Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Publication Year
- Publication
- Publication Type
Articles 1 - 20 of 20
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Persistence Of The Probabilistic Perspective, Richard D. Friedman
The Persistence Of The Probabilistic Perspective, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
The publication now of an essay written by Craig Callen nearly a decade ago is cause for wistful celebration. Even while we are reminded how suddenly and prematurely Craig’s life ended, it is good to have one more academic contribution from him, especially because it is marked by the erudition, thoroughness, gentleness, and humor that characterized him.
Proposal To Reverse The View Of A Confession: From Key Evidence Requiring Corroboration To Corroboration For Key Evidence, Boaz Sangero, Mordechai Halpert
Proposal To Reverse The View Of A Confession: From Key Evidence Requiring Corroboration To Corroboration For Key Evidence, Boaz Sangero, Mordechai Halpert
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Both case law and legal literature have recognized that all, and not just clearly statistical, evidence is probabilistic. Therefore, we have much to learn from the laws of probability with regard to the evaluation of evidence in a criminal trial. The present Article focuses on the confession. First, we review legal and psychological literature and show that the probability of a false confession and, consequently, a wrongful conviction, is far from insignificant. In light of this, we warn against the cognitive illusion, stemming from the fallacy of the transposed conditional, which is liable to mislead the trier of fact in …
New Pleading, New Discovery, Scott Dodson
New Pleading, New Discovery, Scott Dodson
Michigan Law Review
Pleading in federal court has a new narrative. The old narrative was one of notice, with the goal of broad access to the civil justice system. New Pleading, after the landmark Supreme Court cases of Twombly and Iqbal, is focused on factual sufficiency, with the purpose of screening out meritless cases that otherwise might impose discovery costs on defendants. The problem with New Pleading is that factual insufficiency often is a poor proxy for meritlessness. Some plaintifs lack sufficient factual knowledge of the elements of their claims not because the claims lack merit but because the information they need is …
"False But Highly Persuasive": How Wrong Were The Probability Estimates In Mcdaniel V. Brown?, David H. Kaye
"False But Highly Persuasive": How Wrong Were The Probability Estimates In Mcdaniel V. Brown?, David H. Kaye
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
In McDaniel v. Brown, the Supreme Court will review the use of DNA evidence in a 1994 trial for sexual assault and attempted murder. The Court granted certiorari to consider two procedural issues—the standard of federal postconviction review of a state jury verdict for sufficiency of the evidence, and the district court's decision to allow the prisoner to supplement the record of trials, appeals, and state postconviction proceedings with a geneticist's letter twelve years after the trial. The letter from Laurence Mueller, a professor at the University of California at Irvine, identified two obvious mistakes in the state's expert testimony. …
A Very Brief Primer On Bayesian Methods In Evidence, Richard D. Friedman
A Very Brief Primer On Bayesian Methods In Evidence, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
I have been asked to write an extremely short explanation of the Bayesian approach to evidentiary issues, for the benefit of those who regard themselves as probabilistically challenged. Although the application of Bayesian probability to evidence has generated a good deal of debate, its use as a heuristic device should not be particularly controversial. Evidence concerns propositions that are uncertain. Accordingly, some concept of probability must play a role. Standards of persuasion, such as "more likely than not" and "beyond a reasonable doubt" are clearly probabilistic, and the definition of relevant evidence, as expressed in Fed. R. Evid. 40 I, …
A Suggestion On Suggestion, Richard D. Friedman, Stephen J. Ceci
A Suggestion On Suggestion, Richard D. Friedman, Stephen J. Ceci
Articles
Part I of the full article briefly describes the history and current slate of research into children's suggestibility. In this part, we argue that, although psychological researchers disagree considerably over the degree to which he suggestibility of young children may lead to false allegations of sexual abuse, there is an overwhelming consensus that children are suggestible to a degree that, we believe, must be regarded as significant. In presenting this argument, we respond to the contentions of revisionist scholars, particularly those recently expressed by Professor Lyon. We show that there is good reason to believe the use of highly suggestive …
The Suggestibility Of Children: Scientific Research And Legal Implications, Stephen J. Ceci, Richard D. Friedman
The Suggestibility Of Children: Scientific Research And Legal Implications, Stephen J. Ceci, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
In this Article, Professors Ceci and Friedman analyze psychological studies on children's suggestibility and find a broad consensus that young children are suggestible to a significant degree. Studies confirm that interviewers commonly use suggestive interviewing techniques that exacerbate this suggestibility, creating a significant risk in some forensic contexts-notably but not exclusively those of suspected child abuse-that children will make false assertions of fact. Professors Ceci and Friedman address the implications of this difficulty for the legal system and respond to Professor Lyon's criticism of this view recently articulated in the Cornell Law Review. Using Bayesian probability theory, Professors Ceci and …
Towards A (Bayesian) Convergence?, Richard D. Friedman
Towards A (Bayesian) Convergence?, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
If I understand them correctly, several leading Bayesioskeptics (Allen, Callen, Stein) acknowledge - with varying degrees of specificity and varying degrees of grudgingness - that standard probability theory can be useful as an analytical tool in considering evidentiary doctrines and the probative value of evidentiary items.
