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Full-Text Articles in Law
Should Shareholders Be Rewarded For Loyalty? European Experiments On The Wedge Between Tenured Voting And Takeover Law, Chiara Mosca
Should Shareholders Be Rewarded For Loyalty? European Experiments On The Wedge Between Tenured Voting And Takeover Law, Chiara Mosca
Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review
Corporate law reveals its democratic background when it comes to the general meetings of shareholders, finding, on both sides of the Atlantic, its most tangible expression in the “one share, one vote” principle. While, in the political landscape, the “one person, one vote” standard is absolute dogma and weighting votes according to people’s preferences and interests has never proved feasible, in the corporate scenario the one share, one vote principle is constantly challenged by the incentives of companies and their shareholders to shape corporate rights according to specific needs. In this respect, some legislators (specifically in France and Italy) have …
Balance And Team Production, Kelli A. Alces
Balance And Team Production, Kelli A. Alces
Seattle University Law Review
For decades, those holding the shareholder primacy view that the purpose of a corporation is to earn a profit for its shareholders have been debating with those who believe that corporations exist to serve broader societal interests. Adolph Berle and Merrick Dodd began the conversation over eighty years ago, and it continues today, with voices at various places along a spectrum of possible corporate purposes participating. Unfortunately, over time, the various sides of the debate have begun to talk past each other rather than engage with each other and have lost sight of whatever common ground they may be able …
The Long Road To Reformulating The Understanding Of Directors' Duties: Legalizing Team Production Theory?, Thomas Clarke
The Long Road To Reformulating The Understanding Of Directors' Duties: Legalizing Team Production Theory?, Thomas Clarke
Seattle University Law Review
In this Article, the historical evolution of corporate governance is considered, highlighting the different eras of governance, the dominant theoretical and practical paradigms, and the reformulation of paradigms and counter paradigms. Two alternative and sharply contrasting theorizations, one collective and collaborative (the work of Berle and Means), the other individualistic and contractual (agency theory and shareholder value) are focused upon. The explanatory potential of Blair and Stout’s team production theory is elaborated, along with its conception of the complexity of business enterprise, with a mediating hierarch (the board of directors) securing a balance between the interests of different stakeholders. The …
Towards A European Constitution Of The Firm: Problems And Perspectives, Thomas E. Abeltshauser
Towards A European Constitution Of The Firm: Problems And Perspectives, Thomas E. Abeltshauser
Michigan Journal of International Law
This article will discuss in particular the proposed EEC directive on the harmonization of corporate structures as well as the proposed regulation of the Societas Europea. Initially, these proposals were strongly oriented toward German law. As such, a corporation had to have a managing board as well as a so-called supervisory board and a general meeting of stockholders. Since the EEC Commission published the so-called "Green Paper," which contains a comparative analysis of national legal systems requirements for the structure of corporations and provisions for co-determination rights for employees at the board level, the new proposals concerning the constitution of …
The Supervision Of Corporate Management: A Comparison Of Developments In European Community And United States Law, Alfred F. Conard
The Supervision Of Corporate Management: A Comparison Of Developments In European Community And United States Law, Alfred F. Conard
Michigan Law Review
In 1971, Eric Stein published an account of the remarkable progress of the European Economic Community (EEC) toward a harmonized law of business corporations. The progress was particularly striking from an American viewpoint, because the harmonization was achieved by moving toward the more rigorous of the various national standards, in contrast to the "race of laxity" or "race for the bottom" that has characterized the movement toward uniformity in the corporation laws of U.S. states.
New Ways In Corporate Governance: European Experiments With Labor Representation On Corporate Boards, Klaus J. Hopt
New Ways In Corporate Governance: European Experiments With Labor Representation On Corporate Boards, Klaus J. Hopt
Michigan Law Review
Corporate governance has been discussed in Europe for over 150 years. Indeed, in the 1840's, when the first Corporation Act was enacted in Prussia, three troubling features of the corporate organization form had already been discerned: (I) the vulnerability of small investors who lacked the influence and sophistication to. control the corporation; (2) the risk to creditors and the public created by the limited liability of the corporation, especially when combined with inadequate funds and poorly controlled management; and (3) the power that big corporations could amass economically, by monopolizing markets, and politically, by exerting influence on public opinion and …