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Full-Text Articles in Law

The Cognitive Psychology Of Circumstantial Evidence, Kevin Jon Heller Nov 2006

The Cognitive Psychology Of Circumstantial Evidence, Kevin Jon Heller

Michigan Law Review

Empirical research indicates that jurors routinely undervalue circumstantial evidence (DNA, fingerprints, and the like) and overvalue direct evidence (eyewitness identifications and confessions) when making verdict choices, even though false-conviction statistics indicate that the former is normally more probative and more reliable than the latter The traditional explanation of this paradox, based on the probability-threshold model of jury decision-making, is that jurors simply do not understand circumstantial evidence and thus routinely underestimate its effect on the objective probability of the defendant's guilt. That may be true in some situations, but it fails to account for what is known in cognitive psychology …


From The Wrong End Of The Telescope: A Response To Professor David Bernstein, Margaret A. Berger, Aaron D. Twerski Aug 2006

From The Wrong End Of The Telescope: A Response To Professor David Bernstein, Margaret A. Berger, Aaron D. Twerski

Michigan Law Review

On the pages of this law review, in an article entitled Uncertainty and Informed Choice: Unmasking Daubert, the authors argued for the recognition of a new product liability cause of action when drug companies fail to warn about uncertain risks attendant to the use of non-therapeutic drugs whose purpose is to enhance lifestyle. We noted that in the post-Daubert era, plaintiffs have faced increasing difficulty in proving that a given toxic agent was causally responsible for the injuries suffered after ingesting a drug. That plaintiffs cannot overcome the barriers to proving injury causation does not mean that defendants have met …


Learning The Wrong Lessons From "An American Tragedy": A Critique Of The Berger-Twerski Informed Choice Proposal, David E. Bernstein Aug 2006

Learning The Wrong Lessons From "An American Tragedy": A Critique Of The Berger-Twerski Informed Choice Proposal, David E. Bernstein

Michigan Law Review

Margaret Berger and Aaron Twerski are among the leading scholars in their respective fields of Evidence and Products Liability. I have benefited from their work on many occasions. Precisely because of the deserved respect and esteem in which Berger and Twerski are held-not to mention the prominence of their forum, the Michigan Law Review-their proposal to create a new "informed choice" cause of action in pharmaceutical litigation is likely to receive sympathetic attention. Because I believe that their proposal is ill-conceived and dangerous, I feel compelled (with some trepidation) to write this response. Berger and Twerski propose that courts recognize …


Same Old, Same Old: Scientific Evidence Past And Present, Edward K. Cheng May 2006

Same Old, Same Old: Scientific Evidence Past And Present, Edward K. Cheng

Michigan Law Review

For over twenty years, and particularly since the Supreme Court's Daubert decision in 1993, much ink has been spilled debating the problem of scientific evidence in the courts. Are jurors or, in the alternative, judges qualified to assess scientific reliability? Do courts really need to be concerned about "junk science"? What mechanisms can promote better decision making in scientific cases? Even a cursory scan of the literature shows the recent explosion of interest in these issues, precipitating new treatises, hundreds of articles, and countless conferences for judges, practitioners, and academics. To this literature, Professor Tal Golan adds Laws of Men …