Answering The Bayesioskeptical Challenge, Richard D. Friedman
Answering The Bayesioskeptical Challenge, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
In recent years, some scholars of evidence, myself among them, have made active use of subjective probability theory - what is sometimes referred to as Bayesianism - in thinking about issues and problems related to the law of evidence. But, at the same time, this use has been challenged to various degrees and in various ways by scholars to whom I shall apply the collective, if somewhat misleading, label of Bayesioskeptics. I present this brief paper to defend this use of probability theory, and to discuss what I believe is its proper role in discourse about evidentiary issues.
Irrelevance, Minimal Relevance, And Meta-Relevance (Response To David Crump), Richard D. Friedman
Irrelevance, Minimal Relevance, And Meta-Relevance (Response To David Crump), Richard D. Friedman
Articles
Professor Crump's analysis runs the full traverse from academic theorizing to practical observation. I will attempt to follow him over the same course, addressing three questions among the congeries that he raises. First, is it true that all evidence satisfies the minimalist definition of relevance? Second, should evidentiary codes include a tighter definition of relevance? Third, how should we assess lawyers' use of evidence that, loosely speaking, is irrelevant?
Assessing Evidence, Richard D. Friedman
Assessing Evidence, Richard D. Friedman
Reviews
David A. Schum's Evidential Foundations of Probabilistic Reasoning, 2 C.G.G. Aitken's Statistics and the Evaluation of Evidence for Forensic Scientists,3 and Bernard Robertson and G.A. Vignaux's Interpreting Evidence: Evaluating Forensic Science in the Courtroom4 all have something to tell us about how to use and evaluate evidence. Although the books are addressed to different primary audiences5 and their authors come from a variety of disciplines and from distant points of the English-speaking world,6 all three help draw the connection between underlying theory and presentation in the courtroom. Though Schum uses numerous examples from litigation and discusses the legal literature of …
Probability And Proof In State V. Skipper: An Internet Exchange, Ronald J. Allen, David J. Balding, Peter Donnelly, Richard D. Friedman, David H. Kaye, Lewis Henry Larue, Roger C. Park, Bernard Robertson, Alexander Stein
Probability And Proof In State V. Skipper: An Internet Exchange, Ronald J. Allen, David J. Balding, Peter Donnelly, Richard D. Friedman, David H. Kaye, Lewis Henry Larue, Roger C. Park, Bernard Robertson, Alexander Stein
Articles
This is not a conventional article. It is an edited version of messages sent to an Internet discussion list. The listings begin with the mention of a recent opinion of the Connecticut Supreme Court, parts of which are reproduced below. The listings soon move to broader issues concerning probability and other formal systems, their limitations, and their uses either in court or as devices for understanding legal proof.
