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Face-To-Face With Facial Recognition Evidence: Admissibility Under The Post-Crawford Confrontation Clause, Joseph Clarke Celentino Jan 2016

Face-To-Face With Facial Recognition Evidence: Admissibility Under The Post-Crawford Confrontation Clause, Joseph Clarke Celentino

Michigan Law Review

In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court announced a major change in Confrontation Clause doctrine, abandoning a decades-old framework that focused on the common law principles of hearsay analysis: necessity and reliability. The new doctrine, grounded in an originalist interpretation of the Sixth Amendment, requires courts to determine whether a particular statement is testimonial. But the Court has struggled to present a coherent definition of the term testimonial. In its subsequent decisions, the Court illustrated that its new Confrontation Clause doctrine could be used to bar forensic evidence, including laboratory test results, if the government failed to produce the …


Making The Right Call For Confrontation At Felony Sentencing, Shaakirrah R. Sanders Apr 2014

Making The Right Call For Confrontation At Felony Sentencing, Shaakirrah R. Sanders

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Felony sentencing courts have discretion to increase punishment based on un-cross-examined testimonial statements about several categories of uncharged, dismissed, or otherwise unproven criminal conduct. Denying defendants an opportunity to cross-examine these categories of sentencing evidence undermines a core principle of natural law as adopted in the Sixth Amendment: those accused of felony crimes have the right to confront adversarial witnesses. This Article contributes to the scholarship surrounding confrontation rights at felony sentencing by cautioning against continued adherence to the most historic Supreme Court case on this issue, Williams v. New York. This Article does so for reasons beyond the unacknowledged …


Counsel's Control Over The Presentation Of Mitigating Evidence During Capital Sentencing, James Michael Blakemore May 2013

Counsel's Control Over The Presentation Of Mitigating Evidence During Capital Sentencing, James Michael Blakemore

Michigan Law Review

The Sixth Amendment gives a defendant the right to control his defense and the right to a lawyer's assistance. A lawyer's assistance, however, sometimes interferes with a defendant's control over his case. As a result, the Supreme Court, over time, has had to delineate the spheres of authority that pertain to counsel and defendant respectively. The Court has not yet decisively assigned control over mitigating evidence to either counsel or defendant. This Note argues that counsel should control the presentation of mitigating evidence during capital sentencing. First, and most importantly, decisions concerning the presentation of mitigating evidence are best characterized …


Confrontation And Domestic Violence Post-Davis: Is There And Should There Be A Doctrinal Exception, Eleanor Simon Jan 2011

Confrontation And Domestic Violence Post-Davis: Is There And Should There Be A Doctrinal Exception, Eleanor Simon

Michigan Journal of Gender & Law

Close to five million intimate partner rapes and physical assaults are perpetrated against women in the United States annually. Domestic violence accounts for twenty percent of all non-fatal crime experienced by women in this county. Despite these statistics, many have argued that in the past six years the Supreme Court has "put a target on [the] back" of the domestic violence victim, has "significantly eroded offender accountability in domestic violence prosecutions," and has directly instigated a substantial decline in domestic violence prosecutions. The asserted cause is the Court's complete and groundbreaking re-conceptualization of the Sixth Amendment right of a criminal …


"An Opportunity For Effective Cross-Examination": Limits On The Confrontation Right Of The Pro Se Defendant, Alanna Clair May 2009

"An Opportunity For Effective Cross-Examination": Limits On The Confrontation Right Of The Pro Se Defendant, Alanna Clair

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The rights of a defendant to confront his accusers and conduct his defense without the assistance of counsel are sacrosanct in the American judicial system. The rights of the defendant are even sometimes exalted at the expense of the rights of the public or of victims of crime. This Note examines the problem of a pro se defendant using his confrontation right to intimidate or harass his alleged victims testifying against him. It is well-established that the confrontation right is not unconditional. The problem comes in determining whether the courts can place limits on the confrontation right of a pro …


Davis And Hammon: A Step Forward, Or A Step Back?, Tom Lininger Jan 2006

Davis And Hammon: A Step Forward, Or A Step Back?, Tom Lininger

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Prosecutors, defense attorneys, and lower court judges hoped that the Supreme Court’s ruling in the consolidated cases of Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana (hereafter simply Davis) would provide a primer on testimonial hearsay. In retrospect, these hopes were somewhat unrealistic. The Davis ruling could not possibly clear up all the confusion that followed Crawford v. Washington, the landmark 2004 case in which the Court strengthened the right of the accused to confront declarants of testimonial hearsay. In Davis, the Court focused on the facts under review and developed a taxonomy that will be useful in similar cases, but …


