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Amicus Brief: Kumho Tire V. Carmichael, Neil Vidmar, Richard Lempert, Shari Diamond, Valerie Hans, Stephan Landsman, Robert Maccoun, Joseph Sanders, Harmon Hosch, Saul Kassin, Marc Galanter, Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen Daniels, Edith Greene, Joanne Martin, Steven Penrod, James Richardson, Larry Heuer, Irwin Horowitz

Robert MacCoun

This brief addresses the issue of jury performance and jury responses to expert testimony. It reviews and summaries a substantial body of research evidence about jury behavior that has been produced over the past quarter century. The great weight of that evidence challenges the view that jurors abdicate their responsibilities as fact finders when faced with expert evidence or that they are pro-plaintiff, anti-defendant, and anti-business.

The Petitioners and amici on behalf of petitioners make a number of overlapping, but empirically unsupported, assertions about jury behavior in response to expert testimony, namely that juries are frequently incapable of critically evaluation …

The New Rules For Admissibility Of Expert Testimony: Part Ii, Robert Sanger

Robert M. Sanger

As described in the last Criminal Justice column for the Santa Barbara Lawyer magazine, the California Supreme Court’s opinion in Sargon Enterprises v. University of Southern California, 55 Cal. 4th 747, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 614 (2012) made it clear that California is now, (and perhaps unsuspectingly has been for some time), a Daubert jurisdiction. This requires the trial court be the “gatekeeper” and make a determination as to the admissibility of scientific or expert testimony and to determine the limits of any testimony, if it is introduced. The Court held that there are essentially three criteria: The first criterion …

The New Rules For Admissibility Of Expert Testimony: Part I, Robert Sanger

Robert M. Sanger

In a previous series of articles for this magazine, I took the position that California really was a Daubert jurisdiction in the sense that Kelly and Frye and thenexisting case law required that the court be the “gatekeeper” and make a determination as to: 1) whether a science (or area of expertise) was a science (or area of expertise); 2) whether the witness was a scientist (or expert); 3) whether the data was reliable; and then, and only then, 4) what a true scientist (or expert) could say based on the science and based on the reliable data. In the …