Response: Exaggerated And Misleading Reports Of The Death Of Conditional Relevance, Peter Tillers
Response: Exaggerated And Misleading Reports Of The Death Of Conditional Relevance, Peter Tillers
Michigan Law Review
In 1980 the late Professor Vaughn C. Ball of the University of Georgia published an article called The Myth of Conditional Relevancy. Ball's article is widely admired. One well-known evidence scholar, Ronald J. Allen, liked Ball's article so much that he borrowed its title word for word. Although the extent of Allen's enthusiasm for Ball's analysis may be unmatched, a good number of students of evidence - including this writer - have said that Ball's analysis of conditional relevance is both original and important. Richard Friedman, by contrast, cannot be counted as one of Ball's more ardent admirers. Although Friedman …
Conditional Probative Value: Neoclassicism Without Myth, Richard D. Friedman
Conditional Probative Value: Neoclassicism Without Myth, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
The concept of conditional relevance is an essential aspect of the classical model of evidentiary law. Some of the great scholars of evidence have endorsed and shaped it.1 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b) it plays a crucial role in the division of responsibility between judge and jury,2 as well as in the application of the personal knowledge3 and authentication 4 requirements. And the Supreme Court has applied it with great force.5 In recent years, though, the concept has come under attack from several notable scholars. The late Vaughn Ball led the assault, calling the concept a "myth."'6 Peter Tillers, …
Character Impeachment Evidence: The Asymmetrical Interaction Between Personality And Situation, Richard D. Friedman
Character Impeachment Evidence: The Asymmetrical Interaction Between Personality And Situation, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
In Part I of this Comment, I present a short version of my argument against the admissibility of character impeachment evidence of criminal defendants, showing how the key elements ofthis argument are present in Professor Uviller's own Article. In Part II, I suggest that, notwithstanding Professor Uviller's comments to the contrary, an asymmetrical result-never admitting character evidence to impeach criminal defendants but admitting such evidence in some circumstances to impeach other witnesses- is perfectly reasonable. Finally, in Part III, I contend that Professor Uviller's interesting judicial surveys support the solution I have proposed for the problem of character impeachment evidence.
Intellectual History, Probability, And The Law Of Evidence, Peter Tillers
Intellectual History, Probability, And The Law Of Evidence, Peter Tillers
Michigan Law Review
A Review of "Beyond Reasonable Doubt" ad "Probable Cause": Historical Perspectives on the Anglo-American Law of Evidence by Barbara J. Shapiro
Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian (!?) Analysis And A Proposed Overhaul, Richard D. Friedman
Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian (!?) Analysis And A Proposed Overhaul, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
Typically, arguments for restricting character impeachment evidence are based in part on the premise that prior crimes, at least violent crimes, generally indicate little about a person's veracity. The argument advanced here against character impeachment of criminal defendants does not rely on that premise; in fact, it accepts the premise that prior antisocial behavior, even not involving dishonesty, often does indicate a good deal about a person's general truthtelling inclination. A careful analysis of the situation of the accused on the witness stand-rather than an easy assumption about irrelevance-leads to this Article's broad conclusion that character impeachment evidence of criminal …
Webs Of Things In The Mind: A New Science Of Evidence, Peter Tillers
Webs Of Things In The Mind: A New Science Of Evidence, Peter Tillers
Michigan Law Review
A Review of Evidence and Inference for the Intelligence Analyst by David Schum
Probability Theory Meets Res Ipsa Loquitur, David Kaye
Probability Theory Meets Res Ipsa Loquitur, David Kaye
Michigan Law Review
This Article uses probability theory normatively in an effort to clarify one aspect of the famous tort doctrine known as res ipsa loquitur. It does not urge that jurors be instructed in probability theory or be equipped with microprocessors. Rather, it seeks an accurate statement of the res ipsa doctrine in ordinary language. In particular, this Article will show that the conventional formulation of the doctrine is misleading at best, and should be replaced with a more careful statement of the conditions warranting the res ipsa inference. To this end, Section I briefly surveys the legal doctrine, or, more precisely, …
Modeling Relevance, Richard O. Lempert
Modeling Relevance, Richard O. Lempert
Michigan Law Review
During the past decade, particularly during the years immediately following the California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Collins, a number of articles have appeared suggesting ways in which jurors might use certain mathematical techniques of decision theory as aids in the rational evaluation of circumstantial evidence. Professor Tribe, in an important response to the post-Collins articles, argues against introducing these techniques into the factfinding process. Problems that Tribe foresees include the necessary imprecision of the probabilistic estimates that these techniques require, the dwarfing of soft variables by those that are more readily quantified, and the potential dehumanization …