Circling Around The Confrontation Clause: Redefined Reach But Not A Robust Right, Lisa Kern Griffin Jan 2006

Circling Around The Confrontation Clause: Redefined Reach But Not A Robust Right, Lisa Kern Griffin

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

The Supreme Court’s consolidated ruling in United States v. Davis and United States v. Hammon is a classic of the genre of consensus opinions to which the Roberts Court aspired in its first, transitional term. The opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, contains practical accommodations unusual in a decision by the Court’s fiercest proponent of first principles. The restraint that characterized the term is, of course, more about considerations of logistics (including the desire to avoid re-arguments after the mid-term replacement of Justice O’Connor) than about the alignment of logic. Because it reflects temporary institutional constraints rather than intellectual agreement, the …


Davis/Hammon, Domestic Violence, And The Supreme Court: The Case For Cautious Optimism, Joan S. Meier Jan 2006

Davis/Hammon, Domestic Violence, And The Supreme Court: The Case For Cautious Optimism, Joan S. Meier

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

The Supreme Court’s consolidated decision in Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana offers something for everyone: by “splitting the difference” between the two cases—affirming one and reversing the other—the opinion provides much grist for advocates’ mills on both sides of this issue. While advocates for defendants’ rights are celebrating the opinion’s continued revitalization of the right to confrontation, which began in Crawford v. Washington, advocates for victims have cause for celebration as well: the decision is notable for its reflection of the Court’s growing—albeit incomplete— awareness and understanding of the dynamics of domestic violence and their implications for justice. …


Still "Left In The Dark": The Confrontation Clause And Child Abuse Cases After Davis V. Washington, Anthony J. Franze, Jacob E. Smiles Jan 2006

Still "Left In The Dark": The Confrontation Clause And Child Abuse Cases After Davis V. Washington, Anthony J. Franze, Jacob E. Smiles

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

In his concurring opinion in Crawford v. Washington, Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority for holding that the Confrontation Clause applies to “testimonial” statements but leaving for “another day” any effort to define sufficiently what “testimonial” means. Prosecutors and defendants, he said, “should not be left in the dark in this manner.” Over the next two years, both sides grappled with the meaning of testimonial, each gleaning import from sections of Crawford that seemingly proved their test was the right one. When the Court granted certiorari in Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana (hereinafter Davis), hopes were high that …


Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana: Beating Expectations, Robert P. Mosteller Jan 2006

Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana: Beating Expectations, Robert P. Mosteller

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

I begin with a question of effectiveness: does the new Confrontation Clause doctrine effectively protect defendants with respect to the most im-portant types of problematic out-of-court statements? Although they leave much room for the introduction of hearsay in the immediate aftermath of crime generally, Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana (together hereinafter Davis) are better opinions from that broad perspective than I had feared. The new doctrine now covers and provides substantial procedural protection for a very important class of problematic hearsay—statements made to government agents investigating past crime.


Refining Crawford: The Confrontation Claus After Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana, Andrew C. Fine Jan 2006

Refining Crawford: The Confrontation Claus After Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana, Andrew C. Fine

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Clarification of the Supreme Court’s newly minted interpretation of the Confrontation Clause was desperately needed, and Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana promised to provide it. Two terms earlier, in Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court had worked a revolutionary transformation of Confrontation Clause analysis by overruling Ohio v. Roberts and severing the link between hearsay jurisprudence and the Clause. Crawford was hailed by the criminal defense bar, since it seemed to presage a sharp reduction in the frequency of so-called “victimless” trials by holding that “testimonial” hearsay, no matter how reliable, was constitutionally inadmissible in the absence of …


Proposed Amendments To Fed. R. Crim. P. 26: An Exchange: Remote Testimony - A Prosecutor's Perspective, Lynn Helland Jun 2002

Proposed Amendments To Fed. R. Crim. P. 26: An Exchange: Remote Testimony - A Prosecutor's Perspective, Lynn Helland

