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Full-Text Articles in Law

Controlling The Jury-Teaching Function, Richard D. Friedman Apr 2018

Controlling The Jury-Teaching Function, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

When evidence with a scientific basis is offered, two fundamental questions arise. First, should it be admitted? Second, if so, how should it be assessed? There are numerous participants who might play a role in deciding these questions—the jury (on the second question only), the parties (through counsel), expert witnesses on each side, the trial court, the forces controlling the judicial system (which include, but are not limited to, the appellate courts), and the scientific establishment. In this Article, I will suggest that together, the last two—the forces controlling the judicial system and the scientific establishment—have a large role to …


On Generalizations I: A Preliminary Exploration, Terence J. Anderson Jan 1999

On Generalizations I: A Preliminary Exploration, Terence J. Anderson

Articles

No abstract provided.


Towards A (Bayesian) Convergence?, Richard D. Friedman Jan 1997

Towards A (Bayesian) Convergence?, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

If I understand them correctly, several leading Bayesioskeptics (Allen, Callen, Stein) acknowledge - with varying degrees of specificity and varying degrees of grudgingness - that standard probability theory can be useful as an analytical tool in considering evidentiary doctrines and the probative value of evidentiary items.


Answering The Bayesioskeptical Challenge, Richard D. Friedman Jan 1997

Answering The Bayesioskeptical Challenge, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

In recent years, some scholars of evidence, myself among them, have made active use of subjective probability theory - what is sometimes referred to as Bayesianism - in thinking about issues and problems related to the law of evidence. But, at the same time, this use has been challenged to various degrees and in various ways by scholars to whom I shall apply the collective, if somewhat misleading, label of Bayesioskeptics. I present this brief paper to defend this use of probability theory, and to discuss what I believe is its proper role in discourse about evidentiary issues.


Probability And Proof In State V. Skipper: An Internet Exchange, Ronald J. Allen, David J. Balding, Peter Donnelly, Richard D. Friedman, David H. Kaye, Lewis Henry Larue, Roger C. Park, Bernard Robertson, Alexander Stein Jan 1995

Probability And Proof In State V. Skipper: An Internet Exchange, Ronald J. Allen, David J. Balding, Peter Donnelly, Richard D. Friedman, David H. Kaye, Lewis Henry Larue, Roger C. Park, Bernard Robertson, Alexander Stein

Articles

This is not a conventional article. It is an edited version of messages sent to an Internet discussion list. The listings begin with the mention of a recent opinion of the Connecticut Supreme Court, parts of which are reproduced below. The listings soon move to broader issues concerning probability and other formal systems, their limitations, and their uses either in court or as devices for understanding legal proof.


Standards Of Persuasion And The Distinction Between Fact And Law, Richard D. Friedman Jan 1992

Standards Of Persuasion And The Distinction Between Fact And Law, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

The invitation to respond in these pages to Gary Lawson's very interesting article, Proving the Law, was tempting enough. But what made it irresistible was Professor Lawson's comment that he is "addressing, with a brevity that borders on the irresponsible, subjects well beyond [his] depth." Now, that's the kind of debate I really like. Let me jump right in. A principal question raised by Lawson, which I find quite interesting, may be phrased in general, and purposefully ambiguous, terms as follows: Before an actor treats a proposition as a valid2 proposition of law, what standard of persuasion should that proposition …


Loss Of Innocence: Eyewitness Identification And Proof Of Guilt, Samuel R. Gross Jan 1987

Loss Of Innocence: Eyewitness Identification And Proof Of Guilt, Samuel R. Gross

Articles

It is no news that eyewitness identification in criminal cases is a problem; it is an old and famous problem. Judges and lawyers have long known that the identification of strangers is a chancy matter, and nearly a century of psychological research has confirmed this skeptical view. In 1967 the Supreme Court attempted to mitigate the problem by regulating the use of eyewitness identification evidence in criminal trials; since then it has retreated part way from that effort. Legal scholars have written a small library of books and articles on this problem, the courts' response to it, and various proposed …