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Full-Text Articles in Law
Junk Science At Sentencing, Maneka Sinha
Junk Science At Sentencing, Maneka Sinha
Faculty Scholarship
Junk science used in criminal trials has contributed to hundreds of wrongful convictions. But the problem is much worse than that. Junk science does not only harm criminal defendants who go to trial, but also the overwhelming majority of defendants—over ninety-five percent—who plead guilty, skip trial, and proceed straight to sentencing.
Scientific, technical, and other specialized evidence (“STS evidence”) is used regularly, and with increasing frequency, at sentencing. Despite this, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and its state equivalents—which help filter unreliable STS evidence at trials—do not apply at the critical sentencing stage. In fact, at sentencing, no meaningful admissibility …
Assertion And Hearsay, Richard Lloret
Assertion And Hearsay, Richard Lloret
Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)
This article explores the characteristics and functions of assertion and considers how the term influences the definition of hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 801. Rule 801(a) defines hearsay by limiting it to words and conduct intended as an assertion, but the rule does not define the term assertion. Courts and legal scholars have focused relatively little attention on the nature and definition of assertion. That is unfortunate, because assertion is a robust concept that has been the subject of intense philosophic study over recent decades. Assertion is not a mere cypher standing in for whatever speech or conduct one …
Completing The Quantum Of Evidence, Edward K. Cheng, Brooke Bowerman
Completing The Quantum Of Evidence, Edward K. Cheng, Brooke Bowerman
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
In "Evidentiary Irony and the Incomplete Rule of Completeness," Professors Daniel Capra and Liesa Richter comprehensively catalog the many shortcomings in current Federal Rule of Evidence 106 and craft a compelling reform proposal. Their proposal admirably solves the identified problems, keeps the rule reasonably succinct, and furthers the accuracy and fairness goals of the rules of evidence. In this Response, we focus on Capra & Richter's proposal to formally recognize a "trumping" power in Rule 106, which would allow an adverse party to offer a completing statement even if it would be "otherwise inadmissible under the rule against hearsay."