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Although the Supreme Court has declined, for now, to endorse the Judicial Conference proposal to add a Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to permit live video testimony under limited circumstances, I agree with Professor Friedman that the matter is far from over. This is both because the potential benefits to be realized from the use of remote video testimony are too large to ignore and because, on closer inspection, any Confrontation Clause concerns that might underlie the Court's hesitation to adopt the proposal are not warranted. My purpose in writing is to summarize some of the …


Reconceiving The Right To Present Witnesses, Richard A. Nagareda Mar 1999

Reconceiving The Right To Present Witnesses, Richard A. Nagareda

Michigan Law Review

Modem American law is, in a sense, a system of compartments. For understandable curricular reasons, legal education sharply distinguishes the law of evidence from both constitutional law and criminal procedure. In fact, the lines of demarcation between these three subjects extend well beyond law school to the organization of the leading treatises and case headnotes to which practicing lawyers routinely refer in their trade. Many of the most interesting questions in the law, however, do not rest squarely within a single compartment; instead, they concern the content and legitimacy of the lines of demarcation themselves. This article explores a significant, …


Police-Obtained Evidence And The Constitution: Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence From Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, Arnold H. Loewy Apr 1989

Police-Obtained Evidence And The Constitution: Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence From Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, Arnold H. Loewy

Michigan Law Review

The article will consider four different types of police-obtained evidence: evidence obtained from an unconstitutional search and seizure, evidence obtained from a Miranda violation, confessions and lineup identifications obtained in violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel, and coerced confessions. My conclusions are that evidence obtained from an unconstitutional search and seizure is excluded because of the police misconduct by which it was obtained. On the other hand, evidence obtained from a Miranda violation is (or ought to be) excluded because use of that evidence compromises the defendant's procedural right not to be compelled to be a witness against …


Confusing The Fifth Amendment With The Sixth: Lower Court Misapplication Of The Innis Definition Of Interrogation, Jonathan L. Marks Apr 1989

Confusing The Fifth Amendment With The Sixth: Lower Court Misapplication Of The Innis Definition Of Interrogation, Jonathan L. Marks

Michigan Law Review

This Note examines how these courts have applied or misapplied Innis, and concludes that, while many of these decisions are consistent with Miranda and Innis, too many others are not. In order to evaluate these cases, it is first necessary to understand the meaning and significance of Innis. Part I thus considers Innis and its background. Part II then examines lower court decisions applying the Innis test, dividing these decisions into six groups based on the most common factual scenarios. Because the cases deal with factually specific police practices, this method constitutes the most useful way to …


Videotaping Children's Testimony: An Empirical View, Paula E. Hill, Samuel M. Hill Feb 1987

Videotaping Children's Testimony: An Empirical View, Paula E. Hill, Samuel M. Hill

Michigan Law Review

Increases in the number of reported incidents of child abuse and sexual molestation have resulted in more and younger children becoming courtroom participants. Some courts refuse to consider the special needs of the child in this adversarial environment. Relying on questionable precedent, these courts hold that the defendant's right to directly confront the child, as well as strict compliance with evidentiary rules, overrides that child's interest in freedom from embarrassment or psychological trauma. This Note focuses on pressures felt by the testifying child and the ways in which these pressures affect her testimony; it then proposes using videotaped testimony as …


Constitutional Constraints On The Admissibility Of Grand Jury Testimony: The Unavailable Witness, Confrontation, And Due Process, Barbara L. Strack Oct 1982

Constitutional Constraints On The Admissibility Of Grand Jury Testimony: The Unavailable Witness, Confrontation, And Due Process, Barbara L. Strack

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Defendants, however, have raised serious constitutional objections to the introduction of grand jury testimony when the witness is unavailable to testify at trial. These claims have focused on the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment and the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Defendants have contended that the introduction of testimony from a grand jury proceeding which cannot be subjected to cross-examination fatally compromises the defendant's right to a fair trial. Lower courts are split over admitting grand jury testimony in these circumstances, and the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the issue. As a result, …


Reflections On Alfred Hill's "Testimonial Privilege And Fair Trial", Peter Westen Apr 1981

Reflections On Alfred Hill's "Testimonial Privilege And Fair Trial", Peter Westen

