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Probability, Individualization, And Uniqueness In Forensic Science Evidence: Listening To The Academies, David H. Kaye
Probability, Individualization, And Uniqueness In Forensic Science Evidence: Listening To The Academies, David H. Kaye
David Kaye
Day in and day out, criminalists testify to positive, uniquely specific identifications of fingerprints, bullets, handwriting, and other trace evidence. A committee of the National Academy of Sciences, building on the writing of academic commentators, has called for sweeping changes in the presentation and production of evidence of identification. These include some form of circumscribed and standardized testimony. But the Academy report is short on the specifics of the testimony that would be legally and professionally allowable. This essay outlines possible types of testimony that might harmonize the testimony of criminalists with the actual state of forensic science. It does …
Do We Need A Calculus Of Weight To Understand Proof Beyond A Reasonable Doubt?, David H. Kaye
Do We Need A Calculus Of Weight To Understand Proof Beyond A Reasonable Doubt?, David H. Kaye
David Kaye
The commentary on a paper by L.J. Cohen, prepared for a symposium on probability and inference in the law of evidence, shows that the legal requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt can be understood simply as demanding a sufficiently high probability that the prosecution's narrative or story of the facts, which captures all the elements of the offense, is true. No separate measure of the "weight" of the totality of the evidence is required to understand the burden of persuasion. Any incompleteness in the evidence can be accounted for by a conditional probability that includes the presence of any …
Case Comment - People V. Nelson: A Tale Of Two Statistics, David H. Kaye
Case Comment - People V. Nelson: A Tale Of Two Statistics, David H. Kaye
David Kaye
In recent years, defendants who were identified as a result of a search through a database of DNA profiles have argued that the probability that a randomly selected person would match a crime-scene stain overstates the probative value of the match. The statistical literature is divided, with most statisticians who have written on the subject rejecting this claim. In People v. Nelson, the Supreme Court of California held that when the random-match probability is so small as to make it exceedingly unlikely that any unrelated individual has the incriminating DNA profile, this statistic is admissible in a database-search case. …
'False But Highly Persuasive:' How Wrong Were The Probability Estimates In Mcdaniel V. Brown?, David H. Kaye
'False But Highly Persuasive:' How Wrong Were The Probability Estimates In Mcdaniel V. Brown?, David H. Kaye
David Kaye
In McDaniel v. Brown, the Supreme Court will review the use of DNA evidence in a 1994 trial for sexual assault and attempted murder. The Court granted certiorari to consider two procedural issues - the standard of federal postconviction review of a state jury verdict for sufficiency of the evidence, and the district court's decision to allow the prisoner to supplement the record of trials, appeals, and state postconviction proceedings with a geneticist's letter twelve years after the trial.
This essay clarifies the nature and extent of the errors in the presentation of the DNA evidence in Brown. It questions …
Evidence Engendered, Kit Kinports
Evidence Engendered, Kit Kinports
Kit Kinports
Part I of this article briefly describes feminist legal theory and its evolution. Part II then discusses the extent to which evidence as a whole is a gendered topic that reflects predominantly male traits and ideals, and Part III analyzes various specific evidentiary doctrines from a feminist perspective. Finally, Part IV examines way of incorporating feminist theories in teaching an evidence course.