Law Commons^™

When Daubert Is The Way: The Road Less Traveled By, Cynthia Ford

Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings

No abstract provided.

Daubert, Or Not Daubert? That Is The Question On Expert Testimony In Montana State Courts, Cynthia Ford

Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings

No abstract provided.

You Say Its Your Birthday... But Could You Prove It?, Cynthia Ford

Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings

No abstract provided.

Oral Tradition And The Kennewick Man, Cathay Y. N. Smith

Faculty Law Review Articles

No abstract provided.

A Blueprint For Obtaining Judicial Notice Of A Fact That Need Not Be Proven At Trial, Cynthia Ford

Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings

No abstract provided.

The "Duh" Standard Is The Basic Premise In Montana's Rules Of Judicial Notice, Cynthia Ford

Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings

No abstract provided.

Montana Rules Of Evidence: Essential Accessory In Any Court, Cynthia Ford

Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings

No abstract provided.

Tribal Courts Part Ii: Crow, Ft. Belknap, Fort Peck And Northern Cheyenne, Cynthia Ford

Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings

No abstract provided.

Evidence Rules In Montana's Tribal Courts, Part I Of Ii, Cynthia Ford

Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings

No abstract provided.

What The Best Evidence Rule Is - And What It Isn't, Cynthia Ford

Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings

No abstract provided.

The Mother's Day Column: Parent-Child Evidentiary Privilege In Montana, Cynthia Ford

Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings

In this article the author examines the lack of parent-child evidentiary privilege in Montana.

He Loves Me? He Loves Me Not? He Wants To Keep Me From Testifying?, Cynthia Ford

Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings

This article discusses spousal privilege as it exists in Montana.

"Santa Baby, Just Slip A Sable Under The Tree For Me:" Or At Least A Catchall Exception To The Hearsay Rule?, Cynthia Ford

Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings

This article examines Montana's two rule-based "catchall" or "residual" hearsay exceptions, and a statutory exception that applies only to child declarants in criminal cases.

"As I Lay Dying:" A Halloween Meditation On The Use Of Dying Declarations In Montana, Cynthia Ford

Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings

This article discusses the Montana hearsay exception for "dying declarations."

Prior Statements In Montana: Part Ii, Cynthia Ford

Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings

This article is part two of a two-part series on prior statements in Montana. This article examines prior consistent statements under M.R.E.. 801(d)(1)(B) and how the language of the rule is unclear and confusing, especially compared to the federal version. As a result, Montana has a myriad of case law attempting to apply the Montana rule on prior consistent statements. The article first provides background to the establishment of the rule about prior consistent statements. Next the article discusses both federal and Montana "trigger" cases and compares Montana's approach with that of the federal courts. The article then offers suggestions …

Tender Is The Night: Should Your Expert Be?, Cynthia Ford

Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings

This article discusses the practice of tendering an expert for acceptance or certification by the court at trial in the presence of the jury. The article considers Tennessee and Montana state and federal evidence law. The author suggests that Montana courts and lawyers should comply with the A.B.A. Updated Civil Trial Standard 14 and let juries assess the testimony of a Rule 702 witness without a special designation accorded by the judge certifying a witness as an "expert" in his or her field.

In-Court Identifications Not Hearsay, Are Admissible, Cynthia Ford

Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings

This article examines M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(C) and begins by looking at Montana case law before the rule was adopted and after it was adopted. The article follows with a look at the plethora of federal cases interpreting 801(d)(1)(C). The article points out that although Montana's version of 801(d)(1)(C) mirrors the same rule in the F.R.E, it doesn't seem that the Montana rule is used very often in reported cases. The author concludes that the rule is a good tool to escape from a hearsay objection and thereby avoid a protracted excursion into the numerous hearsay exceptions. Further, the rule applies in …

A Refresher: Mt Evidence Law Sources And Research, Cynthia Ford

Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings

This article discusses how to locate, research, and use Montana evidence law sources.

