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The Supreme Court's Decision To Recognize A Psychotherapist Privilege In Jaffee V. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996): The Meaning Of The Term 'Experience' And The Role Of 'Reason' Under Federal Rule Of Evidence 501, Diane Marie Amann, Edward J. Imwinkelried Jul 1997

The Supreme Court's Decision To Recognize A Psychotherapist Privilege In Jaffee V. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996): The Meaning Of The Term 'Experience' And The Role Of 'Reason' Under Federal Rule Of Evidence 501, Diane Marie Amann, Edward J. Imwinkelried

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In Jaffee v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996), the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a testimonial privilege protecting the patient-psychotherapist relationship. Its decision is based on Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which permits courts to decide novel questions of privilege in the light of reason and experience. The Court held that this rule authorized not only recognition of a new privilege, but also a privilege of a broad scope, extending to relationships between patients and licensed clinical social workers. Its decision came as a mild surprise, given a widely shared assumption that Rule 501 creates a …


On Parol: The Construction And Interpretation Of Written Agreements And The Role Of Extrinsic Evidence In Contract Litigation, Keith A. Rowley Jan 1997

On Parol: The Construction And Interpretation Of Written Agreements And The Role Of Extrinsic Evidence In Contract Litigation, Keith A. Rowley

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As a general rule, extrinsic evidence, whether written or oral, is not admissible to prove either the intent of the parties to a contract or the meaning of contractual terms when the parties have executed an unambiguous, fully-integrated (i.e., final and all-inclusive) written agreement. The trial court may consider various types of extrinsic evidence, however, in determining whether a particular agreement is fully integrated or ambiguous, and even in choosing among rival interpretations of an agreement where ambiguity is not present. If the trial court determines that an agreement is not fully integrated, then the trier of fact may consider …