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

I have learned a great deal from "Testimonial Privilege and Fair Trial"-as I always do from Professor Hill's work. Indeed, he has changed my way of thinking in this area in several important respects. At the same time, I come to rather different conclusions than he regarding each of his three major topics. Part I of this article examines the problem of finding a "remedy" for testimonial privileges that violate a defendant's right to a fair trial. Part II discusses the problem of determining when a defendant is entitled to assert that the "right" has been violated. Finally, Part III …


The Future Of Confrontation, Peter K. Westen May 1979

The Future Of Confrontation, Peter K. Westen

Michigan Law Review

The Supreme Court seems to be setting the stage for a long-awaited examination of the confrontation clause. It has been ten years since the Court endeavored in Dutton v. Evans to reconcile the evidentiary rules of hearsay with the constitutional commands of confrontation. Dutton came at the tail end of a string of confrontation cases that the Court had resolved without apparent difficulty. Not surprisingly, the Court approached Dutton in the evident belief that it could resolve the constitutional problems of hearsay once and for all. Instead, after oral argument in 1969 and a rehearing in 1970, the Court found …


Compulsory Process Ii, Peter Westen Dec 1975

Compulsory Process Ii, Peter Westen

Michigan Law Review

This Article examines the validity of the conventional wisdom. It draws support for its analysis from the constitutional principles of compulsory process, and, in their absence, from related doctrine in the areas of a defendant's right to confront witnesses against him and his right to a fair trial. Part I of the article defines the constitutional standard that governs the simple case of a nonindigent defendant who makes a timely application to produce a witness from within the territory of the jurisdiction. Parts II through IV, in turn, examine that standard in the light of complicating factors such as the …


Constitutional Restraints On The Exclusion Of Evidence In The Defendant's Favor: The Implications Of Davis V. Alaska, Michigan Law Review Aug 1975

Constitutional Restraints On The Exclusion Of Evidence In The Defendant's Favor: The Implications Of Davis V. Alaska, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

This Note, first, examines the Davis methodology for determining whether a foreclosed line of cross-examination warrants protection by the confrontation clause, and suggests a test employable by reviewing courts for making that determination. Then, the Note sketches the contours of the clash, prefigured by Davis, between the right of confrontation and the limitations on cross-examination that result from both the assertion of testimonial privileges and trial court relevance rulings.


The Confrontation Clause And The Scope Of The Unavailability Requirement, Jerry J. Phillips Jan 1973

The Confrontation Clause And The Scope Of The Unavailability Requirement, Jerry J. Phillips

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The confrontation clause is that language of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution which provides, "[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right… to be confronted with the witnesses against him." Despite the seemingly absolute language of the confrontation clause, which would suggest that no hearsay evidence may be admitted against an accused in a criminal proceeding, its guarantee has been subject to exception. For example, when either a witness to an event or his testimony is shown to be unavailable, others will be allowed to testify as to the information which the declarant-witness has related …


Betts V. Brady Twenty Years Later: The Right To Counself And Due Process Values, Yale Kamisar Dec 1962

Betts V. Brady Twenty Years Later: The Right To Counself And Due Process Values, Yale Kamisar

Michigan Law Review

I am quite distressed by talk that the landmark case of Mapp v. Ohio "suggests by analogy" that the Court may now overrule Betts v. Brady. For whether one talks about the fourth or the sixth amendment, there is much to be said for Justice Harlan's dissenting views in Mapp. "[W]hatever configurations ... have been developed in the particularizing federal precedents" should not be "deemed a part of 'ordered liberty,' and as such ... enforceable against the States .... [W]e would not be true to the Fourteenth Amendment were we merely to stretch the general principle [ of …


Constitutional Law - Right To Effective Assistance Of Counsel In Federal Courts And Waiver Thereof, Richard M. Adams S.Ed. Apr 1955

Constitutional Law - Right To Effective Assistance Of Counsel In Federal Courts And Waiver Thereof, Richard M. Adams S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

Indicted for illegal traffic in narcotics, petitioner and his trial counsel allegedly attempted to fabricate an alibi on the false testimony of petitioner's girl friend. The evidence indicated that on several occasions before trial, the girl was invited to the office of petitioner's attorney, given narcotics, and told to memorize certain false testimony to be used in petitioner's defense. Later the girl bad a change of mind and agreed to testify for the government Despite the strenuous objections of defendant's counsel, a description of this alleged fraud on the court was given in the prosecution's opening statement, and the witness …