Prior Statements In Montana: Part I, Cynthia Ford

Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings

This article is part one of a two-part series on prior statements in Montana. In part one, the article explores Montana's approach to prior inconsistent statements under M.R.E. 801. The article states that prior inconsistent statements are clearly admissible in Montana state court trials. Once a witness has testified on the stand, anything else said on the same subject, anywhere, any time, to anyone, which outright contradicts trial testimony, or serves to fill a memory lapse on the stand, is admissible -- not just for impeachment, but also to prove the fact earlier asserted.

Rule 611(C): Where You Lead, I Will Follow, Cynthia Ford

Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings

This article examines M.R.E. 611(c), which relates to leading questions when examining witnesses. The first part of the article discusses the purpose behind the "no-leading on direct" rule and how to tell leading from non-leading questions. Then the article offers tips for leading and non-leading questions and answers the question of why leading on cross is allowed. Lastly, the article examines how strictly the rule is observed and reviews Montana cases on 611(c).

Montana V. Federal Evidence Rules 2013: A Short Comparison, Cynthia Ford

Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings

This article provides a short comparison of the current Federal Rules of Evidence and the Montana Rules of Evidence. It is meant to cover major differences and does not include those, in the view of the author, that are minor or inconsequential.

A Short History Of The Mt Rules Of Evidence, Cynthia Ford

Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings

This article traces the history of the wholesale revision of Montana's evidence rules that stemmed from a corresponding changes in the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) in 1975. The article begins discussion with the appointment of the Montana Supreme Court Commission on the Rules of Evidence in 1974 and continues to the adoption of the new Montana Rules of Evidence (MRE) effective January 1977.

The author points out that the current version of the MRE is substantively identical to the 1977 version. By contrast the FRE has gone through twenty separate, substantive amendments. The author suggests that the drastic difference …

An Agument For Original Intent: Restoring Rule 801 (D) (1) (A) To Protect Domestic Violence Victims In A Post-Crawford World., Andrew King-Ries

Faculty Law Review Articles

Prosecution of domestic violence is extremely difficult, largely due to the fact that defendants are successfully pressuring victims to refuse to testify or to recant their testimony at trial. With its decision in Crawford, the Supreme Court eliminated the ability of prosecutors to use hearsay exceptions to place the domestic violence victim's statements before the jury for their substantive consideration. The Supreme Court also closed this avenue to combat defendants' efforts to avoid liability through coercive pressure on victims. Therefore, the Court's change in the Confrontation Clause law limits the prosecution's arsenal for combating witness intimidation and, at the same …

True To Character: Honoring The Intellectual Foundations Of The Character Evidence Rule In Domestic Violence Prosecutions, Andrew King-Ries

Faculty Law Review Articles

This article calls for a new character evidence rule allowing the admission of prior acts of abuse within the context of a current domestic violence prosecution. Section II discusses the history of domestic violence in America and explores the three ways that the law has condoned domestic violence, including implicit sanction through the effect of the character evidence rule. Section III examines the intellectual background of the character evidence ban. This section also explores the conflict between the character evidence rule and the law's recognition of domestic violence. Further, Section III demonstrates how the character evidence ban violates its underlying …

Questions Of Fact In The Practice Of Law: A Response To Allen & Pardo's Facts In Law, Facts Of Law, Paul F. Kirgis

Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings

In an article in this journal, Professor Ronald Allen and Michael Pardo critiqued efforts to explain the fact-law distinction on ontological, epistemological or analytical grounds. Finding those efforts unavailing, the authors concluded that decisions to label an issue 'legal' or 'factual' rest on purely functional considerations turning on a complex set of variables including the conventional meanings of the terms, structural relationships among potential decision-makers, and a distinction between matters of general and specific import. In this response, it is argued that Allen and Pardo's critique is accurate to the extent it addresses the fact-law distinction from a general jurisprudential …

A Legisprudential Analysis Of Evidence Codification: Why Most Evidence Rules Should Not Be Codified—But Privilege Law Should Be, Paul F. Kirgis

Faculty Law Review Articles

In this article, I will suggest standards for use in assessing a proposed codification. Although the standards I will identify are useful for evaluating a proposed codification of privilege law, they are also more generally applicable. Indeed, I will use them to examine the codification of evidence law in general. First, I will ask whether, as a normative matter, the law of evidence should be codified. I will then focus on the individual rules of evidence, most notably the privilege rules, to draw conclusions about whether those standards are met.