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Re-Assessing The Evidentiary Regime Of The International Court Of Justice: A Case For Codifying Its Discretion To Exclude Evidence, Siyuan Chen Jan 2015

Re-Assessing The Evidentiary Regime Of The International Court Of Justice: A Case For Codifying Its Discretion To Exclude Evidence, Siyuan Chen

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

Like many international tribunals, the International Court of Justice subscribes heavily to the principle of free admissibility of evidence. Neither its statute nor rules impose substantive restrictions on the admissibility of evidence, whether by way of exclusionary rules or an exclusionary discretion. Instead, the court’s practice has been to focus on evaluating and weighing the evidence after it has been admitted. There are certainly features of the ICJ that sets it apart from domestic courts and arguably justify such an approach: the ICJ is for settling disputes between sovereign states; it does not use a typical fact-finding system; its rules …


'In The Interests Of Justice' As The New Test To Exclude Relevant Evidence In Singapore: Anb V Anc [2014] Sghc 172; Wan Lai Ting V Kea Kah Kim [2014] Sghc 180, Siyuan Chen Jan 2015

'In The Interests Of Justice' As The New Test To Exclude Relevant Evidence In Singapore: Anb V Anc [2014] Sghc 172; Wan Lai Ting V Kea Kah Kim [2014] Sghc 180, Siyuan Chen

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

In 2012, Singapore’s venerable Evidence Act (EA), which is based on Stephen’s Indian Evidence Act of 1872, underwent major amendments for only the third time in 120 years. Previously, conflicting case law had created long-standing confusion as to whether the Singapore courts possessed any discretion to exclude evidence even when was found relevant under the EA. The main reason driving this jurisprudential inconsistency was that while the relevancy provisions in the EA were meant to provide exhaustive definitions of admissibility, Stephen’s then-revolutionary ‘inclusionary’ approach to relevance was simply at odds with modern conceptions of relevance and modern litigation practice. Thus, …