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Disentangling Michigan Court Rule 6.502(G)(2): The "New Evidence" Exception To The Ban On Successive Motions For Relief From Judgment Does Not Contain A Discoverability Requirement, Claire V. Madill
Michigan Law Review
Michigan courts are engaging in a costly interpretative mistake. Confused by the relationship between two distinct legal doctrines, Michigan courts are conflating laws in a manner that precludes convicted defendants from raising their constitutional claims in postconviction proceedings. In Michigan, a convicted defendant who wishes to collaterally attack her conviction must file a 6.500 motion. The Michigan Court Rules generally prohibit “second or subsequent” motions. Nonetheless, section 6.502(G)(2) permits a petitioner to avoid this successive motion ban if her claim relies on “new evidence that was not discovered” before her original postconviction motion. Misguided by the similarity between the language …
A Model For Fixing Identification Evidence After Perry V. New Hampshire, Robert Couch
A Model For Fixing Identification Evidence After Perry V. New Hampshire, Robert Couch
Michigan Law Review
Mistaken eyewitness identifications are the leading cause of wrongful convictions. In 1977, a time when the problems with eyewitness identifications had been acknowledged but were not yet completely understood, the Supreme Court announced a test designed to exclude unreliable eyewitness evidence. This standard has proven inadequate to protect against mistaken identifications. Despite voluminous scientific studies on the failings of eyewitness identification evidence and the growing number of DNA exonerations, the Supreme Court's outdated reliability test remains in place today. In 2012, in Perry v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court commented on its standard for evaluating eyewitness evidence for the first …
Errors In Good Faith: The Leon Exception Six Years Later, David Clark Esseks
Errors In Good Faith: The Leon Exception Six Years Later, David Clark Esseks
Michigan Law Review
Given this vast literature on the good faith exception, little room appears to exist for additional commentary on the propriety of the decision, its theoretical weaknesses or strengths, or what further changes in constitutional criminal procedure it forebodes. This Note will not add to the many voices complaining of the Court's misconstrual of the grounding of the exclusionary rule, nor of its crabbed notion of deterrence. Instead, it accepts, arguendo, the propriety of the exception and its underlying purpose, and then examines the six-year experience with the revised rule. The proliferation of reported applications of the good faith exception …