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Articles 1 - 8 of 8
Full-Text Articles in Law
Of Flutes, Oboes And The As If World Of Evidence Law, Richard O. Lempert
Of Flutes, Oboes And The As If World Of Evidence Law, Richard O. Lempert
Articles
Reading Allen's article, I am reminded of a cold war parable I heard during the 1960s. It concerned a flute and an oboe who joined an orchestra one year and immediately set to quarrelling. The flute was distressed because whenever it was playing at its lyrical best the oboe would enter. drowning it out. The oboe was affronted because its deepest, most sonorous passages were invariably ruined by the high-pitched flute butting in. When the orchestra split up for the summer and these quarrelsome instruments went their separate ways, the flute, as it angrily contemplated the oboe, found itself stretching …
After The Dna Wars: Skirmishing With Nrc Ii, Richard O. Lempert
After The Dna Wars: Skirmishing With Nrc Ii, Richard O. Lempert
Articles
This article traces some of the controversies surrounding DNA evidence and argues that although many have been laid to rest by scientific developments confirmed in the National Research Council's second DNA report, there remain several problems which are likely to lead to continued questioning of standard ways prosecutors present DNA evidence. Although much about the report is to be commended, it falls short in several ways, the most important of which is in its support for presenting random match probabilities independent of plausible error rates. The article argues that although one can sympathize with the NRC committee's decision as an …
Towards A (Bayesian) Convergence?, Richard D. Friedman
Towards A (Bayesian) Convergence?, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
If I understand them correctly, several leading Bayesioskeptics (Allen, Callen, Stein) acknowledge - with varying degrees of specificity and varying degrees of grudgingness - that standard probability theory can be useful as an analytical tool in considering evidentiary doctrines and the probative value of evidentiary items.
Confrontation And The Definition Of Chutzpa, Richard D. Friedman
Confrontation And The Definition Of Chutzpa, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
You may know the standard illustration of chutzpa - the man who kills both his parents and then begs the sentencing court to have mercy on an orphan. In this article, I discuss a case of chutzpa that is nearly as outlandish - the criminal defendant who, having rendered his victim unavailable to testify, contends that evidence of the victim's statement should not be admitted against him because to do so would violate his right to confront her. I contend that in a case like this the defendant should be deemed to have forfeited the confrontation right. On the same …
Irrelevance, Minimal Relevance, And Meta-Relevance (Response To David Crump), Richard D. Friedman
Irrelevance, Minimal Relevance, And Meta-Relevance (Response To David Crump), Richard D. Friedman
Articles
Professor Crump's analysis runs the full traverse from academic theorizing to practical observation. I will attempt to follow him over the same course, addressing three questions among the congeries that he raises. First, is it true that all evidence satisfies the minimalist definition of relevance? Second, should evidentiary codes include a tighter definition of relevance? Third, how should we assess lawyers' use of evidence that, loosely speaking, is irrelevant?
Dealing With Evidentiary Deficiency, Richard D. Friedman
Dealing With Evidentiary Deficiency, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
Lack of information distorts litigation. Claims or defenses that a party might prove easily, or that might even be undisputed, in a world of perfect information can be difficult or impossible to prove in the real world of imperfect information. Some information deficiencies are inevitable, at least in the sense that we could not eliminate them without incurring undue social costs. In some cases, however, a person's conduct may have caused the deficiency. More generally, the person may have had available a reasonable alternative course of conduct that would have eliminated, or at least mitigated, the deficiency. Ariel Porat and …
Crime, Politics, And Race (Symposium: Justice And The Criminal Justice Process), Samuel R. Gross
Crime, Politics, And Race (Symposium: Justice And The Criminal Justice Process), Samuel R. Gross
Articles
The biggest problem with the criminal justice system is that too many crimes are committed-too many rapes, too many murders, too many robberies; too much violence that inflicts an untold amount of suffering and destruction on too many people. If that seems obvious, what follows should be equally obvious. The most important step to take to solve the problems of the criminal justice system is to reduce the number of crimes that are committed: to prevent crimes. The best thing we can do to help the victims of crime is to keep them from becoming victims in the first place. …
Answering The Bayesioskeptical Challenge, Richard D. Friedman
Answering The Bayesioskeptical Challenge, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
In recent years, some scholars of evidence, myself among them, have made active use of subjective probability theory - what is sometimes referred to as Bayesianism - in thinking about issues and problems related to the law of evidence. But, at the same time, this use has been challenged to various degrees and in various ways by scholars to whom I shall apply the collective, if somewhat misleading, label of Bayesioskeptics. I present this brief paper to defend this use of probability theory, and to discuss what I believe is its proper role in discourse about evidentiary issues.