Illusion Of Scientific Lie Detection, Chunlin Leonhard, Christoph Leonhard

Georgia Law Review

Humans believe that other humans lie, especially when stakes are high. Stakes can be very high in a courtroom, from substantial amounts of monetary damages in civil litigation to liberty or life in criminal cases. One of the most frequently disputed issues in U.S. courts is whether litigants are malingering when they allege physical or mental conditions for which they are seeking damages or which would allow them to avoid criminal punishment. Understandably, creating a scientific method to detect lies is very appealing to all persons engaged in lie detection. Neuropsychologists claim that they can use neuropsychological assessment tests (Malingering …